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                        ABSTRACT 
 
The legal and regulatory framework of the oil and gas industry and the 
contracting obligations arising thereof have evolved over time in many forms 
across oil producing states. Given the peculiarities of each of these oil producing 
states, the framework is constantly changing. The changing face of politics, 
climate and rapidly developing technology are changing the landscape of the 
industry, demanding a fundamental need for petroleum resource-endowed states 
to take a strategic view and choose what legal framework and contracting 
approaches are likely to deliver their ultimate objective: optimum production 
with topmost financial gains. The idea behind the exploration and exploitation 
of natural resources is to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing 
states with the anticipation that such investment will put them on the centre 
stage of global economics and lead to an improvement in research and 
technology transfer that would sustain economic growth and development. 
However, the objective of transnational corporations is to maximise their 
profits. Ultimately, it is the exploration licensing contracts that states use to 
implement oil exploration and exploitation policies. The present research 
therefore seeks to look at the dynamics of the legal and regulatory framework 
of the oil and gas industry focussing on its everchanging contract types and 
nature. 
The research attempts to look at the causes of the imbalance in international oil 
and gas contracts with an eye on the observation that one of the causes of the 
imbalance are the investment treaties because they focus on a state’s obligations 
with little or no focus on obligations from transnational corporations towards 
the states. Some critical clauses that need to be taken into account by parties to 
the contract are also explored because it is argued that contractual clauses are 
also among the causes of imbalance in international oil and gas contracts. This 
research therefore addresses the causes of imbalance by looking at the problems 
associated with investment treaties and the long-term contractual relationship 
between the host states and the transnational corporations, particularly the 
associated risks with oil and gas contracts such as; political, economic, natural 
and technical risks. Essentially, the study will narrow down on the processes, 
technicalities, case studies and   the features of four main types of oil and gas 
contracts namely, Production Sharing Agreement, Joint Ventures, Service 
Contracts and the two Concessions, (Old and New). The research also attempted 
to answer the following questions: what is the current structure of oil contracts 
and to what extent can parties’ commitments be altered to ensure the sustenance 
of economic stability?  Which type of contract is the best for development and 
financial purposes? What are the causes of imbalance in the oil contract and to 
what extent have the principles of international environmental law been utilised 
at a state level and whether developing countries have been able to overcome 
the pressures from transnational corporations on the issue of environmental 
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It is established that a failure to adopt the right type of petroleum contract by the host states 
may cause serious challenges and exploitation. In seeking to provide a guide therefore, this 
research examines and analyses types of petroleum contracts with a focus on the main elements 
and the way they are drafted and interpreted in different jurisdictions.  
The academic researchers have concluded that there are four main types of exploration and 
exploitation contracts namely and in summary, old and modern concession, joint ventures, 
service contract and production sharing agreement (PSA).1 Therefore, it is pertinent to look at 
their definitions as given in literature. Spalding and King define petroleum contracts as a 
system by which the host state grants the petroleum company the exclusive rights to explore 
and produce hydrocarbons in an allocated areas of land for a certain time, in an exchange for 
payment of taxes and royalty.2 As mentioned earlier that there are two types of oil and gas 
concession agreements, the traditional concession agreement and modern concession 
agreement. The traditional concession grants transnational corporations exclusive license to 
explore and export oil for a long period.3 These aspects of the agreements were regarded as 
                                                          
1 Hossain K. Law and policy in Petroleum Development: Changing Relations Between Transnational and 
Government. New York & London: Nichols Publishing Company (1979), Waelde T. W. &Beredjick, N, 
Petroleum Investment policies In Development Countries. London, United Kingdom (1988) Johnston, D. 
International Petroleum Fiscal System and Production Sharing Contracts, (1994) Taverne, B. G. Petroleum 
Industry Governments: A Global Study of the Involvement of Industry and Government in the Production and 
Use of Petroleum, Kluwer Law International, (2008), Machmud, T. N. The Indonesian Production Sharing 
Contract: An investor’s perspective, Kluwer Law International (2000). 
2 King & Spalding LLP; ‘An Introduction to Upstream Government Petroleum Contracts: Their Evolution and 
Current Use’ (2005) 1 OGEL. Available at <https://www.ogel.org/article.asp?key=1730> accessed 5 August 
2015.  
3 Various contracts were concluded under the old concession and transnational corporations were given 75 years 
or more to explore and exploit mineral resources. Some were granted exclusive rights to explore the entire country 
in exchange for royalty payments which were considered little by comparison with the oil companies’ benefits 





unbalanced owing to their lengthy duration and the large areas in which the agreements 
covered. However, the new concession emerged when it became apparent that the old 
concession was unfavourable to the interests of the host state. The modern concession 
agreement grants exclusive rights to the transnational corporations to explore, extract, produce 
and market the natural resources in a specified area for a fixed period. The identified problems 
with old concessions have been rectified in the new concessions. The transnational corporations 
cannot expect to be granted an exclusive licence to explore over an entire country and they are 
no longer permitted to cover large geographical location during exploration activities. Above 
all, the long period that was previously allowed is reduced to reasonable period.4A joint venture 
is another type of petroleum agreement. Under the joint ventures, the national oil company 
partners with transnational corporations to explore, extract, produce and market natural 
resources through a joint operating agreement (JOA). In Nigeria, the joint ventures 
arrangement means joint ownership of license, joint funding obligations, shared capital and 
reward but risk and liability are split including tax liabilities.5 In addition, service contract is 
also a petroleum contract which Denis defines as a contract by which a contractor international 
oil company (IOC) undertakes to explore for hydrocarbons at his own risk and expense on 
behalf of a national oil company (NOC), and by which he is reimbursed and remunerated in 
cash depending on the success of the exploration.6 Therefore, a service contract is a type of 
petroleum agreement whereby transnational corporations are required to explore oil and gas 
                                                          
4 Article 4 (a) of Petroleum Working Contract Between Indonesia and P.T. Stanvac Indonesia, 1964 is examined 
contact is examined in Chapter 3 and it reveals that oil company was given 6 months to start exploration activities 
and maximum of 8 years to conclude other related exploration matters. Similarly, the transnational corporations 
were given 12 years in total for exploration activities.  
5 Chapter 3 examines Nigerian’s joint ventures in depth and highlights the disadvantages of this type of contract 
for developing country. The chapter further points out why Nigeria has decided to switch from joint ventures to 
production sharing agreement.    
6 Guirauden Denis, Legal, Fiscal and contractual frame work, oil and gas exploration and production; reserves, 





fields on behalf of host state in return for prearranged payment with no control over the 
produced oil and with no profit sharing option. Consequently, production sharing agreements 
(PSA) were defined in Brazilian’s Bill of Law as a “regime of exploration and production of 
oil, natural gas and other fluid hydrocarbons whereby oil companies will be granted rights to 
explore for develop and produce petroleum reserves, at their cost. In the event of a commercial 
discovery, costs incurred will be reimbursed to oil companies through an entitlement to 
production referred to as “cost oil”. The remaining petroleum, after deduction of cost oil, is 
considered “profit oil”.7 It is observed from the PSA’s definition that it grants transnational 
corporations the exclusive rights to explore and produce oil with a unique significant distinction 
among other types of petroleum contracts mentioned so far. It is based on a sharing formula 
where the profit of oil and gas will be shared according to the agreed proportion between the 
host state and the transnational corporations. In view of the various contract types and their 
definitions, this research acknowledges that the host states need to take a strategic view and 
choose the best out of the four highlighted, the contract type which is likely to deliver the 
country’s ultimate objective, optimum production with topmost financial gains and Nigeria 
will be used as a case study for the research. 
The challenges facing the industry are quite enormous particularly those arising from the nature 
and obligations of the types of petroleum contracts outlined above and the varied perceptions 
by stakeholders. In Nigeria for example, the government was severely criticised over a 
Production Sharing Agreement it signed with Ashland Oil and the furore it generated led to a 
public inquiry because it was argued that the contract failed to maximise returns for Nigeria 
and was therefore susceptible to exploitation against the interest of Nigeria. The investment in 
the oil industry has over the years been regarded as a source of economic development, 
                                                          





particularly in Africa where it has been the key element of globalisation and a source of 
employment, technological progress, productivity improvements and importantly economic 
growth.8 
Exploration licensing contracts are what states use to implement oil and gas exploration 
policies and some of the producing states that depend heavily on oil revenue are likely to face 
exploitation from transnational corporations if they fail to adopt the right type of petroleum 
contracts. In addition, most of the notable challenges facing the oil producing states, including 
Nigeria are caused by the nature and obligations of petroleum contracts. It is not disputed that 
states owned the hydrocarbon resources and they delegate the task of exploration and 
exploitation to transnational corporations that have the financial resources and expertise to 
embark on the exploration project. However, the exploration project will be governed by 
certain types of contracts and efforts to justify the best types of oil contracts have led to 
controversial debates and generated various inputs from academic writers. Accordingly, some 
of the features of petroleum agreements will be thoroughly examined by this research. It is 
important to point out that there is no material on gas therefore this research is solely based on 
oil contracts. Additionally, new types of energy became popular after commencement of this 
research and they are not considered. 
The issues of granting exploration licence to transnational corporations to explore oil for a long 
period is regarded as a key problem under the Old Concession and was eventually changed 
under the New Concession which resolved the concerns of large geographical location 
associated with the Old Concession.  
                                                          
8Chisa Onyejekwe, ‘Legal uncertainties and foreign direct investment: a case study of Nigeria’ (2018) 





The Joint Venture is another type of oil contract and was initially regarded as the best option 
owing to the greater advantages it accorded the host state to control oil exploration activities. 
Evidence from the cases analysed in this research have suggested that the lack of funding by 
the host states due to imbalance in financial capacity among partners is seen as a major 
challenge which has prompted the host states, particularly from developing countries to explore 
other options such as Service Contracts and Production Sharing Agreements. However, the 
Service Contract was labelled as economically inefficient and prone to potential loss.9  On the 
other hand, the lack of financial burden for the host states before, during and after exploration 
and exploitation activities have been regarded as one of the advantages under the Production 
Sharing Agreement. Besides, Michael added that Production Sharing Agreement emerged from 
the adoption of the UN Resolution 1803 and 3281 and paved the way for oil producing states 
and their national oil companies to participate in exploration and exploitation activities.10 This 
can be justified because the UN Resolutions (1962) provided for the sovereign rights over 
natural resources and for the resources to be effectively used for the development of their 
countries.11 Nevertheless, findings from the Production Sharing Agreement revealed that the 
oil contract comes with certain risks and are only suitable for transnational corporations that 
are willing to take risks associated with exploration and exploitation activities under this type 
of contract. The experience in Brazil is a graphic illustration of how the adoption of certain 
types of petroleum contract can pose a serious challenge particularly from stakeholders. The 
                                                          
9 Smith E.E. and others, International Petroleum Transactions, (2nd edn 2000) 512. 
10 Miceal Likosky, Contracting and regulatory issues in the oil and gas and metallic minerals industries, 
Transnational Corporations, VOL. 18 No. 1 (April 2009) 12. 





Brazilian government signed Production Sharing Agreements in November 201312 with the 
hope of meeting the nation’s ambitious development strategy, including boosting its ship-
building and other energy related sectors. However, the contract has drawn protests from the 
nation’s oil workers whose union has long been opposed to any foreign involvement in Brazil. 
They argue that it will slow down investments and have negative effects on the development 
of the oil sector. But supporters of the deal say the contract is necessary to attract necessary 
capital and technical expertise required to tap into the challenging deep water-field. They 
opposed the old concession under which, they argued, international oil companies-controlled 
government revenue by regulating production, which placed severe constraints on national 
sovereignty and its control over state resources and wealth.13 
Despite the above, there is a dearth of research work and literature focusing specifically on oil 
and gas contracts. Accordingly, this research aims to narrow this gap by looking at the 
dynamics of the legal and regulatory framework of the oil and gas industry and the ever 
changing contract types and nature, especially in developing countries.  Thus, this research 
explores all the four types14 of oil and gas contracts and the elements of these contracts with 
the way they are drafted and interpreted in different jurisdictions while focusing on the 
Nigerian context to analyse the features, advantages and disadvantages of each type of contract. 
The study further examines the critical clauses that need to be taken into account by parties to 
the contract with a view to providing answers to some of the fundamental questions imperative 
to improving revenue generation to oil producing countries. This study also exposes many of 
                                                          
12Brazil’s Libra PSA- First anniversary, ‘Special Report: Energy & Natural Recourses Sector’ (Financial World 
Magazine, November 2014)  <https://www.financialworldwide.com/brazils-libra-psa-first-
annivasary#.XBUFzxLGUK>  accessed on 18 January 2018.   
13 Brazil’s Libra PSA- First anniversary (n 12). 





the complexities and issues that States struggle with in formulating contracting policies. 
Essentially, a petroleum contract is simply one part of the overall petroleum regime that 
governs petroleum resources. Others are; Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), the 
Constitution, Regulation and Petroleum Laws. Petroleum contracts are structured to 
contemplate the entire life span of a project; its beginning, middle and end. 
Hypotheses 
The current research is titled, ‘OIL AND GAS CONTRACTS: A LAW IN CONTEXT 
ANALYSIS USING NIGERIA AS A CASE STUDY’. This research intends to provide 
answers to the following research questions: 
1. What is the current structure of oil contracts and to what extent can parties’ commitment 
be altered to ensure the sustenance of economic stability?   
2. Which contract type is the best for development and financial purposes? 
3. What are the causes of imbalance in the oil contract and to what extent have the 
principles of international environmental law been utilised at a state level and whether 
developing countries have been able to overcome the pressures from transnational 
corporations on the issue of environmental law?  
Providing answers to the questions above will in turn, lead to a number of other issues which 
will be dealt with by each chapter of the research as outlined below: 
Chapter 1: The Current Structure of International Oil Contracts 
Chapter 2: Duties of Transnational Corporations and How a Balance May Be Struck 
Chapter 3: Some Certain Features of Oil Contracts 
Chapter 4: The Causes of Imbalance in International Oil Contracts 






Chapter 1 examines various bilateral treaties involving the transnational corporations and the 
host states towards understanding the operating mechanisms and current structure of 
international oil and gas contracts. It examines critically both sides of the arguments for and 
against the current form and structure of BITs. It is observed that treaties have been mostly in 
favour of the transnational corporations and evidence established that BITs are primarily to 
protect foreign investors and their investments by addressing obligations of a state towards 
transnational corporations, but none or very few obligations of the transnational corporations 
towards the states; and this unbalanced relationship is perceived as a deficiency of the 
investment regime.15 Investment treaties are recognised around the world as mechanisms to 
increase investments and prosperity in host states and to promote economic relations. However, 
this chapter argues that one of the treaties’ features makes it impossible for the host state to 
hear domestic claims arising from exploration activities because it allows the transnational 
corporations to bring claims before international tribunals owing to the dispute resolution 
mechanisms in the treaties.  The review of the literature in this area has revealed that “the 
central aim of BITs is to protect foreign investors and their investment.”16 Many States have 
shown their dissatisfaction over the fact that submission of disputes to investment arbitration 
curtails their sovereignty and it could not be concluded that the sovereign choice of the state 
when signing investment treaty to gain the rights of business has priority over a subsequent 
choice of the state to secure the right of people. On this point, Valentina added that “it seems 
that the regime established according to investment treaties does not strike the right balance 
                                                          
15 Xemena Herrera-Bernal, ‘Arbitral Jurisprudence; the arbitrator’s concerns about treating the parties equally 
and taking into account the needs of the state/or concession authority’ (2013) International Business Law 
Journal 1. 
16 Bernhard Maier, ‘How has international law dealt with the tension between sovereignty over natural resources 





between the parties concerned.”17 The chapter aims at providing a review of a number of oil 
related arbitral cases in which the question of expropriation was raised because some investors 
argued that the host state law constituted a vehicle to expel them from the host country as 
analysed in  Occidental v Ecuador18  where the tribunal found that Ecuador’s measures were 
‘tantamount to expropriation.’ 19 In addition, Chapter 1 seeks to draw out a balanced assessment 
on BITs from works of research that have examined some notable matters relating to 
investment treaties and identified the lack of treaty provisions that can ensure a symmetric 
investment protection. Going further, it discusses how developing countries are facing 
difficulties in amending and renegotiating bilateral investment treaties. The chapter shows that 
developed countries have enhanced documented transparency in investment treaties in order to 
safeguard their regulatory powers and points out that most of the treaties signed by countries 
such as the US, Canada, and Australia contain general exception clauses which allowed reasons 
for justifying regulatory measures.20 The chapter later explained how a balance may be struck 
through the harmonisation of contending interests between host states and transnational 
corporations.  
Chapter 2 of the research covers salient matters arising from the focal points raised in chapter 
1. It focuses on how the right balance may be struck by examining the international mechanisms 
regulating the activities and conducts of transnational corporations. The host states and the 
transnational corporations have different objectives according to Mato.21The host states in one 
                                                          
17 Valentina Sara Vadi, ‘Cultural Heritage and international investment law: a stormy relationship’ (2008) 
International Journal of Cultural Property 1. 
18 ICISD Case No. ARB/06/11, Award October 5 2012. 
19 Occidental (n 18). 
20 US 2004 Model BIT, Canada 2004 Model BIT and Australia- Singapore Free Trade Agreement. 





hand aspire to promote their economic growth while the transnational corporations on the other 
hand want to maximise their profits 22 In order to evaluate these postulations, Chapter 2 
examines the UN Resolution (1962) which provides the rights of all states to freely dispose of 
their natural resources and wealth in accordance with national interest.  The chapter highlights 
the importance of UN Resolution (1962) because the special features of oil and gas contracts 
are found under its provisions which have enabled developing countries to rise up to the 
challenges of transnational corporations. Its provisions have challenged international economic 
law and the unbalanced relationship between the developed and developing countries. In 
addition, an in-depth examination of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of State 1974 
(CERDS) in this chapter is intended to identify how the host states could regulate foreign 
investments in accordance with its local law and national priorities. CERDS addressed the 
needs and aspirations of developing states by allowing them to create laws that will ensure 
transnational corporations operate under the local law. However, some of the CERDS 
provisions were considered by developed states as one-sided, particularly the provision which 
stipulates that every state has the right to expropriate foreign investment.23 Amongst others, 
the chapter further examines UNCLOS III (1982) which defines the rights and obligations of 
member states with regards to the Oceans. It provides for business activities and sets out 
guidelines for transnational corporations. It also stipulates direct and specific obligations for 
transnational corporations. The chapter discusses all of these including international 
mechanisms which regulate the activities of transnational corporations as well as international 
legal personality of transnational corporations which has raised a longstanding and complex 
debate. 
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Chapter 3 of this research is intended to analyse the features of oil and gas contracts as the 
general theme of the research in order to find out which contract type is the best for 
development and financial purposes. The chapter examines the four types of oil contracts, their 
features, advantages, disadvantages and several factors to be considered by the host states 
before adopting these exploration agreements. The findings from this chapter is also expected 
to shed some lights on the underlying problems of each contract types that have prompted the 
host states to shift from one contract type to the other. For example, the PSA was first used in 
Indonesia in 1966 when the classic concession was less favourable and was replaced to enable 
the government exercise control over its oil. Similarly, Nigeria concluded PSA 1973 while the 
government established the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in 1977 and 
signed NNPC/Shell 1 joint venture 1984, shifted to Production Sharing Contracts in 1993, 
opted for Service Contract in 2000 and concluded new PSCs in the downstream oil sector in 
2002.24  In the same vein, Brazil has adopted three contracts model over the years. The Service 
Contract was adopted by Brazil in 1975 and later changed into the concession regime in 1979, 
the country is currently utilising the PSA. The chapter investigates the rationale behind the 
shifting as Bindermann posits that the main reason for host state adopting a PSA was premised 
on nationalism and government ownership of the host state’s natural resources25 and Al-Attar 
and Almoair claimed that a PSA is the right option for host states, particularly, where reserves 
were large with medium exploration costs.26 In addition, the method of granting exploration 
licence has changed since the Old Concession era with the Middle East mainly associated with 
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concession types. Justification for the shifting from old concession to the new one has been 
classed into four categories. Firstly, the exclusive rights granted to the transnational 
corporations to explore and exploit the oil covered wide geographical areas and sometimes the 
whole country. Secondly, the concessions were signed for long duration. Thirdly, the 
transnational corporations were in the control of exploration and exploitation activities and 
lastly, there was no requirement within the old concession to produce oil, the transnational 
corporations decide in accordance with the oil market price. Thus, the new concessions were 
adopted to change some of the less favourable terms within the old concessions. Under the 
modern concessions, the host state can get better value for its exploration projects. This chapter 
explores all of these in order to address important issues surrounding the oil contracts and to 
illustrate how they have developed. Consequently, the findings from this chapter will suggest 
which oil contract is more favourable for development and financial purposes. 
The petroleum contracts’ concept was developed in international investment law to protect the 
interest of host states and transnational corporations and on this point chapter 4 will address 
the causes of imbalance in oil contracts by examining the long-term contractual relationship, 
and the associated risks including political, economic, natural and technical risks. The chapter 
will analyse these risks which could not be practically avoided but can be transferred or be 
spread through risk management methods.  In order to evaluate these hypotheses, the chapter 
analyses some of the important clauses in petroleum contracts together with the risks inherent 
in exploration projects. This chapter answers one of the research questions: What are the causes 
of imbalance in the oil and gas contract and what terms and conditions are usually incorporated 
into petroleum contracts with a view to preventing or minimising the pollution level in a 
country by transnational corporations? 
This chapter argues that the clauses in oil and gas contracts can put the host state in a situation 





findings from this chapter will show that the host states among developing countries are 
unilaterally taking measures which affect the rights of transnational corporations and thereby 
reducing the value of their investment and therefore a right balance needs to be struck.  
Exploration agreements are anticipated to last long which makes it important that such 
contracts are stable, predictable and profitable. Additionally, the host states and the 
transnational corporations are aware of the nature of likely risks and it may be possible to 
foresee the likely events which may make performance impossible. The parties can manage 
inherent risks in exploration projects through the clauses of their contracts by inclusion of 
standard clauses for example, stabilisation, renegotiation, force majeure, arbitration and 
governing law clauses. This chapter will provide a detailed review of these clauses. 
Arbitration clauses will be addressed in detail, inter alia, with the development of the Nigerian 
courts’ principles in this area. Nigeria is among the contracting members around the world that 
have favoured arbitration to settle investment disputes and enacted many laws to promote 
arbitration, particularly for the settlement of disputes in the oil industry. The binding effect of 
arbitration clauses are carefully considered with information that highlights certain disputes 
that are excluded from arbitration in Nigeria. A critical analysis of these clauses is intended to 
identify how the parties to petroleum agreements could avoid imbalance in their respective 
agreements and how they could come up with effective clauses that will ensure the rights and 
obligations of the parties are fulfilled. The findings from this chapter can also be used as a 
primary reference for understanding the causes of imbalance in petroleum agreements. 
Chapter 5 seeks to discover international environmental laws which have been developed to 
safeguard the environment in relation to oil exploration activities and their application by the 
host states. The numbers of incidents on environmental issues as a result of oil exploration and 
production activities have established that transnational corporations are responsible for some 





Exxon Valdez off the Alaskan Coast, where crude oil contaminated around 1,300 miles of 
coastline and affected marine life, local people and fishing activities.27 There is also the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster, a major historical mark in the Gulf of Mexico. The incident which 
resulted in a massive oil leak after the explosion of oil rig led to sever contamination and had 
adverse effect on local communities and fishing activities. 28 Similarly, in Nigeria, there was 
also an oil spill incident in Akwa Ibom State in which ExxonMobil’s pipeline was reportedly 
ruptured and spilled about a million gallons of crude oil. However, environmental problems 
are not limited to oil spillage. It includes air pollution, chemical accidents and hazardous 
materials, gas flaring, global warming and acid rain, just to name a few. Some of these 
identified incidents occurred as a direct result of human activities and can be managed if not 
completely eradicated. Chapter 5 therefore investigates the major principles of international 
environmental laws and the way they are applied at a national level to ultimately protect the 
environment. Part of the chapter examines the relevant paragraph of UNCLOS III (1982), 
which takes care of exploration and the host state responsibilities. The chapter further discusses 
internal and external challenges faced by the host states, particularly, the implementation of 
principles of international environmental law.  It is maintained that the host state’s involvement 
in certain types of oil contracts specifically, joint ventures, has hindered the implementation of 
local law on environmental issues. Thus, the chapter seeks to identify why the victims of oil 
pollution are, in some cases left without any remedy despite the emergence of environmental 
liability legislation. The grievances of innocent victims of oil sabotage which resulted in oil-
spillage and pollution in Delta region of Nigeria are not being carefully considered. It, 
therefore, starts with a case by case examination of related Nigerian environmental laws to 
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discover the legal basis upon which transnational corporations could not be held liable for 
environmental pollutions. To reach its goals, the chapter analyses the following environmental 
legislation; the Associated Gas Re-injection Act and Regulations 1979, the Associated Gas Re-
injection Act 2004, Management Act on Environmental Draft 2000, the Oil Pipeline Act 1956, 
Petroleum and Distribution (Anti Sabotage) Act 1975, Petroleum Drilling and Production 
Regulation 1969, the Oil Navigable Waters Act 1968, and the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 
1971.  The academic writers’ views on this issue are also critically analysed to highlight the 
assertion that the primary motive behind some of the aforementioned laws was the protection 
of transnational corporations’ interest and that the interests of innocent victims of oil pollution 
were a secondary objective. The chapter further sheds some lights on enforcement rights for 
the local people and consider whether the victims of the Delta region could have obtained a 
fair judgement they deserved if liability for pollution is regulated by a global treaty. The chapter 
also analyses the likely impact of public awareness on environmental laws and policies because 
a lack of public awareness and lack of governmental initiative are regarded as the key factors 
which made environmental laws ineffective. The chapter thereafter offered suggestions for 
better access to environmental information. 
Methodology 
In relation to the importance of research methodologies, Morris and Murphy posit that “there 
is no one right methodology or perfect methodology and you may find that your work 
incorporates one or more methodologies depending on the nature and needs of your research.”29 
Chatterjee’s view on research design cannot be overlooked. He posits that ‘Research design is 
concerned with the structure, plan and method(s) of investigation with a view to reaching 
                                                          





acceptable answers to research questions’,30 and he explains further that one of the most 
important objectives of a research is to ‘collect information with a view to solving problems’.31 
The theme of this research indicates that it is essentially a legal research in nature. It should 
therefore be dealt with through an appropriate approach based on comparison and analysis of 
existing oil agreements, contractual literatures including regulations, laws and decision of 
court. 
This research utilised a mixed method of Black Letter Law, Comparative Legal Analysis and 
the Socio-Legal (law in context) approaches in responding to the research questions in this 
thesis. Black letter law methodology is applied in the present research as an analysis of a 
number of technical legal provisions that are found in primary sources; the Nigerian 
Constitution and in particular, Nigerian Company Act 1968,Companies and Allied Matters Act, 
1990 (CAMA), Nigerian Associated Gas Re-Injection Act (Continued Flaring of Gas 
Regulations) , 1984, Oil and Pipelines Act, 1956, Petroleum and Distribution ( Anti- Sabotage 
Act, 1975, Petroleum Drilling and Production Regulation 1969, Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 
1968 and the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 2004 just to mention a few. The aim of this 
approach is to effectively organise and describe the legal rules as authoritative legal sources in 
order to provide an account of their importance in the case law analysis as well as to pinpoint 
the underlying issues in the Nigerian legal system that affect the rights of its citizens as 
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discussed in chapter 2,32 chapter 4, 33and chapter 534 of the thesis. In addition, Morris and 
Murphy observed that the Black Letter or Doctrinal Analysis ‘focuses almost entirely on law’s 
own language of statutes and case law to make sense of the legal world’.35Aynalem and Vibhute 
added that black letter methodology requires the researcher to focus mainly on the law itself 
rather than its application.36 Therefore, this research is primarily based on primary resources 
of information and the secondary resources of information such as books and published articles 
have been referred to where necessary.  Chapter 1 and 2 utilise the primary sources such as 
bilateral investment treaties involving transnational corporations with analytical investigation 
to help better understand the operating mechanisms and structure of oil and gas contracts. In 
addition, the research examines various resolutions of the UN such as United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 1962, which brought about Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources including special features of oil and gas contracts. It is worth noting that the current 
research utilises regulations, statutes, government policy documents and relevant case laws to 
examine the investment treaties. This is to draw out a balanced assessment on BITs from 
previous works of research that have examined some notable issues relating to investment 
treaties and identify the lack of treaty provisions that can ensure a symmetric investment 
protection. 
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The technique of comparison and analysis is adopted in chapter 3 to deal with a comparison 
between a production sharing agreement and other types of petroleum contracts such as 
traditional concession and modern concession, joint ventures and service contract. This is to 
help ascertain whether there are differences and similarities between the PSA and other types 
of petroleum contracts. It therefore started with a careful examination of each types of contract 
in a comparative approach. The comparative technique will focus on the differences between 
the selected petroleum contracts; highlight the differences and what each system can learn from 
the others. In so doing, it will suggest the best contract type for development and financial 
purposes.  
With regards to the difference between Black letter law and the Socio-legal or law in context 
approach, Morris and Murphy maintained that the socio-legal (law in context) method looks 
beyond legal doctrine to understand law as a social phenomenon. In view of this, most legal 
researchers have considered the socio-legal approach as ‘law in action’ rather than ‘law in 
books’.37 Conversely, Hutter had observed that the latter position is not to conclude that socio-
legal studies ignore the law in books.38 It should be made clear that socio-legal studies tend to 
express the practical application of the law in relation to prevailing social needs rather than the 
ordinary wordings of law or books. In relation to the current research, the Nigerian domestic 
law is critically analysed with the aim of gaining insight into the ideology of the judiciary and 
its application of law. This analysis highlights various issues in relation to arbitration in the 
petroleum industry in Nigeria. The research has shown the significance of the court decision in 
tax related arbitration matters. It showed how judges are deviating from their primary function, 
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which is to apply and interpret the law.39 The analysis further identifies a number of issues as 
impediment to effective implementation of environmental law in Nigeria.40 The law was 
criticised owing to an imbalance between environmental and economic considerations. It is 
shown in the course of the research that the law offered maximum protection for the 
transnational corporations and their business interests. 
The current research is also socio-legal (law in context) in nature because of its objective to 
enforce social regulation within the ambit of environmental pollution. It directs attention to the 
intervention of the state through law41 and specifically focuses on the need for the government, 
transnational corporations (TNCs) and the judiciary to protect the environment through oil and 
gas contracts, BITs and judicial interpretation. This is clearly shown in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
Hutter observed that socio-legal (law in context) scholars are particularly concerned with 
comprehending the social, political and economic processes that bring law about and shape its 
form and content as regards enforcement and its daily impact.42 This latter feature of the socio-
legal study is clearly reflected and deployed in chapter 5 of the research which focuses on the 
host state’s involvement in certain types of oil contracts specifically, joint ventures, and how 
such contracts have hindered the implementation of local law on environmental issues. 
Selznick reasoned that in law-and-society theory, the phrase ‘law in context’ points to the many 
ways in which legal rules and concepts such as contracts and conceptions of justice are 
animated and transformed by intellectual history; how much legal institutions depend on 
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underlying realities of class and power.43 In this vein, it is shown how activities of transnational 
corporations have affected the growth and application of the law in Nigeria. 
 With regards to the link between the socio-legal studies and law in context, Qureshi noted that 
the socio-legal approach studies ‘law in context’, rather than merely in books, and that the law 
in context approach stimulates awareness of the social aspects of the law and provides a unique 
understanding of the way law develops and works in different societies.44 In this vein, it is 
stated that a succession of academic writers’ are of the view that the primary motive behind 
some of the extant laws in the oil and gas sector mentioned in chapter 5 were enacted for the 
protection of transnational corporations’ interest and that the interests of innocent victims of 
oil pollution were a secondary objective. This could be seen as law in context. 
.
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                                       CHAPTER 1 
THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL OIL CONTRACTS 
1.1   Introduction 
This chapter examines Bilateral Treaties and Energy Charters with an analysis of the degree of 
fairness or otherwise towards host states. It looks into various treaties involving International 
Oil Companies (‘IOC’) with analytical investigation to help better understand the operating 
mechanisms and current structure of international oil and gas contracts. The UN 1962 
Resolution cannot be overemphasised. It is argued that special features of oil and gas 
agreements are found in the UN Resolution 1803. The Resolution brought about Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR), it emphasised the importance of economic 
development of the host states, particularly, the developing countries and their economic 
independence. However, the 1962 Resolution is critically evaluated in Chapter 2 of this 
research. This chapter focuses on situations where treaties have been mostly in favour of 
transnational corporations to demonstrate the lop-sidedness of these agreements against host 
nations and how a right balance may be struck. Findings from this chapter have shown that 
some of treaties prevent a host state from hearing domestic claims arising from exploration 
activities in the local court. This was regarded as a mechanism that weakens the sovereignty of 
the member states concerned. Evidence is shown within the chapter that submission of disputes 
to investment arbitration curtails state sovereignty and does not guarantee representation of the 
local state whose law has been contended.1 In addition, it is alleged that treaties give 
transnational corporations a right to bring claims before international arbitral tribunals in 
accordance with the dispute resolution provisions within the treaties, and this measure may 
enable the transnational corporations to challenge local laws that are likely to engage their 
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rights. However, the investors have argued that domestic law constitutes a mechanism to expel 
them from the host state country. The chapter, therefore, examines investor-state cases to 
establish that the motive behind the treaties is to promote economic relations between the 
parties and to bring development to the host states and to protect the business interest of 
transnational corporations. Thus, the cases of AES Summit v Hungary,2CMS v Argentina,3 
Fraport v Phillines,4Genin v Estonia,5Inceysa v EL Salvador,6Maffezini v Spain,7 
Muhammed Ammar Al Bahloul v Tajikistan,8 Occidental v Ecuador,9Plama v 
Bulgaria,10Saluka v Czech Republic,11 Thunderbird v Mexico,12 and WDF v Kenya13are 
critically discussed.  
This chapter also contained highlights of major challenges linked with investment treaties and 
it is established that the weak bargain power of developing countries and lack of authority 
required to demand change in the current treaty regime are not the only problems but also 
include a lack of provision within the treaties to regulate and control investor’s conducts. It is 
established that there is no effective domestic law and legal institution to regulate the activities 
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of transnational corporations operating within the host states’ borders. It has been suggested 
that regulating investor’s activities should be a primary duty of the host states. They should be 
able to address the problems relating to foreign investors’ activities themselves.14 The chapter 
looks at various ways that a right balance may be struck between the host state and transnational 
corporations. It is argued that there is a need for all actors in the oil and gas sector to work 
collaboratively to ascertain the investments and goals of the transnational corporations and 
what benefit the exploration projects can bring to the host states and their citizens. The chapter, 
therefore, analyses the general aspiration of the transnational corporations and at the same time 
addresses the usual aspirations of a host state from exploration of natural resources and the 
findings would enable the parties to balance the conflicts of interest and ensure that they benefit 
from exploration projects. 
In providing a background to the above, the historical evolution and origin of bilateral treaties 
is also explored to explain and highlight the persistent divide between developing and 
developed world while analysing the rights and protection given to foreign investors in the 
customary Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 
Before the creation of the numerous Bilateral Treaties, the FDI regime which is governed by 
customary international law was in place. The FDI regime however proved ineffective because 
of its failure to provide the type of standard protection and rules wanted by foreign 
investors.15The investors believed that states have a customary right to expropriate, a situation 
described by Brownlie as the confiscation of investors’ assets deliberately without 
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justification.16 Other commentators argued that states were depriving the investors their 
entitlements with a nominal or no compensation.17 In such circumstances, the customary law 
provided for potentially hostile exhaustion of local remedies which may eventually enable 
investors to call for help from their home states to use diplomatic means to pursue the 
case.18Meanwhile, the priority for developed countries is to maximise protection for their 
investors that was not available in customary norms. In addition, developed countries also 
lobbied for the prohibition of expropriation and compensation that is prompt, satisfactory and 
effective.19They were able to use diplomatic protection under customary international law to 
protect foreign investors by espousing the claim of their nationals against another state.20  
Various types of protective actions are available to an investor’s home state including consular 
action, judicial and arbitral proceedings, negotiations mediation, restorations, reprisals, 
severance of diplomatic relations, economic pressure, and as a final resort the use of force.21 
Article 1 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic protection gives a broad definition of the 
Diplomatic Protection as consisting of the invocation by a State, through diplomatic action or 
other means of peaceful settlement, of the responsibility of another State for an injury caused 
by a wrongful act of that State to a natural or legal person that is a national of the former State 
                                                          
16 I Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th edn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.509.  
17 Campbell MeLachlan, Laurance Shore & Mathew Weiniger, International Investment Arbitration-substantive 
Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 509. 
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with a view to the implementation of such responsibility.22 Meanwhile, the Permanent Court 
of International Justice (PCIJ) recognises investors’ actions through diplomacy. No wonder, 
PCIJ declared that espousal by the State is an elementary principle of international law.23  
Though it is optional, the rules relating to nationality of claims, exhaustion of local remedies, 
and the discretionary character of the diplomatic protection (that whether a state will espouse 
its national’s claim depends on her own will) were developed.24 The diplomatic protection 
resulted in the formation of claims tribunals or commission where the early jurisprudence of 
state-state responsibility for injuries to aliens was also developed.25 Importantly, the traditional 
legacy of nationality of claims developed by the diplomatic protection continues to apply to 
the present time investment claims.26 
Despite the gains of diplomatic protection, the divide in the approach of the developing and the 
developed states caused an unsettled notion of customary norms on the right to expropriate and 
the nature and level of awards to be paid for expropriation. Bilateral Treaties were considered 
as an alternative to diplomatic protection. They normally allow the settlement of disputes 
between investors and host states by arbitration.  Arbitration is preferred to domestic courts of 
the host state simply because foreign investors believe that judgement can be easily influenced 
by politics and local policies. It also takes place in private. 
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It is submitted that before the introduction of contemporary BITs, bilateral treaty practice 
started during the 1920s to 1930s through the US Friendship, Commerce and Consular 
Relations Treaties (FCCRs) specifying explicit protections for investors and then from the 
1940s to 1960s Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties (FCNs) providing state-state 
dispute resolution by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).27 It was established that the 
contemporary BITs provisions are very close to the outline of the US Commercial Treaties. 
Besides, the language and concepts of FCN treaties on the issues of investments, namely and 
in summary, the establishment, expropriation, national treatment, most favoured nation 
treatment or the international law standard for capital transfers are all reflected to a great extent 
in contemporary BITs.28 It is further analysed that the divide on customary norms and failure 
of international community to agree on universal rules to govern foreign investment has led to 
more expansion of bilateralism and pluralism in the shape of the regionalisation of investment 
regimes and many BITs and FTAs containing investment chapters have been concluded in the 
last few decades accordingly. A good example is Article 10 part 3 of Energy Charter Treaty 
(1969) as well as Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which 
came into force on January 1, 1994. An academic writer has argued that making a claim under 
Chapter 11 is advantageous to foreign investors. He believes that it reduces the possibility of a 
jury that would be sensitive to the needs of the nation.29 It also allows host state as well as the 
investor to appoint their respective arbitrators to present their respective positions and provides 
                                                          
27 Won-Mong Choi, “The Present and Future of Investor State Dispute Paradigm” (2007) 10 (3) Journal of 
International Economic Law 731. 
28 Detlev F Vagts’ Comments in “Avoidance and Settlement of International Investment Disputes” (proc.38, 
April 12- 14, 19840, 78 American Society of International Law Proceedings, pp.46 and 47. 
29 S Gainguly, “The Investor State Dispute Settlement Mechanism (ISDSM) and a Sovereign’s power to Protect 





for the application of international law and not domestic law to the dispute, thereby 
circumventing the domestic courts of the host state.30 
Chapter 11 of NAFTA was heavily criticised, especially with regards to the weakened 
sovereignty of member nations, the high rate of taxes as well as the ad hoc nature of the 
tribunals and lack of lucidity in NAFTA proceedings.31 Critics argued further that NAFTA 
gives foreign investors greater rights than it does to domestic investors.32 In addition, it is 
clearly stated in Article 1110 of NAFTA that “no party may directly or indirectly nationalise 
or expropriate an investment of an investor of another party in its territory or take a measure 
tantamount to nationalisation or expropriation of such an investment”.33 
A case which highlights the overtly pro foreign investor stance of Chapter 11 is Metalclad v 
Mexico.34 The same case establishes that NAFTA’s investment dispute mechanism could cost 
taxpayers billions of pounds. The Government of Mexico was held liable to pay damages of 
$15.6 million, a burden which was shifted to the tax payers.35 In addition, the provisions under 
NAFTA enable investors to directly bring an action against a State government in order to 
discourage the host State from making otherwise legitimate laws. This claim was further 
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substantiated by the argument that the prospect of litigating costly NAFTA suits might deter 
governments from enacting law that might result in a suit under NAFTA.36 
Another major criticism of NAFTA’s Chapter 11 is the dispute resolution mechanism which is 
perceived to be a loophole. Critics contend that the ad hoc nature of the tribunals coupled with 
the absence of appeals mechanism lead to discrepancy and instability.37Nevertheless, the 
history has indicated that the first BIT was signed between Pakistan and Germany in 1959 and 
came into force 1962.38  Several provisions were made in the treaty which covered areas such 
as full protection and security, non-discrimination,  compensation on expropriation, free 
transfer of capital and state- state dispute settlement by the ICJ with mutual agreement of 
disputing parties failing which, by an arbitral tribunal on request of either of disputing party. 
This agreement encouraged other states and they quickly emulated the Pakistan-German 
example and more BITs were endorsed during 1960s on a similar structure as described above. 
Initially, BITs were believed to be useful in a situation whereby they are signed between a 
developing and a developed country according to Deborah.39 She further explained that the 
paradigm had shifted and now BITs have been concluded between two developed countries as 
well as between two developing countries. A typical example is South- South investment 
agreements.40 
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1.2   The Balancing of Interest between oil companies and host countries 
Foreign direct investment in petroleum industries requires adequate protection and as a result 
around 3,000 investment protection treaties have been created by states worldwide.41Most of 
them refer to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes.42The main 
purpose of these was described by Salacuse as a way to create a stable international legal 
framework to assist and protect foreign investments.43 One commentator posits that “the central 
aim of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) is to protect foreign investors and their 
investments”.44  However, this type of legal framework is expected to provide mutual benefits 
for foreign investors and host states because it will contain terms and standards of treatment 
that are to be accorded to IOCs by the state. For example, adequate protection and security, fair 
and equitable treatment as well as substantive guaranty should all be addressed in investment 
treaties. Most of these treaties are bilateral investment treaties (BITs), also referred to as 
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (IPPAs) and also include regional free trade 
agreements. In addition, they extended to multilateral treaties such as the Energy Charter 
Treaties which creates a specific legal framework to promote long-term cooperation in the 
energy field and to minimise the non-commercial risks of energy-sector 
investments.45Commentators have explained that “the fact that investment treaties contemplate 
obligations of  a state towards the individuals but none or very few obligations of the investor 
towards the state has been signalled by some as a particular deficiency of the investment 
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regime”.46 Meanwhile, Sornarajah referred to the globalisation process as “a power-based 
process which seeks to secure the rights of business over the rights of people” and underlined 
an evolution from a host state with duties towards the investor to a host state with rights in 
relation to the investor.47 It is not known how the alleged imbalance of interest will be resolved. 
It has been debated whether the way to address the issue should be by simply including new 
terms in the investment treaties or not as a general concern. The only certainty is that, it is 
difficult for an arbitrator to conclude that the sovereign choice of the state when entering into 
an investment treaty to gain the rights of business has priority over a subsequent choice of the 
state to secure the rights of people. 
It is claimed that investment treaties are recognised by states globally as mechanisms to 
promote economic relations between them, to increase investment and prosperity in host states, 
and to protect foreign investors by reference to the standards agreed in the treaty.48 The critics49 
argue further that, one of the treaties’ features actually prevents host states from hearing 
domestic claims arising from exploration activities in the courts of the host state. Rather, it 
gives investors a right to bring claims before international arbitral tribunals, in accordance with 
the dispute resolution mechanisms in the treaties. This is a clear indication that the domestic 
laws may be too difficult to predict or unreliable. In addition, Valentina says, “it seems that the 
regime established according to investment treaties does not strike the right balance between 
                                                          
46 X Herrera-Bernal - Int'l Bus. LJ, 2013, p,1. 
47 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, the International law on Foreign Investment, 3rd ed, (Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), pp 169- 203. 
48Jessica Gladstone & Nicola Leslie, Energy and investment security: protection under international law 
(International Energy Law Review 2013) p,1. 







the parties concerned”.50 She argues further that investment agreements make provisions for 
an extensive protection of investors’ rights. She believes they offer investors a distinctive 
dispute settlement mechanism, that is arbitration between the foreign investor and the host 
state. Meanwhile, this option enables foreign investors to challenge any national law that is 
likely to infringe on investor’s rights.51 Other critics have asserted that, generally speaking, 
bilateral investment treaties do endorse a “one-sided focus on investor protection and thereby 
government-only discipline”.52 This connection raises an important question: if domestic 
regulation aimed at protecting state interests can be challenged by international investors, is 
arbitration an appropriate forum to protect that interest?  
Theoretically, investment treaty arbitration is viewed as public law because it replaces courts 
with a private model of adjudication in matters of public law.53 In response to this question, 
Herrera -Bernal emphasised the difficulty faced in practice by arbitrators when dealing with 
investor-state cases, in order to ensure equal treatment between competing interests of the 
parties to the arbitration, which are of a different nature.54 Many States have expressed their 
dissatisfaction over the fact that the submission of disputes to investment arbitration curtails 
their sovereignty. One commentator explained further that “it is indeed a common complaint 
of States that the submission of disputes to investment arbitration curtails their sovereignty”.55 
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It is further argued that, investor-state arbitration neither grants the public a formal role in the 
proceedings nor guarantees representation of the local state whose law is also been contended.56 
It is not disputed that a method is required to settle investor-state disputes, but the use of 
arbitration is not a suitable option because most of its decisions have shown some shortcomings 
that need to be redressed. The following cases are good examples where investors argued that 
domestic legislation constituted a vehicle to expel investors from the host country. 
In Occidental v Ecuador,57the tribunal made an effort to describe the responsibility of the 
actors in petroleum contracts, both investor and host state. Occidental Petroleum Corporation 
entered into a petroleum participation contract with the host state of Ecuador in May 1999 to 
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specifically block 15 located in the Amazonia. Meanwhile, in October the following year 2000, 
Occidental entered into a farmout agreement with Alberta Energy Corporation, pursuant to 
which Alberta Energy Corporation acquired 40 per cent economic interest in Block 15 in return 
for certain capital contributions. The transfer, however, breached both the participation contract 
and Ecuadorian law, which required ministerial authorisation. In 2006, the host state decided 
to terminate the original contract with Occidental and issued a decree declaring the caducidadof 
the contract. The declaration was made on the basis of Occidental having effected an 
unauthorised transfer of economic interest without approval of Ecuadorian government and in 
contrary to the Hydrocarbons Law and the participation contract. 
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Occidental argued that the host state’s decision to terminate the contract was an administrative 
action based on legislative powers and therefore, needed to be implemented in a proportionate 
manner.58 In addition, they alleged that the host state terminated the contract without cause, 
that is, in absence of a termination event under the original contract, Ecuador breached its 
obligations under both the participation contract and bilateral treaty. They argued further that 
the Farmout Agreement did not operate as an Assignment of rights in violation of Ecuadorian 
Law.  Even if at all termination event was found to have taken place, they believe that the 
termination would still be in violation of Ecuador’s obligations under bilateral treaty as well as 
Ecuadorian law because it was arbitrary, unfair, disproportionate and discriminatory. 
Ecuador argued in its defence, that the Farmout Agreement effected an assignment and 
therefore required government authorisation, as required by Ecuadorian law. It argued further 
that Occidental was liable for a number of violations of Ecuador’s Hydrocarbons law, that the 
Caducidad Decree actually complied with the international law and Bilateral Treaty and that 
no expropriation took place. A Caducidad decree is an Ecuadorian law principle and 
administrative decree through a declaration by the Ministry of Mines and Energy to terminate 
the two agreements between the parties. Ecuador therefore argued that the Caducidad had been 
a bona fide administrative sanction in furtherance of a legitimate regulatory policy.59 
 The ICSID Tribunal determined that the Farmout Agreement entered into was actually in 
violation of Ecuadorian law, since it was not authorised by the host state. Nevertheless, the 
tribunal held that the termination of the participation contract was a disproportionate response 
to Occidental’s assignment of rights under the Farmout Agreement. The tribunal explained 
further that there were a number of options to terminating the Participation Contract; the latter 
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should have been used as a last resort. The Tribunal noted that Ecuador did not suffer “any 
quantifiable loss as a direct result of a third party taking an economic interest in Block 15”.60 
Therefore, the termination of the contract was disproportionate to its objective.  The tribunal 
held that the Caducidad Decree was issued in violation of Ecuadorian law, which recognises 
the proportionality principle, and in breach of the Bilateral Treaty and customary international 
law. The tribunal eventually held that Ecuador’s measures were “tantamount to 
expropriation”.61It then analysed the proportionality of the sanction in view of Ecuador 
Constitutional and Administrative laws and then in the context of International investment 
disputes.62 
The tribunal decision in the above case established that the principle of proportionality must 
be observed in a variety of international law settings and it must also be applied to potential 
breaches of Bilateral Treaty obligations such as fair and equitable treatment obligations. To 
this end the Tribunal noted. 
…the overriding principle of proportionality requires that any 
administrative goal must be balanced against the investor’s own interest 
and against the true nature and effect of the conduct being censured.63 
The decision which emerged from this case emphasised the application of the principle of 
proportionality as an important part of fair and equitable treatment under BITs. The decision 
further illustrates the power of investment arbitration. In addition, the issue of fair and equitable 
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treatment was also considered by the tribunal in CMS v Argentina64 and held that provision 
under BIT had been engaged because Argentina had acted contrary to the investment agreement 
made before its economic crisis in 2001. This case was decided in favour of the foreign 
investor. Meanwhile, in the case of Saluka v Czech Republic65 the tribunal also held that the 
fair and equitable standard was breached because of the non- transparent and discriminatory 
way in which the government had acted. 
With regards to BITs, which Skovgaard described as having as their stated purpose a measure 
to protect and promote foreign investment.66Denza and Brooks emphasised the importance of 
bilateral agreements and concluded that “the investment protection agreements have 
undoubtedly played a significant role in giving precision to the standards to be observed and, 
to a large extent, in taking the political steam out of the whole subject of the treatment of foreign 
investment”.67 Investment in a petroleum project involves significant development expenditure 
involving maximum protection and assurance. Particularly, concessions for the extraction of 
mineral and petroleum wealth entered into by governments should be honoured by those 
governments. Without this expectation, foreign investors would not be prepared to take the 
risk. In order to minimise the risk, oil companies often request some form of assurance and 
protection in the investment regime so that either the conditions of the agreement are respected 
by the host state, or some form of compensation or redress are guaranteed when there is a 
unilateral change to the original agreement or subsequent change in domestic legislation. 
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However, regardless of promises of protection and assurance in investment treaties; disputes 
still arise, and it can only be resolved through international arbitration.  
Supporters of the Investment Treaty Arbitration (ITA) argue that its structure, substance and 
procedures are geared towards achieving greater coherence by balancing competing human 
rights and economic interests and values.68 Others have argued that the present structure of the 
ITA coupled with the development of substantive norms of international investment law are 
composed of a more balanced approach to resolving problems between competing interests and 
it has so far proved itself as a legitimate system for rights adjudication.69 
Several institutions have emerged to provide international investment arbitration services. 
These institutions are well recognised, and they have followed independent rules of procedure 
to provide impartial dispute resolution services, uninfluenced by domestic policies or politics 
of host states. In addition, there are some notable developments regarding the approaches taken 
by investment tribunals to safeguard the regulatory autonomy of a host state. Some of these 
approaches and cases dealt with the tribunals highlighted the reasons ITA could be perceived 
as an unbiased, balanced, reliable and responsible system. 
For example, a host state’s actions can be justified if there is a compelling need to maintain 
public order. According to the provision under article 24 (3) of ECT, a contracting party shall 
not be prevented from taking any measure which it considers necessary “for the protection of 
its essential security interest” and/or “for the maintenance of public order”. In Saluka v Czech 
Republic,70 the legitimate rule of the financial services sector was acknowledged. The Tribunal 
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held in this case that states were not liable for adopting “in a non-discriminatory manner bona 
fide regulation that are meant for the general welfare”.71 
Tribunals have also ruled in a similar case Genin v Estonia72  that Estonia was right to act as 
a sensible and concerned supervisor of the banking sector. The investor alleged that the host 
state’s revocation of its bank’s operating licence constituted a violation of the BIT, as well as 
Fair and Equitable Treatment standard which is believed to be the cornerstone of international 
investment law. However, the investor’s failure to disclose the true identity of the shareholders 
of its parent companies was one of the grounds that justified the host state’s action.  The tribunal 
discovered that an investor is required under Estonian law to provide clear information on such 
beneficial ownership. Therefore, a failure to cooperate was the cause of legitimate concern 
which eventually urged the interference of the host state, that is, the revocation of its operating 
licence.73  In this regard, tribunal held that the regulation concerned actually reflected a clear 
and legitimate exercise of the central bank’s regulatory and supervisory responsibilities and 
that the Estonian government “ had acted within its statutory discretion… and its ultimate 
decision could not be said to have been arbitrary or discriminatory against the foreign 
investors”.74 
Furthermore, the case of AES Summit v Hungary,75 where the Tribunal found that Hungary’s 
enactment of the 2006 Electricity Act Amendment did not breach investment standards under 
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the Energy Charter Treaty. The challenged measure had reintroduced regulated prices, which 
imposed a cap on the profit entitlement of companies in the energy sector and were applied 
equally to all generating companies. An ICSID Tribunal decided that Hungary’s creation of 
price decrees in answer to public outrage over the alleged high profits of public utility 
companies did not amount to expropriation, simply because it did not deprive the investor of 
effective control of its investment or deprive it significantly of value.  This ruling indicates that 
claims under the Energy Charter Treaty might be less likely to succeed where investors are 
making excessive profits and it could be acceptable reasons for government of the host state to 
make law. Thus, there had been no breach of fair and equitable treatment, national treatment, 
impairment of investment, most favoured-nation treatment, constant protection and security of 
expropriation. 
As also illustrated in Muhammad Ammar Al Bahloul v Tajikistan,76 proof of expropriation 
requires a higher level of interference otherwise the claim would fail. The Tribunal held that 
the state’s temporary failure to issue an exploration licence was not considered expropriation 
unless it could be established that the state terminated its contract, or it has refused to perform 
its obligations under the underline contract. Although Tajikistan was held to be in breach of art 
10(1) ECT, arbitrators rejected most claims advanced by the claimant but ruled that Tajikistan 
had failed to live up to commitment in four contracts to issue licenses for exploration in four 
designated areas of the country. Therefore, the tribunal reserved judgement as to the relief to 
be granted to the claimant who sought orders of specific performance. 
                                                          






In Inceysa v El Salvador,77 the duty of an investor and investment to abide by the host state’s 
domestic laws was explored through the lens of the Spain-El Salvador BIT’s provision asking 
that an investment be made “in accordance with the law of the host country”. The Tribunal 
affirmed that its competence to hear the dispute depends on the legality of the investment. In 
the tribunal’s view, it was clear and obvious from the intent of the parties to the contract that 
investments made illegally, that is, in breach of host state’s domestic law are excluded from 
the scope of the BIT, and therefore, any disputes arising as a result fall outside its jurisdiction. 
The claimant’s (Inceysa) breaches of the laws of El Salvador were established. Facts presented 
to the tribunal indicated that the investor had acted in deceitful manners throughout the bidding 
process. All of these acts were considered and held to have breached general principles of law 
which according to the tribunal are part of the laws of El Salvador. They include the principle 
of good faith, international public policy, the nemo auditor propiamturpitudinemallegans 
principle, and the principle prohibiting unlawful enrichments. Importantly, the Tribunal 
concluded that dispute could not be heard because the contract was formed illegally so tribunal 
is incompetent to hear it. 
Furthermore, in the case of Fraport v Philippines78the tribunal acknowledged that respect for 
the laws of the host state is a critical part of development and a worry for international 
investment law. The dispute occurred between the government of Philippine and a German 
company (Fraport) in relation to the annulment of the concession contract for the construction 
and operation of an international passenger terminal at Ninony Aquino International Airport in 
Manila (“Terminal 3”). The concession contract was concluded 1997 between the Philippine 
company known as Philippine International Air Terminals Co (‘PIATCO’) and Philippine 
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Department of Transportation and Communication. In 1999, Fraport, a German company in 
international airport business, became a shareholder in PIATCO later acquired the ownership 
of PIATCO by holding 61.44% of the shares in 2001. Fraport also signed a confidential 
shareholder agreement to exercise managerial control over the company. In 2002, the Supreme 
Court in the Philippines ruled that a 1997 concession agreement to build Terminal 3 was null 
and avoid ab initio for violations of host state law and public policy. Meanwhile, Terminal 3 
was nearly completed by the PIATCO at the time of the decision. 
After failed negotiations for compensation from the Philippine Government, Fraport requested 
arbitration with ICSID. PIATCO alleged several breaches of the Germany-Philippine BIT 
particularly, obligations towards an investor in the Philippines, including expropriation. 
However, the host state challenged the Tribunal’s jurisdiction on the basis that the claimant’s 
investment was not accepted in accordance with the laws of the host state as stated under article 
1(1) of the BIT and further denied all liability under the BIT. They argued further that the 
Terminal 3 concession was a public utility subject to the nationality restrictions of the host state 
constitution and the prohibitions imposed by the Anti –Dummy Law which prevent foreign 
ownership and control of national company  and that Fraport deliberately sought to side line 
the nationality requirement which put a limit on foreign ownership of the capital of a public 
utility to 40% through the back door, by holding 61.44% of the share and by signing the 
confidential shareholder agreement in order to exercise control over the company. It was a 
deliberate act to claim the ownership of the company indirectly.   
Based on the facts of this case and relevant accompanied evidence, the Tribunal held that 
Fraport consciously, intentionally and covertly structured its investment for mere economic 





foreign ownership and control legislation known as Anti-Dummy Law.79As a result, the 
tribunal held that there was no investment in accordance with law and that it did not have 
jurisdiction rationemateriae to rule on the Fraport allegations of breaches by the host state of 
certain provisions of the BIT and dismissed the case. 
Similarly, the case of Maffezini v Spain80 established that failure to comply with the host 
state’s law and regulations might exclude foreign investors from treaty right to which they 
would otherwise be entitled.  The investor brought a claim and alleged that host state had 
breached its obligations under the Argentine-Spain BIT, for suspending the construction of the 
chemical plant. The Tribunal recognised that under the Spanish constitution81 and Spain’s 
Decree on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), investors in chemical industries are 
required to carry out an EIA, and the Spanish government reserved the power to discontinue 
any chemical project that has started before the EIA is approved.82 The Tribunal held that it 
was clear that the investor decided to carry on with its project before the EIA was finalised, 
despite his awareness of the requirement under Spanish Law. In doing so, the tribunal 
concluded that he deliberately and consciously evaded the obligation in order to avoid 
additional costs.83 Accordingly, the tribunal held that the host state measure, which aimed at 
ensuring the observance of its laws by any business entity operating within its jurisdiction, did 
not amount to a breach of the BIT.84  Article 2(1) of the Argentine-Spain BIT, calls for the 
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promotion of investment in compliance with national legislation and the provision was in line 
with the tribunal ruling on this case. 
Moreover, in Thunderbird v Mexico,85where  Thunderbird claimed that Mexico’s regulation 
and closure of its gaming facilities breached the national treatment obligation under Art 1102; 
the most favoured nation treatment obligation under Art 1103 also Art 1104 obligation to 
accord the better of the treatment required under Art 1102, 1103 as well as the obligation to 
provide treatment in accordance with international law under Art 1105(1) and finally breach of 
obligation under Art 1110 which prohibit expropriation. The lack of transparency on the part 
of the investor was the main contributory factor that defeated its claim of breach of the Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA). This was a case of a dispute relating to a US investment in a gaming 
operation activity in Mexico. In this case, the claimant claimed a violation of its legitimate 
expectations, created by Mexico’s official statement which provides positive support and 
acceptance of its gaming activities (THE OFICIO). However, the Tribunal decided that no such 
legitimate expectations could have existed, due to Thunderbird’s lack of transparency and 
improper disclosure of information when he applied for the approval of the gaming operation 
in Mexico. Consequently, the claimant had provided incomplete and inaccurate information at 
the time of application in regard to the nature of its investment, which eventually misled the 
appropriate body in Mexico to produce its statement in the Oficio. As a result, the claim should 
fail.86 
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Similarly, in WDF v Kenya87where tribunal held that agreements stained with corruption could 
not be enforced and that bribery is contrary to the international public policy of most 
countries.88 In this case, the issue of corruption and bribery was extensively examined. An 
agreement for the construction, operation and maintenance of duty-free complexes was 
concluded between Kenya’s government and World Duty Free Ltd. The claimant WDF brought 
an action before arbitration alleging that the host state had breached the agreement in several 
respects which established expropriation of its properties. The host state argued in its defence 
that the award of the initial contract was obtained by an unlawful act, because the investor had 
bribed the then President of Kenya (Daniel Arap Moi) with US $2 million. Therefore, the host 
state asked the tribunal to declare the contract unenforceable and to dismiss all other claims 
associated with the contracts. 
The Tribunal found that “the undisclosed payments to president Moi could not be seen as a 
personal donation for public purposes…but must be regarded as a bribe in anticipation of 
obtaining the conclusion of the investment contract”.89 After thorough examination of both 
domestic and international legislations, including court and arbitral decisions, the tribunal 
pointed out that bribery is contrary to the international public policy of most states.90 In 
addition, it emphasised that contracts tainted with corruption are illegal and, hence claims based 
on such contracts must not be upheld.91 
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The invalidity of a contract based on fraudulent misrepresentation was also upheld in Plama v 
Bulgaria award.92 In this case, the investor Plama, a Cyprus-based company, acquired shares 
in a privatised refinery in Bulgaria. Meanwhile, the approval of the acquisition by the host 
states’ authority was granted as a result of the investor’s fraudulent misrepresentation.  The 
owner of the Plama, Mr Vautrin had already presented as a consortium of two companies with 
sufficient assets and experience needed to acquire the refinery. But the Bulgarian’s authority 
later discovered that those parties had withdrawn, and that Mr Vautrin, who personally did not 
possess the quality and financial resources, failed to disclose the true identity of the investors 
in the refinery, and continued to act in the guise of the consortium.93 Tribunal held that 
concealment of information amounted to fraud, which violated host state domestic law as well 
as international law. As a result, no protection of the Energy Charter Treaty could be granted 
to the investor and his investment. 
The decision from the above cases signals a positive trend that arbitrators are challenging the 
conduct of foreign investors. It has been established through these cases that investment treaties 
impose some reciprocal obligations on host nations as well as foreign investors. It is further 
submitted that the tribunals’ consideration of investor obligations was derived and based on 
international law principles, including transnational public policy also known as the principle 
of good faith, the principle that nobody can benefit from his own wrong, and the principle of 
international public policy which requires compliance with both domestic and international 
laws. In this regard, supporters of the treaties believe decisions that emerged from the above 
cases might encourage host states to raise defences and bring claims regarding investor conduct 
to the tribunal in order to justify their alleged violations of treaty obligations. Therefore, 
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consideration of the protection of investor expectation can now be perceived as a specific 
application of the more general notion of balance between the protection of investor confidence 
and host state’s regulatory powers. Subsequently, Pham added that, investor protection is 
somehow restricted by the desire to maintain a reasonable degree of regulatory flexibility on 
the part of the host government to take legislative action in the public interest.94He explained 
further that the approaches adopted in investment-treaty arbitration are no longer the same, 
they have moved from being pro-investor or insensitive to host states regulatory rights to 
striking a balance between host state and foreign investors rights and obligations.95 Thus, if the 
host state believes there is a tendency of certain arbitrators to favour claimant-investors, host 
states could decide to withdraw from the system altogether as revealed by the denunciation of 
11 BITS.96 Ecuador alone had denounced 9 Bits, Netherlands-Bolivia BIT and EL Salvador-
Nicaragua BITs were denounced.  Nyombi and Mortimer posit that countries around the world, 
Australia, Poland, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa, to mention a few, both developing 
and developed, have intimated a further termination and withdrawal from international 
investment protection. The rationale behind this idea is a perceived imbalance of international 
arbitral decisions that are believed to be the cause of an encroachment on national 
sovereignty.97 
The rise of investment treaties has attracted critical attention from various scholar critics and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Also, there has been a considerable amount of 
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literature criticising the irregularity of the international investment protection regime because 
the treaties create obligations for host states but not for investors. Meanwhile, it created rights 
for investors but not for host states. The absence of responsibilities such as environmental, 
social and fundamental human rights, as well as other obligations relating to corporate 
responsibility has led to an imbalance where only foreign investors can bring claims against 
host states before a Tribunal.  
It is not disputed that investors’ conduct is not regulated in investment treaties. This claim was 
supported by the simple fact that there was no recognition for a corporation’s liability in 
international investment treaties.98 Apart from a handful of international investment 
agreements such as the Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area 
(CCIA) there was a provision under art.13 “Investor Obligation” that investors and their 
investment shall comply with all applicable domestic measures of the member state in which 
their investment is made”. In addition, Art. 72 of the EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership 
Agreement allows Member States to take measures against investors of corrupt practices and 
violations of core labour standards and imposes other obligations of public concerns on 
investors. 
1.3   Lack of treaty provisions which ensure a symmetric investment-protection system 
It is claimed that developed countries have enhanced documented transparency in investment 
treaties in order to safeguard their regulatory powers.99 For example, most of the treaties 
concluded by developed country such as the United State of America, Canada and Australia 
just to mention a few and contain general exception clauses which allowed reasons for 
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justifying regulatory measures.100 In particular, the Chile- Peru Free Trade Agreement clearly 
indicated that measures which are designed and to be applied for public-welfare purposes do 
not usually constitute indirect expropriation.101 Meanwhile, developing countries are still 
facing difficulties in amending and renegotiating Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs).102 In 
addition, Howard rightly asserts further that, a lack of regulatory right in investment treaties to 
protect states from claims for compensation has made them much more vulnerable to the 
uncertainties of the process, and the vagaries of relying on a three-person arbitral panel.103 
It is submitted that the weaker bargaining power of developing countries as well as the cost to 
renegotiate and amend BITs are not the only problems, but the reason may also include lack of 
power required to push for a change in current investment treaty regime. For example, it is 
clear from the reference to the developed countries above that, they have responded well to the 
obstacles and challenges posed by the provision of BITs. As discussed in the Chile-Peru 
agreement (FTA), the two states have successfully incorporated exception clauses into the 
terms of their agreement which eventually put them in an equal standing. Each of them 
participated in treaty negotiation, as both share the same interest in keeping regulatory right in 
the course of protecting foreign investment from the partner’s country. On the contrary, 
developing states rely and depend on the investor-state dispute-settlement mechanism in the 
Bilateral Treaties (International Arbitration). 
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1.4   Lack of provision in regulating investor conduct in Investment Treaties 
It is established that investment treaties are silent on the conduct of foreign investors and the 
failure to make a provision has attracted debates from the both sides, namely the host state and 
foreign investors. On the part of the foreign investors, it is evident that they are not keen on 
pushing for the adoption of a binding mechanism whereby foreign investors are automatically 
bound by international law as this may enable host state to enforce these obligations through 
international arbitration. The international business has capitalised on this and they have shown 
reluctance towards readily accepting any positive duty to protect and observe these rights which 
they considered as the responsibility of the state. For example, one of the very first 
multinational corporations to show this attitude was Levi Strauss & Co. They created 
comprehensive Global Sourcing and operating guide line in 1991 which provide for business 
partner terms of engagement and covered ethical, environmental requirements, health and 
safety standard and legal requirement as well as employment practice guidelines which applied 
to all of the company’s individual business partners. Similarly, the Shell group adopted a 
different principle which sets out commitments to sustainable development, social value and 
human rights. It also formed a social responsibilities committee to review the policies and 
conduct of shell companies with regards to the business principles.104 
The above examples have shown that multinational corporations prefer to share duties with the 
host state on a voluntary basis rather than a mandatory obligation under the treaties. Besides, 
private codes of conduct could not be enforced. Thus, it could be argued that transnational 
corporations are fulfilling their responsibility towards the host state and the local community 
on voluntary basis with no binding mechanism. In addition, according toMuchlinski, an attempt 
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to develop a new social and environmental responsibility agenda has been perceived as a move 
that is likely to create soft law obligations.105 
From the perspectives of the developing host states, they tend to focus on the issues that have 
been catered for in the treaty that is, investment protection. By so doing, they forget to 
emphasise on the most needed aspect, the control of the activities and conduct of foreign 
investors. As mentioned earlier, there is still no recognition for an investor’s liability and 
majority of the host states in developing countries have failed to make use of the international 
agreements as a weapon to tackle the issue of investors conduct. Presently, there is no effective 
domestic legislation and legal institution to regulate and check the activities of multinational 
corporations operating within their respective borders and territories. Meanwhile, they are in 
the right position to advocate and press for a change in current investment treaties. Otherwise, 
they might see the creation of internationally enforceable obligations for foreign investors as a 
means of over-riding their national sovereignty.106 
The case of the Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and 
Social Rights v Nigeria107 is a perfect example of a situation where a host state has failed to 
regulate and check the activities of International oil companies. It was alleged in the above case 
that the Federal government of Nigeria took part in oil production through Nigeria National 
Petroleum Development (‘NNPC’) in association with Shell Petroleum Development 
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Corporation in which NNPC held 55% of the share. NGOs alleged that the Oil companies 
carried out oil exploration in Ogoniland Nigeria without respect for the environment and the 
health of villagers. As a result of oil related activities, they have contaminated the area and 
disposed of toxic wastes into waterways which eventually caused health problems and 
environmental degradation. Oil companies have also failed to develop and maintain appropriate 
equipment that would have prevented the poisonous wastes from spreading to the villages. It 
is further alleged that the Nigerian military force engaged in military operations including 
killing of people, burning and destruction of houses and food. 
The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights held that Nigeria had violated the 
African Charter on Human and People’s right. Nigeria was found to have breached majority of 
the Articles Rights including Article 2, right to enjoy Charter guaranteed rights and freedom 
without discrimination, Article 4, the right to life, Article 14 the right to property, Article 16, 
the right to health, Article 18(1) the right to housing, Article 21, the right of people to freely 
dispose of their wealth and natural resources. Also, Nigeria was found to have violated of 
Article 24 which provides the right of people to enjoy satisfactory environment favourable to 
their development.108 
This case served as a precedent for enforcement of cultural, economic and social rights within 
the international community. And for the host state this case sends a clear message that an 
action group can force their way to the very highest level to have their case heard if ignored by 
the state. Thus, it could be argued that NGOs have called into question the purpose of state 
authority and oil and gas industries. They have made the governments of developing countries 
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aware that this crucial issue should be addressed promptly. They have exposed oil companies’ 
bad practices and brought it to the attention of people around the world. 
However, it is not disputed that developing countries are aware that investment treaties are a 
possible means to prevent unethical conduct and to promote best practices by foreign investors 
operating within their territory. Yet, having made no provisions under investment treaties, it 
could be argued that it is a clear deprivation of the opportunity by the states to set up their own 
domestic laws to tackle these issues. However, one of the commentators asserts on this point 
that “when a host states accept that investor behaviour is controlled in any international 
investment treaties, they admit that they are unable to address the problems relating to foreign 
investors activities themselves”.109 For all the reasons adduced, it could be suggested that, until 
developing countries show an enthusiasm and push for change in the current investment treaties 
and the inclusion of legally binding provisions on foreign investors' obligations in the treaties, 
Multinational Corporations' activities and conduct may never be controlled.   
1.5 How may a balance be struck 
The position of most host states as global exporters of oil110 makes the industry a breeding 
ground for interests and conflicts (business related and otherwise), with all actors in the 
interplay of forces over exploration and exploitations of oil all locked in this ‘battle of interest’ 
including the government, oil companies and in some cases, host communities. However, these 
conflicts are underpinned by other variables some of which include; economic growth, security 
and stability, social justice, transparency, governance, ethnic tensions, community participation 
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and the rule of law.111 These interests are reflective of the many aspirations which the major 
actors believe the rich oil fields will bring to fruition through exploration/exploitation of natural 
resources and the resultant FDI that comes with it. Invariably, conflicts erupt in balancing these 
interests and the differing aspirations while exploiting maximally, the natural resources therein.  
 
The government on the one hand, anticipate a huge and consistent flow of revenue from oil 
companies, the citizens on the other hand, see exploration and exploitation activities of oil 
companies in their community as key to the improvement of their deplorable living standards 
while oil companies on their part, expect huge returns from the enormous investments they 
embark on in the region by virtue of their concession for oil exploration and exploitation. The 
aspirations of these various groups, fuelled by poor governance, unstable/unclear legal rules 
and corruption more often than not result in an amalgam problem which breed social tension, 
nay   sowing the seed of conflicts prevalent in the exploitation of natural resources.112 
 
It is commonplace that governments of most oil laden nations have much reliance and 
dependence on oil rents and rates, royalties and taxes paid by oil companies as well as income 
generated from equity stakes.113 In the light of this huge dependence, oil companies are hard 
pressed in meeting these onerous demands imposed on them by the government. Moreover, 
such reliance on oil companies and oil proceeds breeds the neglect of institutional internal tax 
regime of citizens thereby eroding the fiscal link between the government and the populace of 
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which the end point is poor initiative in the provision of social services.114 The resultant effect 
of this trend is that the citizenry suffers in the midst of plenty thereby breeding social apathy 
towards oil companies and creating avenues for conflict between the duos.   
 
Meanwhile, in consideration of the fact that market prices of commodities are prone to constant 
inflation, economies hugely dependent on oil are vulnerable to market fluctuations affecting 
their export earnings which may ultimately trigger exchange rate instability. This scenario 
creates economic instability which ultimately and increases social tensions with potentials of 
contributing to conflict in the oil sector. This is typified in the “Dutch Disease” phenomenon 
of the 1960s when Netherlands suffered huge economic instability owing to the concentration 
of their revenue on proceeds from the North Sea oil.115 
Aside the huge dependence on oil revenue, transparency issues are also root causes of resource 
related conflicts and clash of interests in most oil producing nations especially in developing 
countries. The difficulty in obtaining information on government activities and finances in the 
oil sector greatly heightens this clash. It is normative that the alienation of transparency breeds 
corruption. Hence, lack of public information with respect to proceeds in this sector, fuelled by 
the obviousness of the rich-poor divide in most oil producing nations of the developing world 
heighten prospects for conflict in the oil sector. Matters are made worse by the confidentiality 
clauses that characterize most concession agreements between oil companies and the 
government.116  Kazakhstan is a typical example of such confidentiality agreements.   The 
Kazakhstan government insist that oil companies in the region sign strict confidential product 
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sharing agreements; such corporations are estopped from publicly disclosing their financial 
transactions with thegovernment.117Such practice is evident also in Chad where funds 
earmarked for certain social projects were never utilized and no information made available to 
the citizens118Angola is another example of such trend where 34 multinational companies made 
payments of undisclosed sums to the government.119Indeed, at one point, the Angola 
Government banned BP directors from entering the country after they formed a board 
resolution stating that they would not take bribe. However, it appears that oil companies have 
increasingly begun to appreciate the need for a comprehensive measure to address transparency 
related problems. This notwithstanding, these efforts need expediency as some oil companies 
get entangled in the thick corruption web in some host nations and end up, guarding financial 
information from the government and certain key policy units of the government.  
 
Unfortunately, the uncertainty and embryonic legal standards that characterise the legal 
systems of some host nations, coupled with the corruption that has left the legal system porous, 
add up to root causes of conflict between oil companies and host nations.  The institution of 
clear codes of conduct and standards in relation to social and environmental outcomes will go 
a long way to bridle the social inequity in the oil sector. 
Additionally, the welfare of the local community where the extraction/exploration activity is 
situated may be potential sources of clash of interests. This issue is central, being that the social 
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depravation of host communities thereto is not reflective of the economic gains derived from 
their natural environment. The Nigerian Niger Delta region is a classic example of such social 
inequity120.  Moreover, human right abuses endemic in oil producing regions of developing 
countries may possibly be common innuendos of clash of interest.  
Admittedly, extractive industries in most developing states will continually experience conflict 
and clashes of interest brewed and triggered by its major actors owing to the global demand for 
fossil fuels used in accelerating development in most part of the world coupled with the huge 
economic dependence on this sector. However, concerted efforts to diversify economic 
activities, new social investment policies, strengthened governance, transparency, public sector 
involvement, public awareness, local content observance, and improvements in the overall 
standards of the citizenry from oil gains may be the answer to temper this ‘battle of interests’ 
in most oil producing nations of developing the developing world.  Effecting these changes 
may not necessarily be easy; hence there is need for all actors in the sector to work 
collaboratively in achieving this. However, for such collaborative effort to yield a dividend 
there is a need to consider what really are the interests/goals of the foreign investors in this 
sector.  Do they actually subscribe to the UN FDI and technology transfer initiative or are host 
nations primarily a means for accelerating profits? This issue forms the next discussion point.  
1.6 The general aspiration of oil companies in exploring and exploiting natural 
resources. 
The expropriation wave by developing countries of foreign investment which characterized 
periods between the 1950s and 1970s did little to deter transnational corporations from 
investing beyond borders of theirhome states as they continually invested in developing 
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countries through FDI.121This begs the question;what motivates the investment decisions of oil 
companies in the oil sectors of developing countries even in the face of the multifarious 
conflicts therein?  
To answer the above question, this section attempts to explore the interests and aspirations 
behind the investments of oil companies.  To achieve the desired result, this work will explore 
and analyse the investment decisions of oil companies in the light of scholarly opinions and 
critics as well as response and mission statements of transnational corporations. This will be 
placed at par with the opinion of the host nations as well as that of host communities and all 
other actors that prevail in the extractive industry of host nations (NGO’s and pressure groups) 
with Nigeria and its oil and gas sector as the focal point.  Furnished with these views, a 
balancing act will be done to throw some light on the interests behind such investment 
decisions.  
1.7    Economic and tax incentives 
It is a common notion among legal experts in FDI that investments by oil companies in the 
developing world, is driven by the promise of the huge profits which such investments breed.122 
Conversely, some scholars opine that such investment drive is fuelled not solely by hopes of 
profit maximization but majorly, by the desire to reap from the massive scale of production as 
well as the opportunity of participating in the exploitation of the mammoth natural resources 
untapped in some host nations.123 Be that as it may, economic incentives bolstered by hopes of 
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profit maximization may be ticked off as one of the interests behind the continued investment 
in oil sectors of developing countries of which Nigeria is just one among many.  
Moreover, the clamour for FDI by developing countries has led to incidences of liberalised tax 
regimes and other cut backs as moves towards competitive advantage in attracting transnational 
corporations; the perceived facilitators of FDI.Such incentives include reduced taxes, duty-free 
imports of products and machinery, accelerated depreciation or amortization, unrestricted 
repatriation of dividends as well as easy entrance and exit into these host nations.124 
The obviousness of this issue is evident in the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission 
Act, 1995125 and Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Micelle nous) Act 1995.126 Both Acts 
liberalised restrictions imposed on full ownership of FDI and capital importation respectively 
as against the earlier provisions of The Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Act 1972 and the 
Exchange Control Act 1962 which had more stringent provisions. For further examples of this 
benefit in practice, see the tax havens islands of Jersey, Guernsey and Cayman as well as the 
Swiss Cantons and the Isle of Man who compromised their tax regulations in return for 
increased presence of foreign firms therein.127 
1.8   Expansion of trade 
However, as activities of transnational corporations diminish, owing to alternative funding 
sources, the globalisation of developing countries and campaigns against neo-colonialism, the 
idea of FDI bridled this gap as it presented an open door through which oil companies gained 
access to resources of developing countries as well as the political control that came with 
                                                          
124 Chike B Onwuekwe (123). 
125 Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act, 1995. 
126 Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Micelle nous) Act 1995. 





it.128This was facilitated by promise of technology transfer and trade liberalisation, rubber 
stamped by endorsements from international organisations; the UN, IMF, WTO,129though the 
idea of FDI was to bridle the North-South divide, the notion of the investments of oil companies 
in host nations remain elusive, hence the need for further inquest and analysis.  As delineated 
above, it could be political, economic, social or even humanitarian.  
 
1.9 Relaxed legal regimes and tax incentives 
Aside from political and economic benefits, oil companies’ investment decisions in host 
nations as typified by Nigeria and its oil sector, may be characterised by the relaxed legal 
regime they hope to exploit as most laws are worded to protect interest of oil companies in a 
bid to retain them owing to the economic and social benefits governments of host nations 
suggest they enjoy through the activities transnational corporations in the exploitation of 
natural resources.130  Moreover, the porosity that pervades some legislation of host nations 
especially in the oil and gas industry when put at par with international law and regulations 
presents itself as incentives which oil companies hope to zero in on. 
1.10   Labour force incentive 
Slightly related to the perceived economic goals of transnational corporations is the docile 
labour force factor. Oil companies attach weight to the level of the trade union activism in a 
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country before concluding on a decision to invest.131  Oil companies generally shy away from 
countries with an organised labour force. They consider it pervasive to business hence the need 
to channel investments in nations with moderated labour force of which Nigeria ticks the box 
correctly.132 
Moreover, access to cheap and available labour (skilled and unskilled) may be huge drivers for 
activities of oil companies in the extractive industries of developing nations. The cost of 
employing and flying in expatriates is saved on the one hand and the other, proffer employment 
opportunities to indigenous people, hence a win-win situation for both parties.   
On the contrary, though oil companies may seem to find host nations as safe havens owing to 
the perversity and unconcerned strength of the labour force as well as low cost of labour there 
to, however, one would wonder how this will even out in the face of the constant conflicts that 
intrigue the some host nations of which Nigeria is a classic example, coupled with the huge 
levies and reparation imposed on oil companies as well as the fear of appropriation.133 
The Bophal gas tragedy in India134  and the building collapse in Pakistan as well as issues in 
Angola135 can be cited to argue that the trend is the same around the world. Considering these 
developments, an important question to ask is the labour factor the major driver that attracts 
investment decisions of oil companies in the oil sector of developing countries?  As in most 
developing countries where oil companies operate, the above issues may be considered the 
major interests for investments in the oil sector as well as exploration of natural resources. 
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Although oil companies may have other interests or motivating factor, however a total jettison 
of most or all of the issues above may be considered a blatant denial of the obvious.  
 
1.11 The host states’ benefits from the exploitation of natural resources 
Just as developed countries did in years counting down to and during the industrial revolution 
so are developing countries doing competitively today,136for foreign direct investment (‘FDI’). 
However, this time it is the other way around.137 The idea is to attract FDI into developing 
states with the anticipation that such investment will put them on centre stage of global 
economics and commerce and to solve other problems that affect the polity in developing 
countries, such as poverty, economic stagnation and decline of public institutions a norm. 
Developing countries surrender their natural resources as incentives for FDI.  
 
In Nigeria for instance, it was upon the above belief that the countries Vision 2020138 agenda 
was built owing to the anticipation and promises the country had for development and 
economic growth that would spill from the exploitation of oil and gas by transnational 
corporations. It is pertinent to explore the various expectations the state had from exploitation 
of its oil. Aside the common aspirations of economic growth and political stability, one may 
infer other ancillary expectations like technology transfer, improvement in research and 
development, nation building as well as integral development of the nation and its citizen base. 
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These issues and more will be analysed below as well as the extent they have been realised 
assessed and impediments there to.  
1.12 Socio-economic development 
The rhetoric in Sub-Saharan Africa especially during the emancipation wave for independence 
in the 1960’s was that effective exploitation of natural resources was the magic key that would 
open doors to economic growth and political stability of any country.139  Like other developing 
countries, Nigeria opened its borders to oil companies with the aspiration that it would add to 
its economic development strategies.140In addition, given the resource base of these 
multinational oil companies and their enormous productive, investment and distribution 
capacity, they constitute genuine transnational actors on whose shoulders any developing 
economy aspired to the leap into the world’s economic domain.141 
 
Furthermore, it was the belief that oil companies through activities in the oil sector of host 
nations, will contribute to the governments’ revenue through taxes, rates, royalties and levies142  
as well as provide employment, in the host communities where they operate which encourages 
spending and free flow of cash in the economy.   
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In Nigeria for example, the promise of oil exploration became the nation’s hope for resurrection 
from the economic stagnation, widespread poverty and laxity in public institutions following 
years of mismanagement in the hands of the military.143With economic stagnation came other 
social inequalities such as impeded access to basic healthcare and social amenities, poverty and 
insecurity. Thus, with the discovery of oil came a glimmer of hope that Nigeria could yet still, 
wriggle out of its indebtedness. Moreover, it would be a calculated move towards growth and 
development as the new-found wealth would provide required finance for investment in 
infrastructure and sustainable development programmes. These measures as intended would 
present rapid economic transformation sustained by an efficient, cleaner and safer energy 
source.144 
 
Also, in line with hopes of economic stabilisation are the hopes of host states buying equity 
stakes in oil companies. This is characterised by the fact that the initial idea was that the 
government entered  into a joint venture (JV)partnership with oil companies typified in Nigeria 
with the government represented by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) of 
which the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) delineates each parties rights and 
obligations, giving Nigeria a fair controlling share of activities oil companies  in the region145 
as well as to some extent influence the investment decision making of these oil companies.146 
However, the JV arrangement was replaced by a Production Sharing Contract (PSC) as the 
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government was always in default owing to its incessant cash calls.147 This however limited 
the government’s grip/intrusion in activities of oil companies but placed no obligation on the 
government with regards the frequent cash calls.  
 
However, the extent to which these objectives were achieved is a different issue altogether as 
there are plethora of criticisms of oil companies and their economic impact on economies of 
developing countries, Nigeria inclusive.148   Critics of oil companies in the oil sector of host 
states was of the view that oil companies counterproductive to the economic stability of host 
nations, with powers to bring down economies overnight149 as well being used as foreign policy 
instruments of their respective home states to stall economic development in the developing 
countries they operate .150 One may have to reconsider the idea of oil companies as tools of 
economic development if their activities destroy local entrepreneurship drive, raise capital and 
make it insufficient available to local firms.151 
 
Oil companies have also been accused of feeding the government false information relating to 
their economic activities as well as repatriating profits back to their home states leaving the 
economies of host nations bereft of FDI.152 This was the view of some critics who challenged 
the activities of multinational oil companies in the Nigeria oil sector, questioning their 
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rationalization as agents of economic stability153  given that Nigeria remains underdeveloped 
even after of over 50 years of exploration and exploitation of natural resources by transnational 
corporations. If this is the case, it could be argued that the promise of economic stability from 
exploitation of natural resources by unachievable. However, these view does not replace the 
fact there were aspirations for globalization, diversification and stability of the economies of 
host states from takings in the oil and gas industry lead by oil companies all achievable through 
hopes of clean technology transfer as will be discussed below.  
  
1.13 Technology Transfer (TT) and Development 
In line with principle 20 of the UN Stockholm Declaration 1972,154 host nations in return for 
the exploration and exploitation rights granted to oil companies and incentives put in place to 
attract them, expects influx of technology that would sustain economic growth and 
development in these nations. Moreover, the UN Conference on Trade and Development 1985 
(UNCTAD) further reiterated the need for the North to South technology transfer facilitated by 
transnational corporations. It described technology transfer as communication of: 
…systematic knowledge for the manufacture of a product, for the 
application of a process or for the rendering of a service’ that ‘does not 
extend to transactions involving the mere sale or lease of goods. 
 
such knowledge must be inclusive of all ‘entrepreneurial expertise and professional know-
how’ needed to commercialise the technology.155  For instance, in Nigeria, the anticipated 
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technology transfer that would spill from multinational oil companies was anticipated to bolster 
the Nigeria’s vision 2020 agenda as one of the high points of that agenda was:  
 
…establishing a global competitive manufacturing sector that contributes 
significantly to GDP with a manufacturing value added of not less than 
40%.156 
 
Moreover, some notable treaties further stressed the need for technology transfer through FDI. 
Article 202 of the United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS) stressed the 
need for co-operation by actors in developing countries ‘in promoting … the development and 
transfer of technology and knowledge’.157Article 4.2 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer also made mention of such transfer of environmentally sound 
technology 1987 (EST).158 The Brundtland Report159 towed a similar part. It placed an 
obligation that the promotion of sustainable development must be in tandem with the 
development and diffusion of new technologies.160 
In the light of the provisions above, the importance of TT seems quite illuminated and the 
aspiration of such transfer into host nations (and other sectors) looking reasonable.  
In the context of Nigeria, Shell among notable oil companies161  will be singled out owing to 
its diversity in this sector. Shell has made some contributions to the technological development 
in Nigeria. However, critics argue that such developments do not stem from TT but strictly 
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their corporate social liability contribution.162  It was further argued that though Shell had some 
good developmental strategies in Nigeria which focus on community development projects, 
road construction, rural electrification, construction of water pipelines, and donation of farming 
equipment. On the one hand, provision of these facilities satisfies the development interests 
and expectation of Nigerians but on the other hand, it falls short of the technology transfer 
requirement; ‘productive production steps’, ‘application of a process’, ‘entrepreneurial 
expertise’ and above all, an ability to ‘commercialise’.163 
 
Furthermore, TT is ostensibly hinged on the availability of personnel to use it, interpret, and 
apply it. Hence technology if received but not managed, is tantamount to no TT.164 Hence the 
idea of TT in the Nigerian Oil and Gas sector as in most host nations seems quite illusory as 
this sector is a beehive of expatriate personnel who are key players in the sector.165  Moreover, 
technology transfer works in consonance with research and development. However, the 
Research and Development departments of most oil companies are based at their headquarters 
abroad.166 This sets one off thinking how TT is possible if this is the case. To buttress this point, 
Shell recently formed a JV with China’s National Petroleum Corporation to develop more 
effective drilling techniques to be used in Nigeria.167 
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Most importantly, the advent of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Law 
(TRIPPS Agreement) by the World Trade Organisation made the idea of technology transfer 
even more cosmetic. TRIPS represented a strengthened Intellectual Property Rights which in 
return will pave way for developing countries to have access to the markets of the developed 
countries and the transfer of technology from the North to the South.168 However, in practice, 
TRIPS have been met with serious criticisms. In Nigeria for example most patents in the natural 
resources sector are owned by the transnational corporations. If this is the case, the resultant 
cost of using such technology is an impediment to the perceived TT, oil companies activities 
should facilitate.169Moreover, most oil companies would rather keep host nations in the dark 
and completely dependent on them, than pave way for clean TT.170  
 
 Nigeria has enacted new law to address and is known as the Nigeria’s Local Content 
Legislation.171 This was a move to maximally sup the gains of oil companies and TT in the 
NOGS whereas, if there was effective and practicable TT in this sector, there would be no need 
for such law. This crystalizes the bickering of critics on the issue of TT and transnational 
corporations in operation in developing countries.  
 
In the light of these issues, it becomes imperative that oil companies in the host states portend 
promises of a win-win situation that serves fuels and satisfies interest of both parties through 
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exploration and exploitation of natural resources in these regions. However, in practice the 
outcome seems rather lopsided as interests of both parties are meshed in this neverending battle 
of interests which ultimately, fails to satisfy the goals of either party but rather a pre-empts 
conflicts, court cases and exorbitant and never ending arbitration proceedings that stalls 
development and economic emancipation, leaving each party with weeping financial costs, 
which a harmonisation of these interests from the start would have helped avoid.   
A discovery of the grounds of conflict between host nations and multinational oil companies 
especially in issues of profit maximization presupposes the need to even out these conflicts and 
temper it with a balance that serves the interests of all actors in the oil industry. The balancing 
act will not only accelerate profit both ways but will breed a stable industrial and economic 
climate that promotes sustainability of the business relationship and interest of the players in 
the business on the one hand and the environment on the other.  
  
One may argue that the first step towards striking this balance is a realisation of both parties 
that the importance of the environment where the exploration and exploitation is carried out; 
the case of the ‘golden goose that lays the golden eggs’; host states and transnational 
corporations must of necessity understand and subscribe to ‘promote social and environmental 
justice on an equal footing with corporate profits’. This notion has been topical in corporate 
governance, sustainable development and international investment literature.172 Researchers 
suggest that a transformation of investment treaties, arbitration mechanisms and contract 
models alone may not necessarily be all that is needed for the required overhaul and balance in 
the extractive industry of host nations; hence the need for both parties to actively work towards 
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better environmental justice which its realisation to a great extent, bridles an even balance of 
interests without jettisoning corporate profits.  
To diffuse arguments that continually question the viability of environmental justice as a 
balancing tool, attention need be drawn to the fact that it is the responsibility of key actors in 
the industry to promote and protect the life, health and natural environment where they operate, 
and it is upon assuming these responsibilities will the eventual profits be reaped maximally and 
symbiotically.173 Ecuador is an example of a host nation where responsible environmental 
justice succeeded as a balancing tool that tempered the seeming unending conflict and years of 
expensive arbitrations suits and counter suits following the activities of Chevron in the 
region.174 
 
Enshrining the ‘Buenvivr’ in their 2008 Constitution evened the inadequate institutional 
frameworks and the chain of errors in economic and foreign investment policies and decision 
making that has been the cause of conflict with Texaco- Chevron and the government of 
Ecuador since the discovery of oil in the country in 1967. This example comes with 
considerable support both globally and within Ecuador175 and since its inclusion in the 
constitution of Ecuador, has helped the countries National Judicial Council resolve over 550 
cases with about 614 pending settlement out of 1164 all between 2008 and 2013; and primarily 
between the government/host communities and Chevron.176 
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With the environmental justice established as the benchmark that must direct exploration and 
exploitation of natural resources and the rubric that pivots the relationship between  
transnational oil companies and host states; this realisation bring to the fore the need for a 
standardised legal and judicial regime that will not only ensure  sustainable practices and 
compliance but also institutes achievable legal codes, standards and agreements which all 
players in the exploitation of natural resources must strictly comply with. Just as important as 
promoting environmental justice and standards, there is that fact of accelerating and 
consolidating host nation’s judicial systems and redoubling efforts to ensure some stability in 
the legal and regulatory regimes of host states; disenable codes, principles and regulations that 
guide business relationship between host nations and multinational companies.177 Instituting 
this, comes with it certain rewards which not only tempers conflict between actors in the oil 
industry but is evidently good for the business relations, ensuring stability and quality in the 
provision of justice, providing an optimal access to justice to all actors in the oil trade and a 
system of continuous improvement, modernization and strengthening of host nations mediation 
systems as well as the assurance of effective judicial proceedings. As window dressing to this 
hybrid judicial system, governments of host nations must extol meritocracy as the system of 
value in their judicial system through establishing professional ethics and standards.178  These 
developments will not only bridle the conflicts between multinational oil companies and host 
nations, it goes further than that; providing an attractive economic environment for 
international investments179 or as the case may be, FDI that encompasses an equitable and 
sustainable aspirations of all actors in the oil trade.  
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A lesson from this is evident in Ecuador where an overhaul of their judicial and regulatory 
systems was imminent following protracted cases and arbitration hearings with Chevron and 
the realisation that the country suffered from weak judicial and regulatory system that 
continually failed to address the business relationship with Chevron as well as the use of 
extraction technologies harmful to the environment.180 However, equipped with a better 
judicial system, Ecuador not only succeeded in swaying some of the court and arbitration ruling 
to their favour, they also compelled Chevron submit to the principle of forum non 
convinienshence adjudicating most cases before Ecuadorian courts.181 As illustrated in the case 
of Aguinda v Texaco Inc, 142F.Supp. 2d 534 (S.D. NY 2001) where the claimants sought 
compensation for damages; judicial protection to remedy environmental pollution on their 
lands and compensation for injury to persons and property caused by pollution. The New York 
District court rejected Chevrons’ claims and held that the case should be heard by Ecuadorian 
courts, ruling that Chevron must submit to Ecuadorian courts and also recognise the ability of 
Ecuadorian courts to decide on issues filed against the Chevron. 
Rife as it is, this tempered conflict between Ecuador and Chevron that was already at breaking 
point at the time, hence with Chevron’s recognition of the Ecuadorian judicial system’s 
capability to deal with the complaints filed against the company and vice-versa, it gave the 
relationship the needed breath of life that was required at this stage, redefining the business 
relationship between Chevron and the government of Ecuador. Under the new regime, the 
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government of Ecuador appreciates and supports the principle that investment risks should be 
properly rewarded182 and they have continued to show commitment to this.  
On the other hand, there is the realisation of both parties to jointly and closely work together 
to renegotiate or terminate BIT’s inconsistent with the principles of environmental justice, 
responsible democracy and human rights.183 This renewed commitment and need for balance 
and stability was represented in the Joint Declaration on Transnational Corporations and 
Human Rights presented by Ecuador before the 24th Ordinary Session of the Human Rights 
Council of the United Nations, seeking to ensure that multinationals act within the limits of 
their powers and are subject to scrutiny and monitoring procedures to ensure the promotion of 
environmental justice and respect for human rights in countries they operate.184 
With the lessons from Ecuador above, it is imperative that a strengthened legal and judicial 
regime backed with definitive and sustainable codes, practices and agreements may be 
considered foundational in making even the incessant conflicts between host nations and 
international multinational oil companies in the exploration and exploitation of natural 
resources. Developing countries must learn from Ecuador, strengthening their legal and judicial 
regime which is of essence especially in issues of reforming BITs and understanding the 
arbitration frameworks which will always come into play should a healthy balance of interest 
and aspirations be expected between multinational oil companies and the host nations in which 
they operate especially in developing countries. 
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An illustration of good practice that can be borrowed from Ecuador following their difficult 
relationship with Chevron is explained here. Ecuador came up with some recommendations in 
reforming arbitration systems. Some useful points include; selecting arbitrators through 
transparent processes that ensures they serve solely as jurors and not as legal representatives of 
companies with cases before the arbitration to avoid conflict of interests. In addition, they 
established an institutional mechanism within the arbitration system that allows parties to 
appeal awards and consequently, they made it a requirement that all local remedies be 
exhausted before entering the arbitration system. The analysis here clearly established that 
Ecuador’s approach might suit and address the concerns and needs of the majority of 
developing countries and avoids the challenges of restrictive standing negatively affects both 
human and the environment. Thus, the host state and the transnational corporations can jointly 
work together and renegotiate or terminate Bit’s inconsistent with the principle of fundamental 
rights and environmental justice. In addition, transnational corporations operating in 
developing countries should respect people and environmental rights in countries they operate 
and the host state in developing countries should consider adopting Ecuador’s template which 
is perceived as perfect for their particular needs. 
Asymmetry to the issues above is the extent to which the activities of multinational oil 
companies are perceived as susceptible to external socio- political influences and disparate to 
domestic interests, threatening the physical, informational and cultural idiosyncrasies of host 
nations as well as exploitative rather than developmental,185 leading to the appropriation wave 
that rocked international investment in the 70’s. This has been sources of concurrent conflict 
with host nations especially in developing countries and common in Nigeria. Socio-political 
scholars theorise that the answer to this niggling trend is putting in place an enabling policy 
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environment that foster private investment.186However, practical this may seem it has failed to 
get to the bottom of the conflict considering the nature of the economic, social and political 
climate of these developing countries where these conflicts brew.  
One may argue that the ‘enabling policy environment’ ideology helped promote liberal 
domestic and foreign investment policies, with government restrictions on regulated economies 
lifted and replaced with workable and well drafted investment codes, implemented to provide 
a congenial climate where foreign investment thrives making for a more interactive business 
relations between host nations and multinational oil companies. Be that as it may, these 
measures, though veritable attempts, still are yet to get to the bottom of the conflict and have 
failed to even out the differences held so dear by parties to this conflict in the oil industry. 
Leaving even the greater challenge of; what is to be done to balance these variances in 
perception, interests and conflicts?  
In answer to the above question many legal and socio-political scholars have borrowed answers 
from the Corporate Social Responsibility literature. However, lessons from host nations 
especially in developing countries have revealed that there is only little good that corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) models and initiatives can do to balance these variant interests 
without leaving behind a trail of other issues, all fuelling the tussle for interests. It is not 
uncommon that CSR models of multinational oil companies breeds problems of its own in 
developing countries. Strategy scholars, institutional researchers as well as business ethicists 
reveal the struggle multinationals face in responding effectively to CSR issues in host nations 
where they operate187 which commonly is the confusion on which set of standards to adopt. 
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Should they develop multiple identities in the different markets they operate or rely on a single 
identity in guiding their CSR practices?188 This confusion suggests CSR is far from the answer 
to balancing the conflict between actors in the oil industry but rather a further source of conflict. 
With CSR and enabling policy environment ruled out as balancing tools to the conflicts 
between host nations and multinational oil companies in Nigeria and other developing host 
nations. There is need to dig deeper to first unearth the background of the conflict and then 
proffer a solution that suggest a healthy balance of interests.  
To understand the hostility and  suspicion host nations have of multinational oil companies as 
susceptible to external influences and disparate to domestic interests comes with the realisation 
that developing countries by virtue of their economic disposition have basic concerns: endemic 
illiteracy, inadequate agricultural, animal husbandry, health  and family planning programs; 
overburdened social-service programs; bureaucratic red tapes; untapped natural and human 
resources; unstable economies with insurmountable void between the haves and the have-nots 
coupled with dysfunctional policies  which are products of internal political strife.189 With these 
problems staring developing host nations in the face, they come to no other assumption than; 
that national development programmes of multinational oil companies are and should be 
designed to come to terms with these problems and effectively transform their societies. 
Moreover, since multinational oil companies are considered ‘major forces influencing 
economic and cultural developments far from home and far into the future and with resources 
for FDI are and should be definitely, the supposed agents for the desired change host 
developing nations aspire for.190 However disparate to this is the moral principle that influences 
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actions of transnational corporations in host nations which more often than not are based on 
Judeo-Christian values, dominated by the three normative ethical theories of deontological, 
utilitarian and situation. It is not uncommon that most investment decisions of multinational 
oil companies are based on deontological ethics, acting autonomously on the basis of their 
reason alone and with emphasis on the whether such actions satisfy some formal conditions, 
duties and choices regardless of their possible consequences. This may be likened to a checklist 
which suggests that if all the boxes are checked then the investment decision must definitely 
be the needful.  
Research has revealed that basing FDI in host states of the developing world on deontological 
ethics is generally incompatible with the socio-economic characteristics of these societies and 
never at par with their polity.191  First, if effectively practiced, it emphasises the welfare of the 
whole group, not just that of the elite and from the perspective of this group and not that of 
transnational corporations. Secondly, the tenets of these ethics are consistent with the 
requirement that community members contribute to community welfare;192 dousing fears of 
corporate philanthropy of a multinational corporation spiralling out of hand and increasing 
dependency from the host nations rather than reversing it.193 This is in line with the fears 
expressed by socio –legal scholars that the activities of multinational oil companies have indeed 
created the greatest form of dependency since the end of colonialism.194  On situation an ethics, 
its heritage makes it readily applicable to most developing countries environments where group 
decisions are based on oral traditions and group consensus fundamental to social traditions. 
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Hence, considering multinational oil companies in operation in Nigeria as well as in other 
developing countries operate in varying and sometimes imperceptibly, cultural environments, 
interacting with culturally disparate ethnic groups, should they  adopt situation or utilitarian 
ethics as the modus operandi it will invariably provide the required reconciliation to the social 
and cultural conflicts needed for effective corporate decision making.195 
 Moreover, the adoption of regional codes of conduct shifts the emphasis from establishing 
ambitious programs to contributing to solving social programs, which if left unsolved, affects 
the profitability of the corporation and ultimately, limits its survival.196  This in essence 
influences the CSR strategies of multinational oil companies, targeting doable projects and 
taking into consideration moral initiatives consistent with the corporation’s markets, products 
and service offerings, social environment, economy and the interest of stakeholders.197  Taking 
this on board is consistent with the notion that corporations should be responsive to their host 
nations and that the interests of the latter should be the basis for the future direction of the 
corporation.198 
Since the eventual FDI that will flow from the presence of the multinationals in the host state 
is tailor made to suit the socio-economic climate of that nation, it follows that investment 
decisions are and will be based on situation and utilitarian ethics, making all stakeholders in 
the industry meaningful participants in the economic activities therein.199 This bridles the 
common problems of situations where development interests of multinational oil companies 
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are tied to that of their home countries and at variance with that of the host nation. Making the 
host state a consumer of the policy preferences of another sovereign nation (the transnational 
corporations home state), adjusting its foreign and domestic policies in conformity with the 
desires of dominant state.200 
Regardless of arguments that suggest otherwise, clearly, adopting a voluntary regional code of 
practice will to a great extent provide ethical guidelines for the continued effective presence 
and involvement of multinational oil companies in the extractive industries of host nation, 
balancing the conflicts of interests and ensuring that both parties benefit gainfully from the 
proceeds and processes in the oil industry. These measures also be extended to CSR models, 
technology transfer as well as in contracts and agreements between the duo. 
1.14   Conclusions 
The findings have shown that there is legal framework which protect foreign investors and their 
investment, and the same provision is expected to confer mutual benefit for the investors and 
the host state but that did not materialise. As established in this chapter that the conduct of 
investors is not regulated in investment treaties, nor is that of the corporations. Neither in 
international investment treaties or local law there is no effective way of regulating the 
activities of transnational corporations in the host statess territories. Therefore, the BITs are 
regarded as one-sided which focused only on investors’ protection. However, the decision from 
the cases discussed in this chapter in relation to arbitration established that arbitrators are 
challenging the conduct of transnational corporations. The chapter has established through 
these cases that investment treaties created certain obligations on host states and transnational 
corporations. 
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The investor’s obligations were derived from international principles such as principle of good 
faith which ensures no one benefits from his wrong action. The chapter has shown that the 
tribunal approaches is to strike the right balance between the host state and transnational 
corporations. It is further observed from this chapter that developed countries have managed 
to overcome the deficiency of investment treaties, they have successfully incorporated a 
general exception clause which allowed them to justify regulatory measures and these measures 
are allowed because they do not constitute indirect expropriation. On the contrary, in CMS v 
Argentina201 where the tribunal held that provision under BIT had been engaged and Argentina 
measures were considered to be in violation of investment treaties. Similarly, the tribunal held 
in Saluka202that Ecuador’s measures were tantamount to expropriation and the tribunal argued 
that principle of proportionality provides that administrative measures must be balanced against 
investors’ interest. Consequently, this chapter has demonstrated that one of the challenges 
associated with investment treaties is the lack of provision regulating investors’ conduct in 
investment treaties, but it is believed that there are international mechanisms which define the 
right and obligations of member states with regards to the ocean. It covers the business 
activities and sets out guidelines for the transnational corporations. The next chapter takes care 
of this and examines the duties of transnational corporations and the host states. 
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                                  CHAPTER 2 
DUTIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HOW A RIGHT BALANCE 
MAY BE STRUCK 
2.1   Introduction 
In one of the four hypotheses through which this research is underpinned, it is asked whether 
there is any legal nexus between environmental pollution and breach of the fundamental rights 
of people?In response, this chapter explores issues bordering on awareness of fundamental 
rights as a vehicle for environmental protection. Although little credence has been given to this 
aspect in the law, and this dimension should have been directly incorporated into it, particularly 
in Nigeria,1 a perti 
2.2 The UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 1803 (XVII) on the Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 1962 
The UN 1962 Resolution upholds the ‘inalienable right of all states freely to dispose of their 
natural wealth and resources in accordance with their national interests2 it also recognises the 
right of a nation to expropriate or nationalise the property of transnational corporations. 1962 
Resolution however provided that ‘the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in 
accordance with the rules in force in the state taking such measures in the exercise of its 
sovereignty and in accordance with international law.3 Additionally, Miranda has further 
explained that transnational corporations in developing states aim to obtain maximum 
guarantees for the security of their investment such as promise of non-expropriation and 
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legislative stability.4 Nevertheless, the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources has been described as a fundamental right of states, as well as of peoples. Tyagi posits 
that “the principle and the right represent the resolve of developing countries to attain economic 
independence and to assert the authority of domestic law”.5 This provision has enabled 
developing country to rise up to the challenges of international monopolies because Article 21 
(5) of the African Charter provides that: 
 State Parties to the present Charter shall undertake to eliminate all forms of 
foreign economic exploitation particularly that practised by international 
monopolies so as to enable their peoples to fully benefit from the advantages 
derived from their natural resources.6 
 
Ideally, the principle of PSNR is commonly accepted and the right is regularly contested as 
discussed in chapter 1 under investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) where Investment 
Tribunals prioritise the terms of International Investment Agreements over host state ability to 
make law. In addition, concluded that ISDS has been decried as a means of permitting foreign 
investors to undermine host states’ regulatory powers.7 This can be justified by the fact that 
developing states are exposed to traditional international law and its controversial features and 
procedure for the settlement of disputes with transnational corporations that were particularly 
a matter of host state jurisdiction. The UN 1962 Resolution was eventually introduced for a 
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change and it is obvious from its principle, the principle of PSNR which upholds the right of 
state to freely dispose of their natural resources according to their national interest.  
Importantly, special features of oil and gas contracts are found in the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) Resolution 1962. Resolution 1803 on the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources attached some importance to the economic development of developing states and 
emphasised their economic independence. For example, paragraph 1 declares that 
The right of people and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural 
wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national 
development and of the well-being of the people of the State concerned.8 
 
Moreover, paragraph 6 provides that international involvement or dealings should be based 
upon respect for the sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources and paragraph 7 clearly 
stated that violations of the rights under the 1962 Resolution is contrary to the spirit and 
principles of the charter of the United Nations and that such violation will surely hampers the 
development of international co-operation and the maintenance of peace.9 In addition, 
paragraph 4 of the 1962 Resolution needs to be critically discussed because it provides that: 
 
Nationalisation, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds 
or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are 
recognised as overriding purely individual or private interests, both 
domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate 
compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such 
measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with 
international law. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise 
                                                          
8 Paragraph 1 of the 1962 UN Resolution. 
 






to a controversy, the national jurisdiction of the states and other parties 
concerned, settlement of the dispute should be made through arbitration or 
international adjudication.10 
 
The 1962 Resolution has been faced with a lot of criticism and Schrijver has argued that 1962 
Resolution contained a compromise between respect for national sovereignty and other rights 
and obligations under international law.11 Nico further explained that the Resolution was put 
in place as an attempt to satisfy developing states because it referred to domestic law at 
paragraph 4 above on issues of compensation to be settled for compulsory-taking of foreign 
investment. At the same time, the resolution tried to assure developed states when reference 
was made to international law as well as reference to adjudication to settle disputes between 
transnational corporations and host states for compensation on expropriation matters. It was 
further argued that the 1962 United Nation Resolution created scope for a conflict interpretation 
and a good example is the United States declaration that in its view the word “appropriate was 
the equivalent of prompt, adequate and effective.” Meanwhile, 1962 Resolution only envisaged 
the standard of appropriate compensation not the United States interpretation. However, the 
US Government has maintained the position that under international law compensation must 
be prompt, adequate and effective. It has also been introduced and appeared in many bilateral 
investment treaties concluded by the United States and other BITs negotiated by capital-
exporting states among themselves as well as with developing state.12 On the other hand, Tyagi 
believed that the US interpretation and formulation has been resisted by the developing states 
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and perhaps the resistance has been the only cause the formulation has not been incorporated 
into multilateral agreements or been used by the international tribunals.13 
Furthermore, the UN eventually made certain clarification on appropriate standard of treatment 
and international law in the subsequent United Nation Resolutions on the similar topic known 
as Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 25 November 196614 and Permanent 
Sovereign over Natural Resources, 17 December 1973.15 Nevertheless, the UN effort and focus 
on domestic law to deal with matter of compensation in case a transnational corporation 
investment was expropriated continued until Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
(CERDS) was introduced.  CERDS consists of three chapters, chapter one deals with the 
“fundamentals of International economic relations” and chapter two addresses the “economic 
rights and duties of states”. Meanwhile the last chapter looks at the “common responsibilities 
towards the international community”.16 It is important to point out that CERDS was created 
to address some of the injustices of traditional investment legislation and the relevant articles 
are discussed below. Article 2 (2) (a) of CERDS provides that each state has the right: 
…to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment within its 
national jurisdiction in accordance with its national jurisdiction in 
accordance with its law and regulations and in conformity with its natural 
objectives and priorities. No state shall be compelled to grant preferential 
treatment to foreign investment.17 
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It is obvious from the above provision that States were given exclusive right to regulate foreign 
investment in accordance with its domestic legislation and national priorities. This provision 
reflects the needs and aspirations of most of developing states because it will enable them to 
create a law that will ensure transnational corporation operates under the local law. In addition, 
transnational corporation business activities will be in line with domestic legislation and a 
breach of any local law can be easily challenged at local courts. However, the majority of 
developed states abstained and some voted against the CERDS, particularly, article 2 (2) (a) 
above, because they wanted host states to deal with transnational corporation according to what 
they perceived to be right in their international obligations.18 Additionally, the developed states 
were against CERDS because of its provisions have empowered developing state to regulate 
and monitor the activities of foreign investors within its jurisdiction. Article 2 (2) (b) provides 
that each state has the right: 
 …to regulate and supervise the activities of transnational corporations 
within its national jurisdictions and take measures to ensure that such 
activities comply with its law, rules and regulations and conform with its 
economic and social policies. Transnational corporations shall not intervene 
in the internal affairs of a host state. Every state should, with full regard for 
its sovereign rights, cooperate with other states in the exercise of the right 
set forth in this subparagraph.19 
 
The above provision was welcomed by developing states because it supported their 
development aspirations and ability to control the activities of transnational corporations within 
their jurisdictions especially, in the absence of international legal mechanism or international 
code of conduct to check TNCs activities. However, provision under art 2 (2) (c) of CERDS 
failed to meet the demand of developed states because it stipulates that every state has the right 
                                                          
18 Ranjan, Prabhash, India and Bilateral Investment Treaties -- A Changing Landscape ICSID Review (2014), 
419- 424.  





to expropriate foreign investment and that states are to decide the right amount of compensation 
to be paid in line with their local laws. Therefore, it essential to look at Article 2 (2) (c) of the 
CERDS which provides that every state has the right: 
…to nationalise, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in 
which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the state adopting 
such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all 
circumstances that the state considers pertinent. In any case where the 
question of compensation gives rise to controversy, it shall be settled under 
the domestic law of the nationalising state and by its tribunals, unless it is 
freely and mutually agreed by all states concerned that other peaceful means 
be sought on the basis of sovereign equality of states and in accordance with 
the principle of free choice of means.20 
 
The above provision is contrary to the developed states request that the questions of 
compensation should be decided according to the principles of international law and Salacuse 
explained that developed states identified dangers to their economic dominance by the primacy 
of domestic law and as a result developed states have decided not to attach legal value to the 
CERDS.21 This move has also led the developed states to promote international investment law 
such as bilateral treaties which grant international protection to transnational corporations and 
give them opportunity to enforce those rights against host states in which they have carried out 
their business activities. Salacuse however concluded that the precise provisions of investment 
treaties are not the same and some treaties put limit on host state governmental action more 
than others and Salacuse believed that virtually all investment treaties address the same issue.22 
While some developed countries perceive the CERDS as a fundamental departure from the 
traditional rules of contemporary international law , the developing states however see it  as a 
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legally binding instrument imposing rights and obligations on states as seen in Article 2 
discussed above . It recommended the domestic law of the host state for the settlement of 
disputes between the transnational corporations and the host states.  
Consequently, it is clear from the above evaluation that CERDS like other resolutions of 
international organisations are not commonly recognised as a formal source of international 
law. This argument can be supported by the provision under Article 38 of the Statue of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ).23 However, such resolutions can contribute to the 
crystallisation or formation of new customary law according to final report of the committee 
on the formation of customary general international law.24  Nevertheless, the UN Resolution 
1962 was accepted by the majority including the leading capital-exporting countries as well as 
developing countries.  It could be argued that it was widely accepted due to its economic 
benefits and empowerment for the developing countries. Commentators such as Schrijver has 
also pointed out that  personal sovereignty over natural resources would “ give moral support 
to a country’s democratic  struggle for the control of its own means of substance, and enable 
the people to remain master of their own natural wealth and resources”25 Another writer points 
out that resolutions advocated for a reference point to respect both national law and the role of 
sovereignty over natural resources and he explained further that resolutions have challenged 
international economic law and the unbalance relationship between developed and developing 
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countries, and he concluded that the resolutions have highlighted the inequality of the economic 
system.26 
2.3 Striking the right balance between transnational corporations and host states. 
Transnational corporations have played a mixed role in global economy. Many positive impacts 
of foreign companies’ investment in the economics of host states have been identified by the 
academic writers.  One of the stated advantages is bringing in companies capable of low-cost 
and quality production. Further, evidence has suggested that they have been responsible for 
achievements of globalisation. For example, transnational corporations have brought many 
benefits attributed to globalisation, such as closing of the knowledge gap and the gap between 
developing and developed states. They have contributed to what is called a spill over benefits 
such as diffusion of knowledge and skills, faster productivity growth and higher wages.27 In 
addition, these corporations have facilitated the transfer of technology, the training of human 
resources and expansion of trade by opening the door to the international market. It is not 
disputed that oil and gas exploration and exploitation have a positive effect as claimed by the 
scholarly articles cited here. But, on the other hand, it is argued by Arruda that the exploration 
activities can have environmental and social impacts for local communities due to associated 
problems with oil and gas industry.28 He explains further that, the exposure to oil and gas 
contaminants disturb the activities and lives of communities living close to oil fields, pipelines, 
plants and wells. They are subject to contamination of soil, water, wildlife, livestock, air and 
sea. 
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Moreover, the number of incidents on environmental issues has established that transnational 
corporations are also responsible for some of the major environmental problems and disasters 
as a result of their exploration and production activities.29 For example, the 1989 disaster of 
Exxon Valdez off the Alaskan Coast, where crude oil contaminated around 1,300 miles of 
coastline and affected marine life, local people and fishing activities.30  Further, the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster is another mark in the history in the Gulf of Mexico. The incident which 
resulted in a massive oil leak after the explosion of oil rig that led to severe contamination and 
had adverse effect on local communities and fishing activities.31 Similarly in Nigeria, there was 
oil spill in Akwa Ibom State. ExxonMobil’s pipeline was reported ruptured and spilled about 
a million gallons of crude oil.  In addition, the UK North Sea spill cannot be overlooked. An 
incident where an oil rig located off the eastern coast of Scotland reported leaking into North 
Sea and the Shell which operates the oil rig reported that the spill released 1,300 barrels of oil 
and spread over a 2.5 square mile area. An oil spill from a Shell platform is regarded as the 
worst in the North Sea in a decade.32 Thus, if the right balance between the host states and 
transnational corporation can be achieved and sustained as discussed here; there is hope that 
the benefits will be preserved, and adverse effects mitigated.  
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Chapter 1 explored the interest and aspirations behind the investment of oil companies as well 
as the usual aspirations of host state from exploitation of natural resources which formed the 
basis of how a balance may be struck between the host state and transnational corporations. 
However, this chapter looks at the striking balance from different perspectives and is concerned 
with some of the most salient issues left out in chapter 1. 
2.3.1. BITs to focus in rights and responsibilities 
As noted previously in Chapter 1, that BITs are important tools for the stabilisation of oil and 
gas contracts. BITs play vital role in the prevention of political risks and provide support which 
ensures oil and gas contracts are stabilised. For example, when international law is not chosen 
as the governing law of the contract, the use of BITs provides for the application of 
international law as well as help in determining jurisdiction in case of dispute between the 
transnational corporations and the host state. Solimene has defined BITs as: 
 …an agreement made between two countries containing reciprocal 
undertakings for the promotion and protection of private investment made 
by nationals of the signatories in each other’s territories.33 
In addition, BITs provide that disputes arising out of contracts are referred to International 
arbitration and one of its features is the provision of the body with jurisdiction right to hear the 
disputes. For example, Article 25(1) ICSID Convention states that: 
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising 
directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any 
constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the 
Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State, which the 
parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the 
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parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent 
unilaterally.34 
 
Nevertheless, host states may opt out and argue that certain matters may not be referred to 
International arbitration according to Article 25(4) of ICSID Convention which provides that:  
Any Contracting State may, at the time of ratification, acceptance or 
approval of this Convention or at any time thereafter, notifies the Centre of 
the class or classes of disputes which it would or would not consider 
submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre. The Secretary-General shall 
forthwith transmit such notification to all Contracting 18 Convention States. 
Such notification shall not constitute the consent required by paragraph 
(1).35 
 
The state may also withdraw completely from the ICSID provided they express this in writing.  
Venezuela denounced the ICSID Convention in 2012.36  States are allowed to opt out, 
according to the provision of Article 71 of ICSID convention which states that:  
Any contracting state may denounce this convention by written notice to 
depositing of this convention. The denunciation shall take effect six months 
after receipt of such notice.37 
 
It should be noted that, even where the state has not expressed its desire to pull-out from the 
ICISD Convention, it is mandatory that the parties concerned give a written consent otherwise 
the ICSID will not have jurisdiction. This provision together with investor state arbitration have 
been criticised by Ghouri for being unfair because the rights of foreign investors are created by 
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the rules incorporated in BITs.38Ghouri posits further that the rules of BITs are comparable 
with and stand parallel to the rules created by the domestic laws of host states concluding that 
arbitral tribunals should strive to balance these rights when conflicts arises between the host 
state and transnational corporations.39  Article II (2) (A) of the treaty between United State of 
America and Argentina can be cited as an example because it demanded for “full protection 
and security” for investors.40The treaty requires that foreign investors should be protected from 
all acts that might cause damage or loss to their investments and the implication of this for the 
host state is that it can be held liable for wrong acts it has not committed.  
Some agreements stipulate that present and future investments must enjoy ongoing security 
and protection.41 On this point, Surya added that the host states are bound by ‘chilling effect’ 
of BITs not to implement any destructive regulations to the activities of the transnational 
corporations.42 Therefore, it is important that ITA tribunals play a crucial role on matters 
relating to host states’ sovereign powers to regulate which may cause damage or loss to the 
investment of transnational corporations. Tribunals should endeavour to balance between the 
rights of transnational corporations and the rights of host states since the primary duty of an 
ITA tribunal according to McLachlan includes interpretation of the treaty in a way that will 
provide both the procedural and substantive basis for the dispute.43 
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One of the disadvantages of bilateral treaties is that they have focused on the rights and not on 
the responsibilities of transnational corporations. However, some of ITA Tribunal cases have 
clearly indicated that both rights and responsibilities are needed to be considered when 
determining appropriate compensation. For example, in Metalclad Corp v The United 
Mexican States, 44 the company had agreed to clean up the improperly dumped hazardous 
materials that have resulted in diseases and environmental pollution but failed to do so. The 
local authority then denied the building permit initially granted by the Mexican Secretarial of 
the Environment and Natural Resources. Metalclad then brought an action against the Mexican 
government and sued for damages under Chapter 11 of NAFTA for $90 million and the 
company was awarded $16.7 Million by an ICISD arbitration panel. The significant point here 
is that in determining the award, Tribunal only looked at the Metaclad’s rights and investments 
but ignored its obligation to clean up the hazardous material which formed the basis of the 
initial agreement. Metalclad case is therefore one example of the failure of transnational 
corporations to live up to expectations and fulfil their responsibilities. 
2.3.2. Non-discrimination 
The principle of non-discrimination has been a long-standing feature of bilateral treaties and 
international trade relations.  It constitutes a corner-stone in different fields of international law 
according to Nicolas.45 World Trade Organisation explains that the principle of non-
discrimination in international trade enables the function of comparative advantage because it 
encourages the purchase of goods from the most proficient foreign producers. It will also 
eliminate national discriminatory protective policy.46 On the other hand, Hudec posits that 
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discriminatory measures lead to “a misallocation of resources by inducing a shift of resources 
towards those relatively less efficient producers who are favoured and away from those more 
efficient producers who are disfavoured”47 However, it is established that non-discrimination 
principle states that contracting parties to BITs shall not treat local market actors more 
favourably than foreign actors (this is known as national treatment NT), or differentiate 
between foreign actors by origin which is referred to as most favoured- nation treatment.  
Non-discrimination obligations cover a wide range of area and it forbids indirect 
discrimination. In addition, non-discrimination obligations are regularly applied by 
international arbitral tribunals and Robert posits that the system appear to be 
functioning.48Some cases relating to non-discrimination have shown that a commitment to non-
discrimination, or equality remain a critical area of international trade law.  
 
The case of BP Exploration v Libyan Arab Republic49 involved an oil concession initially 
granted to an individual Mr Nelson Bunker Hunt in 1957. In 1960 Mr Hunt allocated to BP 
one-half of his interest, BP then became operator and carried out exploration activities in the 
areas and discovered oil in large quantities. The then Libyan government was overthrown and 
the new regime nationalised BP’s interest in the concession and the case was eventually 
referred to arbitration.  A genuine ground for concluding that the nationalisation of the 
properties of the British oil company wasillegal was the fact that the court found Libyan acts 
discriminatory in character. Similarly, in Libyan American Oil Co (LIAMCO) v. Government 
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of the Libyan Arab Republic,50 the Libyan government adopted the petroleum law of 1955 and 
granted exploration contracts to LIAMCO and the contracts were the subject of arbitration. The 
concession permitted exclusive rights for 50 years to discover and sell oil from certain areas of 
Libyan territory. In 1969, the government was overthrown, and the new regime implemented 
nationalisation measure which affected LIAMCO Concession agreements. LIAMCO brought 
an action against Libya and claimed that nationalisation measures were confiscatory, 
discriminatory, unlawful breach of agreement, wrongful taking and contrary to Libyan 
Principles of law as well as the Principles of international law. The tribunals held and confirmed 
that Libyan government took several measures and those measures were “purely discriminatory 
nationalisation, illegal and wrongful”.51 
One of the dangers of the bilateral investment treaties claimed by Stiglitz Joseph is that BITs 
introduced what he regarded as reverse discrimination. In addition, he believes that 
transnational corporations are being treated well, with greater protection, than locally 
incorporated firms.52 Therefore, in order to strike the right balance, the host state should ensure 
they enter into BITs with utmost priority given to discrimination issues. Similarly, transnational 
corporations are also concerned about discrimination. Particularly, when host states unilaterally 
enact law that will prevent them from carrying on their business activities or passing legislation 
that deliberately affect the type of business transnational corporations are engaged in. 
Consequently, evidence from other sectors outside oil and gas industries have indicated that 
discrimination occurs in many business activities and some governments encourage it in their 
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internal policies. For example, Joseph has argued that all states engage in some discrimination 
and supported his argument with the claim that U.S government officials are required to fly in 
American carriers, a practice he describes as an ‘implicit discrimination’.53 The courts in 
America have dealt with several discrimination cases and the Supreme Court found in City of 
Richmond V Croson Co,54 that a measure which treated companies’ differently on the basis of 
origin of their owners would be unconstitutional in the absence of genuine justification. 
Richmond case was a case in which America Supreme Court decided that a contract which set 
aside a programme or gave preference to local minority businesses was unconstitutional under 
the equal protection clause.55 
2.3.3. Transparency and giving regards to legitimate expectations 
The requirements of transparency are also important in order to strike the right balance 
particularly in developing states. Transparency means that the legal framework for the business 
activities between the transnational corporations and host states are readily apparent and that 
crucial decisions that may affect their dealings may be traceable back to the initial legal frame-
work. Consequently, any attempt from either party to violate their obligations to afford 
transparency can be easily detected. For instance, a situation whereby the host state had failed 
to act in accordance with the outcome of discussions previously held with transnational 
corporations as highlighted in the case of Tecmed v Mexico.56 In that case, it was held that 
Mexico violated Article 5 of the Spain-Mexico BIT.57 The tribunal also concluded that INE’s 
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decision not to renew the license was a de facto indirect expropriation. The tribunal then 
emphasised on the strict formula that a state must ‘act in a consistent manner, free from 
ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor’.58 The case of 
Pope and Talbot 59 also exposes failure of the host state to engage in forthright communications 
with the investor and the tribunal held that SLD’s treatment of the investment in relation to the 
verification review process constituted a denial of the fair and equitable treatment required by 
Article 1105 and found Canada liable to the investor for the resultant damages. This is also 
applicable where the host state fails to ensure that there is consistence between the 
representations made by the different organs of government with respect to the same 
investment as pointed out by the tribunal in the case of Metalclad discussed earlier on. The 
tribunal used the NAFTA’s articulation of transparency as a general treaty objective to build a 
stringent standard of application for NAFTA Article 1105. The tribunal ruled that the article 
requires a NAFTA state to ensure that all relevant legal requirements must be capable of being 
readily known to foreign investors and that ‘there should be no room for doubt or uncertainty 
on such matter’.60 On the other hand, host states may not be found to violate any rules where 
regulations are publicised, and transnational corporations are made aware beforehand of any 
rules that govern their business activities. The case of Champion Trading v Egypt ICSID61 
can be cited to support this point. This case was brought under the United States-Egypt BIT.62  
The claimant in this case relied heavily on the requirement of fair and equitable treatment. 
However, the tribunal acknowledged that transparency principle exists but held that the 
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claimant ‘were in position to know beforehand all rules and regulations that would govern their 
investment for the respective season to come’.63 
It is therefore understood from all the cases discussed that transparency from perspectives of 
host states is integral to the maximum protection of investments. It must also be noted that few 
developing states have the regulatory or legal mechanism in place to give room for full 
transparency and investor participation and not until this is achieved, a right balance may not 
be struck between the host states and transnational corporations particularly in developing 
states. 
Furthermore, the world-wide promotion of transparency for the oil and gas industries has 
become accepted as the right solution to weaknesses in governance in developing states. It is 
submitted that if transnational corporations disclose publicly their dealings with the host state 
government, then citizens of developing state will be able to hold a government accountable. 
This may eventually minimise corruption and mitigate conflicts between the transnational 
corporations and host states.   
2.4 Duties of transnational corporations 
It is established that UNCLOS III is the only agreement which successfully defines the right 
and obligations of member states with regards to the Oceans. It covers the business activities 
and sets out guide lines for transnational corporations. It is understood that efforts were made 
on three occasions before an agreement could be reached in 1982 which saw the birth of 
UNCLOS III.  
UNCLOS I brought about four different conventions after a conference in Switzerland from 
1956 to 1958. It was first considered as a successful effort but later revealed the crucial issues 
                                                          





that must be addressed. Areas of territorial waters were left uncovered. Efforts continued in 
order to fill the gap left by UNCLOS I. The aim was to have a unified convention that will 
cover the whole issues, therefore, another conference was held in 1960 but the participants 
were unable to reach any agreement due to the fact that majority of the participants were there 
only as allies or dependants of developed nations. They dominated the negotiations and no 
agreements were reached until more states were allowed to take part in their own capacities 
which resulted in the UNCLOS III. 
Annex III, Article 4 and paragraph 4 deals with issue of exploration and responsibilities of host 
state. Meanwhile, UNCLOS III also stipulates direct and specific obligations for transnational 
corporations. This chapter examines all of these as well as international legal personality of 
transitional corporations and mechanism aimed at effective international regulation of 
transnational corporations. 
2.4.1 Multinational corporations as a subject of International Law 
It is important to discuss commentators’ views on transnational corporations before analysing 
its status in international law or in domestic legislation. Kamminga has described it as a legal 
person that owns or controls productions, distribution or service, facilities outside the country 
it is based.64 Similarly, the OECD states that transnational corporation operate in all sectors of 
the economy. “They usually comprise companies or other entities established in more than one 
country and so linked that they may co-ordinate their operations in various ways.65  However, 
as Dine explains that “multinational and transnational companies do not exist as an entity 
defined or recognised by law. They are made up of complex structures of individual companies 
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with an enormous variety of inter-relationships”.66 Meanwhile, in Jagger’s view “The common 
feature of these large and often rather opaque corporations is that they operate across national 
borders. Operating in many different countries places these corporations outside the effective 
supervision of domestic and International law, which can result in a deficiency”.67 Jagger’s 
view can be justified because incorporated companies under domestic law are bound by the 
law under which they are incorporated. This position is not the same with transnational 
corporations, they are made up of a network of corporations, which are incorporated in other 
jurisdictions, and they can operate across different jurisdictions. Ong believes that private 
transnational economic actors are taking advantage of increased opportunities to trade and 
specially to invest within different national jurisdictions.68 He concluded that they were able to 
achieve this following the success of worldwide efforts at trade liberalisation and investment 
protection, established through international organisations such as the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO).69 Another significant point to the argument presented here is the likely 
effect of the multi-jurisdictional nature of transnational corporations. The reason is that the 
ability of a host jurisdiction to control and monitor their activities may be limited to their 
manifest presence within that host jurisdiction. This aspect will be fully discussed later in this 
chapter. 
Furthermore, the question of multinational corporations as a subject of international law has 
according to Chetail raised a longstanding and complex debate.70 He further explained that the 
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debate first arose during the 1960s in the context of nationalisation and permanent sovereignty 
over resources of newly independent states and recently it resurfaced in the context of their 
alleged responsibility in respect of fundamental rights.71 It could be argued that multinational 
corporations are not a subject of international law simply because some authors consider that, 
in the current stage of international law, the international personality of transnational 
corporations remain an open question.72 Meanwhile, the third US restatement of foreign 
relations law has revealed that” the multinational enterprise or corporation is an established 
feature of international economics life, but it has not yet achieved special status in international 
law or in domestic legislation”.73 It would be pertinent to highlight some of the mechanisms 
aimed at international regulation of transnational corporations. 
2.4.2 International mechanisms regulating the activities of transnational corporations 
There is no binding treaty or framework regulating the activities of transnational corporations 
in International law. Evidence presented above has established that transnational corporations 
do not have legal status in international law. Thus, some of the international instruments that 
focus on the activities of transnational corporations can be examined. There are two ways to 
look at this aspect, through binding treaties that are directed at states but can also be made 
applicable to transnational corporations. Good examples are Bilateral Agreements and 
International Labour organisation (ILO) Conventions) and measures or other law focused on 
the activities of the transnational corporations. The next paragraph therefore focuses on ILO’s 
Tripartite Declaration of the Principles Concerning Multinationals and Social Policy (as 
amended in 200, the Declaration). 
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2.4.3 ILO Conventions 
The ILO contains certain rules with which transnational corporations are expected to comply 
with such as creation of good social policy advantage. It is envisaged that the advances made 
by transnational corporations in organising their operations beyond the national framework 
may lead to abuse of concentrations of economic power and to conflicts with national policy 
objectives and with the interest of the workers. In addition, the complexity of transnational 
corporations and the difficulty of clearly perceiving their diverse operations, policies and 
structures sometimes give rise to concern either in the home or in the host states , or in both.74  
Moreover, transnational activities in the 1960’s and 1970’s were the drive that resulted in 
efforts to create international mechanisms for the control of transnational corporations and 
define their relations to host states, particularly in the developing world.75 
TheILO Declaration was adopted in1977 to encourage the positive contribution which 
multinational enterprises can make to economic and social progress and to minimise and 
resolve difficulties to which their various operations may give rise.76 It is also hoped that the 
transnational corporations would make an important contribution to the promotion of economic 
and social welfare; to the improvement of living standards and the satisfaction of basic needs; 
to the creation of employment opportunities, both directly and indirectly and to the enjoyment 
of basic human rights including freedom of association, throughout the world.77 However, the 
Declaration’s success is tied to the co-operation amongst employers, workers organisations and 
transnational corporations. Consequently, the Declaration is voluntary in nature and is intended 
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to serve as a guide to transnational corporations, workers and host state.78 Some of its relevant 
paragraphs are critically analysed below. 
ILO Declaration at paragraph 8 posits that: 
 
 “All parties concerned by this Declaration should respect the sovereign 
rights of States, obey the national laws and regulations, give due 
consideration to local practices and respect relevant international standards. 
They should respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
corresponding International Covenants adopted by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations as well as the Constitution of the International Labour 
Organisation and its principles according to which freedom of expression 
and association are essential to sustained progress. They should contribute 
to the realization of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at work and its Follow-up, adopted in 1998. They should also honour 
commitments which they have freely entered into, in conformity with the 
national law and accepted international obligations”.79 Meanwhile, 
paragraph 12 provides that “Government of home countries should promote 
good social practice in accordance with this Declaration of principles, 
having regard to the social and labour law, regulations and practices in hot 
countries as well as to relevant international standard. Both host and home 
country governments should be prepared to have consultations with each 
other, whenever the need arises, on the initiative of either”.80 Also, 
paragraph 59 states that “Multinational as well as national enterprises jointly 
with the representatives and organisations of the workers whom they 
employ should seek to establish voluntary conciliation machinery, 
appropriate to national conditions, which may include provisions for 
voluntary arbitration, to assist in the prevention and settlement of industrial 
disputes between employers and workers. The voluntary conciliation 
machinery should include equal representation of employers and 
workers”.81 
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The commentators have exposed the weaknesses of some of the provisions under the 
Declaration for being reliant on thesovereign rights of states particularly paragraph 8. It has 
been further argued that reference to the primacy of national law weakens the Declaration 
according to Muchlinski.82 His argument can be buttressed by the fact that some states have 
weak legal systems and therefore are unable to impose effective law or labour standards. Some 
asserted that it might also lead to transnational corporations feeling reluctant to improve labour 
standard beyond the prevailing standards in states. Eghosa also added that theDeclaration’s 
reliance on state sovereignty allows some degree of regulatory competition in the area of labour 
standards and rights. Though, he believes that such reliance might be beneficial to certain 
countries.83 Nevertheless, the commentators have been able to establish that the Declaration is 
non-binding and a set of voluntary rules agreed upon by governments, employees’ organisation 
and employers. Thus, transnational corporations can decide not to abide by it because sanctions 
are not imposed on them. Notwithstanding the apparent weaknesses of the Declaration, it still 
amongst the mechanisms put in place to regulate transnational corporations’ activities and 
states have all agreed that it should be applied to the operations of multinational enterprises.84 
Other international mechanisms such as the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, the 2000 Global Compacts and the 2011 Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises cannot be 
overemphasised and they are examined below. 
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2.4.4 OECD 2011 Guidelines 
The guidelines were designed and adopted in 1976 and revised in 2000.85 They are 
recommendations that appealed directly to the conduct of multinational businesses operating 
transnational activities with the aim of ensuring their compliance with international human 
rights including environmental protection standards. Like other mechanisms discussed above 
OECD guidelines are also voluntary and non-binding. Paragraph 7 of OECD General Policies 
promotes self- regulation by transnational corporations. The general policies provide that 
enterprises should: 
Develop and apply effective self-regulatory practices and management 
systems that foster a relationship of confidence and mutual trust between 
enterprises and the societies in which they operate.86 
 
However, the states adhering to the guidelines make a binding commitment to implement them 
in line with the decision of the multinational enterprises. Additionally, matters covered under 
the guidelines may also be the subject of domestic legislation and international commitments.87 
Meanwhile, one of the principles makes the guides line applicable to firms and subcontractors 
by its provision that;  
State-owned multinational enterprises are subject to the same 
recommendations as privately-owned enterprises, but public scrutiny is 
often magnified when a State is the final owner.88 
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Nevertheless, the enforcement process in the guidelines have been considered as major 
strength. The setting up of National Contact Points (NCP) to collect information, promote the 
guidelines, assist in settling matters and handle enquiries on issues covered by the Guidelines.89 
The supporters of the guidelines have argued that one of the advantages of revised Guidelines 
is the creation of new human rights under Chapter IV. It is established that chapter IV explain 
the human rights obligations and responsibilities of transnational corporations.90 The human 
rights obligations of transnational corporations introduced in the Guidelines include the need 
to respect human rights during their operations, endeavour not to cause or exacerbate human 
rights impacts, find way to minimise or prevent human rights impacts directly attributed to 
their activities, have a policy commitment to give regard, or promote human rights, implement 
due human rights diligence as appropriate, and co-operate in the remediation of adverse human 
rights impacts to which they have caused.91Therefore, the current edition (2011) of the 
guidelines gives greater recognition to the importance of human rights addressed in the 
international and national sphere. For example, commentary to the Human Rights Chapter (IV) 
states, inter alia, as follows:   
In all cases and irrespective of the country or specific context of enterprises’ 
operations, reference should be made at a minimum to the internationally 
recognised human rights expressed in the international Bill of Human 
Rights, consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
main instruments through which it has been codified: the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and to the principles 
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concerning fundamental rights set out in the 1998 International Labour 
Organisation Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.92 
 
Consequently, the non-binding nature of the guidelines is not distinctive because they have 
been used to promote corporate social responsibility activities in some host states. Also, the 
Guidelines represent an agreement on what constitutes good corporate behaviour in an 
increasing world economy.93 One commentator avers that the Guidelines could develop into a 
binding international law if states adhere and constantly apply them in their dealings with 
transnational corporations.94 
Moreover, the views of the Critics cannot be overlooked. They argue that the Guidelines are 
not biding directly against the private economic actors involved, and furthermore, do not 
establish legal or enforcement mechanisms to hold these private actors responsible under 
international law.95 This fact was based on the provision under the guidelines which states that: 
…although enterprise contributions are implicit in all of them “Several 
instruments already adopted by countries adhering to the Guidelines, 
including Principle 15 of the RIO Declaration on Environment and 
Development, enunciate a “precautionary approach” None of these 
instruments is explicitly addressed to enterprises.96 
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The guidelines therefore draw upon, but do not fully reflect any existing mechanisms or create 
new rules for host states’ governments. Additionally, another commentator argued that the 
guidelines are beset by a plethora of weaknesses because he believed that the guidelines are 
weak in enforcement because the NCP that was previously considered are not available in many 
states. He added that the issues addressed in the guidelines are also minimal; also the OECD 
itself is an exclusive club made up of rich states and therefore excludes most states from 
developing countries.97 
2.4.5 The United Nations Guiding Principles on Businessand Human Rights (UNGPs) 
The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights are arguably the world 
standard for preventing and tackling the risk of adverse impacts on human rights associated 
with business activity. The Guiding Principles was endorsed by the United Nations on June 16, 
2011 and is regarded as the first corporate human rights responsibility initiative to be 
endorsed.98 
It is vital to point out from the outset that the Guiding Principles are not binding on 
transnational corporations. Nevertheless, transnational corporations may ignore them only at 
their risk.  The Guiding Principles embody certain human rights norms that are legally binding 
on them under national law or international law. The Guiding Principles outline the host states 
duty to protect human rights and what transnational corporation should be doing to give respect 
to human rights as well as access to remedy if these rights are not respected. Therefore, this 
work critically investigates the corporate responsibility and the key principles in that regard: 
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Principle 11 provides that “Business enterprises should respect human 
rights. This means that they should avoid infringing on the human rights of 
others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they 
are involved”99 … “The responsibility to respect human rights requires that 
business enterprises (a) Avoid causing or contributing to adverse human 
rights impacts through their own activities, and address impacts when they 
occur; (b) Seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are 
directly linked to their operations, products or services by their business 
relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts”100… “The 
responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights applies to all 
enterprises regardless of their size, sector, operational context, ownership 
and structure. Nevertheless, the scale and complexity of the means through 
which enterprises meet that responsibility may vary according to these 
factors and with severity of the enterprise’s adverse human rights 
impacts.101 
 
In highlighting the major difficulties of the key Principles above one should consider some 
stakeholders’ views whether the UNGPs provide enough standard for businesses, contending 
that the transnational corporations should have an obligation to realise rights instead of 
responsibility. The SRSG on this point conclude that the Ruggie Principles are appealing, they 
do not constitute an international law, nor do they create binding legal obligations. Instead, 
they simply explain existing international human rights required from the states and provide 
information on how to implement them.102 Thus, it remains the host states’ responsibility to 
protect human rights, while transnational corporations only need to respect human rights. 
Therefore, transnational corporations do not have binding legal obligations regarding human 
rights at an international level and remain regulated only at a national level. Enforcement is 
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even more difficult at national level, especially in developing states due to the importance 
attached to economic growth and the idea of an international free market and as Choudhury 
reckons that “domestic measures are no longer sufficient to deal with corporate abuses on a 
transnational scale”.103 
Furthermore, other commentators argue that a lack of binding legal obligations concerning 
human rights at an international level has allowed the transnational corporation to continue 
exploiting developing states with weak regulations in order to evade their human rights 
obligations.104 They argue further that transnational corporations are discernible entities at a 
global level, but the inability of national and internal laws to deal with these entities has resulted 
in a legal loophole.105 Thus, it could be suggested that Guiding Principles needed an 
overarching legal status that could make the framework legally enforceable. Supporters of GPs 
have defended it for creating far more consensus than any other previous attempt at creating 
worldwide business-human rights standard and they have openly praised the consultative 
process for effectively bringing to light issues of human rights.106 Additionally, GPs were 
welcomed for creating a distinction between the duty of states and responsibility of 
transnational corporations. Furthermore, transnational corporations which have opposed the 
binding obligations of human rights previously and against all past attempts at regulating 
transnational behaviour have embraced this new development. 
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On the other hand, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have condemned the Guiding 
Principles for merely imposing non-binding obligations on businesses and others criticised it 
for what they described as the emphasis on processes at the expense of substance.107 Overall, 
international attempts so far have been ineffective and the current position cannot compel 
transnational corporations to behave in responsible way due to the failures of international law 
and as a result commentators have made recommendations that the only way to  hold 
transnational corporations accountable for their unethical practices is to impose legal 
personality on them at in international level .108 
Moreover, corporate legal personality and legal responsibility was established and recognised 
by the international Court of Justice in the case Barcelona Traction, where it was held that 
“only the company, which was endowed with legal personality, could take action in respect of 
matters that were of a corporate character”.109 The decision in that case was also upheld in the 
case of AhmadouSadio Diallo, where the Court of Justice held that “in determining whether a 
company possesses independent and distinct legal personality, international law looks to the 
rules of the relevant domestic law”.110 On this point, Chetail explains that the question whether 
the transnational corporations have international personality requires a case-by-case 
examination of the relevant appropriate norms of international law.111 He explains further that 
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a limited and derived personality may be conferred only by three deferent sources namely and 
in summary, customary law, treaties and internationalised contracts usually concluded between 
a host state and a corporation and mostly in oil and gas industries.112 Both treaties and 
customary law were thoroughly examined in chapter one and therefore the next paragraph takes 
care of third source, that is, internationalised contracts. 
Oil and gas contracts often spell out rights and obligations of the host state and transnational 
corporations as well as a unique clause providing that the agreement is governed by 
international law. Additionally, contract must also provide for international arbitration in case 
of a dispute according to UNCLOS III. This fact was also established in the case of Texaco 
Calasiatic v Libyan Arab Republic113 where the arbitral award stated that  
In other words, stating that a contract between a state and a private person 
falls within the international legal order means that for the purposes of 
interpretation and performance of the contract, it should be recognised that 
a private contracting party has specific international capacities. But, unlike 
a state, the private person has only a limited capacity and his quality as a 
subject of international law does enable him only to invoke, in the field of 
international law, the rights which he derives from the contracts.114 
 
The above interpretation was shared by many authors and Roland Portmann explains that in 
the arbitrator’s view, then, the choice of international law as the proper law of contract 
suggested that the parties to the contracts as in the case above were bestowed with limited 
international personality for the purposes of the contract.115 However, Vincent disagreed and 
claims that such contracts cannot establish an ergaomnes personality but, nevertheless he 
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agreed that those contracts remain important legal tools in order to regulate the conduct of 
transnational corporations at the international level.116 Moreover, similar provisions may be 
available in the aforementioned UNCLOS III.  Thus, it is important to critically analyse some 
relevant provisions under UNCLOS III. 
2.4.6 UNCLOS III 
United Nations Convention on the law of the sea provides inter alia arbitration framework in 
case of disagreement arising from the interpretation or application of oil and gas contract 
between the host states and transnational corporations.  
Article 137 (1) and (3) provides that: 
“1. No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any 
part of the Area or its resources, nor shall any State or natural or juridical 
person appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise of 
sovereignty or sovereign rights nor such appropriation shall be recognized 
3 No State or natural or juridical person shall claim, acquire or exercise 
rights with respect to the minerals recovered from the Area except in 
accordance with this Part. Otherwise, no such claim, acquisition or exercise 
of such rights shall be recognized”.117 
 
It is argued that rights and obligations arising from United Nations conventions such as 
UNCLOS III are indirectly applied to transnational corporations; therefore, the majority of 
Conventions require states to make law and enforce it on transnational corporations. Thus, 
some of environmental and human rights provisions under UNCLOS III cannot be 
overemphasised. 
Key provisions 
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Article 139, Paragraph 1 provides that; 
State parties shall have the responsibility to ensure that activities in the area, 
whether carried out by states parties, or state enterprises or natural or 
juridical persons which possess the nationality of state parties or are 
effectively controlled by them or their nationals, shall be carried out in 
conform with this part. The same responsibility applies to international 
organisations for activities in the area carried out by such organisations.118 
 
Article 153, paragraph 4, of the Convention must be mentioned particularly the last sentence 
which is relevant to this research it emphasises the states’ obligation which includes “assisting 
the Authority by taking all measures necessary to ensure such compliance in accordance with 
article 139”119   It could be established that a state has an obligation to take all reasonable 
measures to prevent substantial pollution, for instance, when a government is unable to create 
environmental laws. The polluting conduct can be attributed to that state and therefore, 
breaches its international regulations.120 
Article 194 of UNCLOS III seeks to prevent activities that can cause pollution it is therefore 
pertinent to explain Article 194 (2) provision which provided that 
States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their 
jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not cause damage by pollution to 
other states and their environment, and that pollution arising from incident 
or activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the 
areas where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this 
Convention.121 
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Article 194 (3) emphasised that measure taken should address all sources of pollution of the 
marine environment. Therefore, article 194 (3) cannot be overstated because it provided that: 
 
Pollution from installations and devices used in exploration or exploitation 
of the natural recourses of the seabed and subsoil, in particular measures for 
preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety of 
operations at sea, and regulating the design, construction, equipment, 
operation and manning of such installations or devices.122 
 
The above provisions indicate that there is an obligation and duties on parties to UNCLOS III 
to ensure environment are protected. In addition, oil and gas exploration and exploitation 
activities fall within the category that are precluded from releasing substances that are likely to 
result in pollution of the marine environment. This Convention therefore makes it incumbent 
on host states to ensure that appropriate measures are put in place to prevent accidents and safe 
operations during exploration and exploitation activities. 
The case of U.S v Mex123 has established that if a state has enacted the appropriate 
environmental law but private parties within its control or jurisdiction inflict harm upon the 
environment of another state, the source state has an obligation to punish the offenders. 
Otherwise, the state may be liable, and the polluting conduct may be attributed to the state. 
Furthermore, Annex III, Article 4, paragraph 4 cannot be overstated because of its provision 
which deals with issue of exploration and exploitation in general sponsoring states’ 
responsibility as stated below. 
The sponsoring state or state, or states shall, pursuant to article 139, have 
the responsibility to ensure, within their legal systems, that a contractor so 
sponsored shall carry out activities in the Area in conformity with the terms 
of its contract and its obligation under this convention. A sponsoring State 
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shall not, however, be liable for damage caused by any failure of a 
contractor sponsored by it to comply with its obligations if that State party 
has adopted laws and regulations and taken administrative measures which 
are, within the framework of its legal system, reasonably appropriate for 
securing compliance by persons under its jurisdiction.   
 
The above provision was clearly explained by the dispute chambers of the International 
Tribunal for the law of the sea. They said “responsibility to ensure” applies “within their legal 
systems” were elements concerning the content of the “due diligence” obligation to ensure. 
Necessary measures are required, and these must be incorporated into the legal system of the 
sponsoring state.124 
Furthermore, “Responsibility to ensure” points to an obligation of the sponsoring State under 
international law. It establishes a mechanism through which the rules of the Convention 
concerning activities in the Area, although being treaty law and thus binding only on the 
subjects of international law that have accepted them, become effective for sponsored 
contractors which find their legal basis in domestic law. This mechanism consists in the 
creation of obligations which States Parties must fulfil by exercising their power over entities 
of their nationality and under their control.125 
 Moreover, Article 235, paragraph 2 of the Convention provides that  
States shall ensure that recourse is available in accordance with their legal 
systems for prompt and adequate compensation or other relief in respect of 
damage caused by pollution of the marine environment by natural or 
juridical persons under their jurisdiction.126 
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Under this provision host states are required to put in place, laws, rules and procedures that 
will govern any future claim for damages in the national court. It was also similar to obligation 
under Annex III Article 22 of the Convention which states that 
 The contractor shall have responsibilities or liability for any damage arising 
out of wrongful acts in the conduct of its operation, account being taken of 
contributory acts or omission by the Authority. Similarly, the Authority 
shall have responsibility or liability for any damage arising out of wrongful 
acts in the exercise of its power and functions, including violations under 
article 168, paragraph 2, account being taken of contributory acts or 
omissions by the contractor. Liability in every case shall be for the actual 
amount of damage. 127 
 
Consequently, it is established from the above that states are allowed to enact law in order to 
deal with wrongful acts of transnational corporations. It is also established from the various 
guidelines discussed earlier that majority of mechanisms and frameworks to regulate activities 
of transnational corporation at international level are weak, voluntary in nature, non-binding 
and are tied to the co-operation of employers, workers and transnational corporation. 
Domestically, developed world have been able to address issues arising from activities of 
transnational corporations but it has not been easy for developing world as critically examined 
below. 
2.4.7. National mechanisms regulating the activities of transnational corporations in 
developing states 
Nigeria is one of the developing states that have been struggling to control the conduct of 
transnational corporations in relation to their exploration activities. Nigeria is the largest 
producer of crude petroleum in Africa and amongst largest producers within the Organisation 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Apart from petroleum, Nigeria’s other natural 
resources include natural gas, tin, iron ore, coal, limestone, niobium, lead, zinc and arable land. 
                                                          





The oil and gas sector accounts for about 35 per cent of gross domestic product, and petroleum 
exports revenue represents over 90 per cent of total exports revenue.128 Nigeria enacted various 
laws that impact on the activities of transnational corporations in different degrees.  These 
include human rights law, tort law, company law, criminal law and labour law, just to name a 
few. Despite all this legislation, so many cases have been considered under domestic 
mechanism such as tort law with little success as a result of inherent procedural problems 
according to Frynas.129  It is further argued by Amao that there are developments in Nigerian 
human rights and company laws which may prove more effective in the control of transnational 
corporations.130 As analysed below under the provision of S. 54 of the Nigerian Company Act 
1968 which makes it a compulsory that the foreign companies should be reincorporated as a 
separate entity. The disadvantages of this provision were thoroughly evaluated. In addition, 
Foster and Ball posit that national legislation such as company law is the only way in which 
states control both national and transnational corporations within their jurisdictions. They 
pointed out that company law gives life to the stances in which a company may end the life 
given to it under the law.131 The next paragraphs therefore look at the various ways in which 
Nigerian domestic laws have impacted on transnational corporations as well as effects of these 
laws for the control of transnational corporations. 
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2.4.8 Local incorporation requirements as a way of regulating transnational 
corporations. 
Nigeria makes it compulsory for foreign companies to be incorporated locally in order to bring 
transnational corporations under the ambit of Nigeria Company Acts 1968. Section 54 provides 
that: 
Subject to section 56 to 59 of this Decree every foreign company which 
before or after the commencement of this Decree was incorporated outside 
Nigeria, and having the intention of carrying on business in Nigeria shall 
take all steps necessary to obtain incorporation as a separate entity in 
Nigeria for that purposes, but until so incorporated, the foreign company 
shall not carry on business132 in Nigeria or exercise any of the powers of a 
registered company and shall not have a place of business or an address for 
service of documents or processes in Nigeria for any purpose other than the 
receipt of notices and other documents, as matters preliminary to 
incorporation under this Decree.133 
 
It must be pointed out that the above provision under Nigerian Companies Act 1968 is contrary 
to the approach adopted in the United Kingdom Companies Act 1985. The UK Companies Act 
simply requires that certain documents and the name and addresses of the personnel authorised 
to act on its behalf should be delivered to the registrar of companies for registration. Similarly, 
provision of the subsequent UK Company Act 2006-part 34 S.1044 TO 1059 does not required 
foreign company to reincorporate.134 
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The disadvantages of S.54 of Nigeria Companies Act 1968 cannot be overlooked. The 
provision has enabled the parent companies of transnational corporations to decline liability 
for any adverse consequence of the activities of their subsidiary, because the subsidiary has 
been incorporated, recognised and operated under Nigeria domestic law. The following cases 
have demonstrated the worrisome outcome. In Mobil Producing (Nig) United v 
Monokpo,135the parent company denied liability for the problems caused by Mobil during 
exploration activities simply because the subsidiary has been incorporated and legally 
recognised in Nigeria as an entity under domestic law while in Shell Petroleum Development 
Company SPDC) of Nigeria v Dr Pere Ajuwa and Honourable Ingo Mac-Etteli136  the oil 
company was granted a stay of execution of a judgement against it for gas flaring. On this point 
Amao argued that S.54 provision is an unnecessary and is regarded as counterproductive137 
because Section 60 of the Nigeria Company Act enables transnational corporations to bring an 
action and actions can be brought against them in Nigeria in their name as well as the name of 
their agents. This point was also established in Offshore International SA v Federal Board of 
Inland Revenue,138 where Court held that a company incorporated in Panama, and had its 
principal office in Texas and without a place of business in Nigeria, was liable to pay tax for 
the business undertaken through a subsidiary in Nigeria under the Nigerian Companies Act. 
Thus, it could be suggested that the provision which required that transnational corporations 
should be reincorporated with the aim of bringing them under the ambit of Nigeria domestic 
law has not achieved that goal. The question whether a transnational corporation can be held 
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responsible for the acts of its subsidiary under the Nigeria law was critically examined below 
with relevant cases. 
2.4.9 The approach of Nigerian Company law to corporate groups  
It is an established law in Nigeria that a holding company and its subsidiaries are distinct and 
separate legal entities.139 It is also an established law that a subsidiary is not regarded as an 
agent of the parent company but classed as a separate legal person.140 Theoretically, some of 
Nigerian case law has proven that it may be possible to bring an action against the parent 
company of transnational corporations to a certain degree, but enforcement is the major 
obstacle. The judgement in Akpan v Shell141 illustrates the challenges and hopes of public 
interest tort litigation in national courts. Hope in the sense that the decision which emanated 
from this case may be relied upon in future decisions in similar cases before domestic courts 
of European Union members which are subjected to EU regulations on matters of jurisdiction 
and applicable law in tort cases.Moreover, Article 2 of Brussels I also provides that “persons 
domiciled in the Member States Shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the Courts of that 
Member State.”142In addition, Article 7 of Rome IIprovides that; 
 …the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of 
environmental damage or damage sustained by persons or property as a 
result of such damage shall be the law determined pursuant to Article 4 (1) 
[i.e, the law of the country in which the damage occurs] unless the person 
seeking compensation for damage chose to base his or her claim on the law 
of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred.143 
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The Akpan case above shows that parent company can be held liable for the wrongful acts and 
omission of their foreign subsidiaries. Akpan considers the question of whether a forum state’s 
court has jurisdiction over violations committed abroad especially in developing states. Nigeria 
Farmers and Non-Governmental Organisations (“NGO”) known as Friends of the Earth 
brought a claim against Royal Dutch Shell and its Nigerian Subsidiary in  the parent company’s 
home land, in the Netherlands Court. They sought compensation for damage caused by pipe-
line oil leakage from an oil installation operated by Shell Petroleum Development Company of 
Nigeria. The Dutch Court overturned the lower court decision and concluded that they had 
jurisdiction to consider the claim brought by Akpan and NGO. Furthermore, the court directed 
that Shell should allow the claimants the free access to all necessary documents and 
information relating to the oil spills. The court further pointed out that there is “an international 
trend to hold parent companies liable in their home state for injurious acts of their foreign 
subsidiaries “and besides “on various occasions the parent company was sued jointly with its 
relevant foreign subsidiary”.144 Nevertheless, Ryngaert has acknowledged that Akpan’s case is 
a typical example of partly successful transnational environmental public interest litigation in 
a multinational parent corporation’s home state.145Seck also justified why she was fully in 
support of litigation such as Akpan and pointed out that such an action can “serve to empower 
the very people whom sovereignty as a construct was imagined to exist”.146 
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2.4.9.1 Compulsory Disclosure requirements under Nigerian Company Law 
The mandatory disclosure requirement under Nigeria company law is perceived as an important 
measure to control and promote Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”). Prior to 1968, it was 
not a requirement for the company to disclose or report accounting activities. The Companies 
Act 1968 makes it a requirement for the companies incorporated in Nigeria to disclose with 
reasonable accuracy the financial position of the company. This provision has been utilised to 
promote the responsibility of corporation in Nigeria. Its concept is similar to the provision of 
British Companies Act 1948. However, the scope of financial disclosure under the 1968 Act 
has been updated in the current version of Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 (“CAMA”). 
Section 331 of CAMA requires that:  
“(1) Every company shall cause accounting records to be kept in accordance 
with this section. 
  (2)  The accounting records shall be sufficient to show and explain the 
transactions of the company and shall be such as to 
(a)  disclose with reasonable accuracy, at any time, the financial position of 
the company; and 
(b) enable the directors to ensure that any financial statements prepared 
under this Part comply with the requirements of this Act as to the form and 
content of the company's statements.”147 
Moreover, there is much emphasis by the critics of the above provisions that there is nothing 
in the CAMA which requires corporate social reporting on non-financial matters.148Amodu 
argued further that, nothing in this primary legislation requires companies in Nigeria to 
demonstrate the good sense of corporate social responsibilities to their stake-holders.149Amao 
also added that CAMA requirements are too narrow and regarded as being largely fixated on 
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financial reporting, and that its efficacy towards promoting CSR and sustainability is in 
doubt.150 This informs the recommendations that some of the CAMA provisions should be 
altered and its disclosure and reports expanded to include corporate social reporting and 
disclosures beyond strict financial matters which is designed to benefit the company’s 
shareholders.151 
While CAMA together with previous Nigerian company law has been regarded as ineffective 
and unable to address the problems of transnational corporations, some human rights issues 
have shown great development in that aspect. The next section discusses these developments. 
2.4.9.2 Transnational Corporations and Human Rights related matters in Nigeria. 
Human rights have been regarded as an important aspect of CSR in Nigeria as elsewhere in the 
developed world. There is evidence that the courts have been playing an effective role in 
promoting and protecting human rights. In the corporate context, the support of NGOs by 
ensuring remedies for the victims of environmental damages is apparent from several cases 
that involved inappropriate transnational corporations’ conduct and activities within the host 
state. The case Gbemre v Shell,152 for example was the case that signalled the possibility of 
using human rights provisions for the purpose of checking transnational corporation activities 
in Nigeria. Prior to this case Nigerian Judges regularly honoured the economic benefits of the 
country over human right protection, mostly in oil and gas related matters despite the existence 
of the legal rights under S.20 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 which 
provides that “the sates shall protect and improve the environment and safeguard the water air 
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and land, forest and wild life of Nigeria”. Meanwhile S. 6 (6) (C) of the same constitution made 
the earlier provision virtually ineffective. It provides that; 
The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of 
this section – shall not except as otherwise provided by this Constitution, 
extend to any issue or question as to whether any act of (sic) omission by 
any authority or person or as to whether any law or any judicial decision is 
in conformity with the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of 
State Policy set out in Chapter II of this Constitution [under which section 
20 falls. 
 
 It however means that the right under s.20 above cannot be relied upon by an aggrieved 
individual in a court of law. The case of Gbemre v Shell was brought under the fundamental 
rights enforcement procedure in the constitution of Nigeria. Mr Jonah Gbemre alleged that 
there had been violations of rights under the constitution that is, rights to life and dignity of the 
human person under section 33(1) and 34 (1) as well as provisions under Articles, 4, 16 and 24 
of the African Charter. The claimants argued that the continuous gas flaring by Shell had caused 
poisoning and pollution of the area which exposed the people to the risk of untimely death, 
illnesses such as cancer and asthma just to mention a few. However, Shell opposed the case by 
arguing that Articles of African Charter do not create enforceable rights under the Nigeria 
fundamental rights enforcement procedure. The court held that the constitutionally protected 
rights encompass right to a clean, poison free, pollution free environment and that exploration 
activities of shell which resulted in gas flaring in the claimants’ community engaged their rights 
to life and the dignity of the human person under the constitution and the African Charter. The 
decision indicates that it is possible to rely on African Chatter for rights which are not available 
under domestic law. In addition, the court ruled that provisions under the Nigeria Associated 
Gas Re-Injection Act (Continued Flaring of Gas Regulations) 1984 and the Associated Gas Re-
Injection (Amendment) Decree no 7 of 1985, which allowed gas flaring are unconstitutional 





environment guaranteed under the constitution. The court therefore ordered that efforts should 
be made to amend relevant legislations governing gas flaring to incorporate fundamental rights 
under the Nigerian constitution. Amao pointed out that, in Gbemre’s case the human rights 
provision were heavily relied on for the first time in Nigeria and posits that it was a positive 
signal towards a significant shift in the control of transnational corporations.153  Another 
important point in this case is that fundamental right enforcement procedure is much quicker 
than other litigation in Nigeria because the case was concluded within 12 months compared to 
other procedures which can take longer than 3 years in the court of first instance.154 Meanwhile, 
continuing efforts of action group, coupled with the outside world for justice for the local 
communities have a great impact in the way that Nigerian courts make decision in 
environmental pollution cases.155  For instance senior Judges have become more thoughtful of 
the bad attitudes of oil companies as seen in decided cases discussed in the following paragraph. 
2.4.9.3 The role of action groups 
The important of action groups on environmental issues cannot be overstated. They play 
fundamental roles in the regulations of the environment and practices of oil companies. Such 
organisations are not part of a government and are not conventional for profit business, 
pursuing justice and social aims. Action groups play important roles in dealing with 
environmental issues. Particularly, the issues of oil spillage, water and air pollution caused by 
the foreign owned oil companies. Their actions were successful, in some cases as a result of 
their solidarity and cooperation with international well-standardised NGOs. They are 
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independent from government and do not rely on any business support. In Africa the majority 
of the action groups are formed by the indigenous citizens who themselves have suffered from 
bad practice and ill effects of oil company’s negligence. Williams commended the NGOs 
efforts and affirming that “action group have changed the way companies think about their 
strategies, changed social perspective in which companies operate, changed the norms of 
appropriate industry action with regards to some questions such as protection for the 
environment, arrangement for the pipe line security as well as financial arrangement with host 
state”.156 
An action group has successfully won an action against the Federal Government of Nigeria in 
the case of Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and 
Social Rights v Nigeria157where it was alleged that the Federal Government of Nigeria took 
part in oil production through Nigeria National Petroleum Development (‘NNPC’) in 
association with Shell Petroleum Development Corporation in which NNPC held 55% of the 
share. NGOs alleged that the Oil companies carried out oil exploration in Ogoniland Nigeria 
without respect for the environment and the health of villagers and as a result of oil activities 
they had contaminated the area and disposed of toxic wastes into water ways which eventually 
caused health problems and environmental degradation. Oil companies have also failed to 
develop and maintain appropriate equipment that would have prevented the poisonous wastes 
from spreading to the villages. It is further alleged that Nigerian military engaged in military 
operation including killing people, burning and destroying of houses and food. 
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The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights held that Nigeria had violated the 
African Charter on Human and People’s right. Nigeria was found to have breached a majority 
of the Article’s Rights including Article 2, the right to enjoy Charter’s guaranteed rights and 
freedom without discrimination, Article 4, the right to life, Article 14 the right to property, 
Article 16, the right to health, Article 18(1) the right to housing, Article 21, the right of people 
to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. Also Nigeria was found to have violated 
Article 24 which provides the right of people to enjoy satisfactory environment favourable to 
their development.158This case served as a precedent for enforcement of cultural, economic and 
social rights within the international community, and for the Nigerian government this case 
sends a clear message that environmental action group can force their way to the very highest 
level to have their case heard if ignored by the state. Thus, it could be argued that NGOs have 
called into question the purpose of state authority and oil and gas industries. They have made 
government in developing countries aware that environmental issues should be addressed 
promptly. 
Furthermore, academics have advocated that action groups’pressure on transnational 
corporations can be used to keep transnational corporations in check and might lead to an 
improvement in their operations and that best practices could emanate as a consequence.159 
This argument can be supported with a successful action of a group of women against the oil 
companies in Nigeria which was broadcasted and reported across globe. The women stormed 
several oil and gas companies’ premises including Chevron and Texaco in Niger Delta. They 
threatened to undress and remain. Action such as this is considered in Nigeria as a taboo, 
something forbidden and can only be used to express anger and displeasure in an exceptional 
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circumstance. Indeed, their action put more pressure on oil companies as they eventually 
entered into a negotiation which resulted in oil companies promised to develop the community. 
160 As noted by the Evaristus “the transformative potential of civil society has effectively forced 
oil industries operating in Nigeria to review and improve their operational practices especially 
in regard to negotiation and consultation with local people”.161 Thus, human rights violations 
by the transnational corporations have been challenged by the individuals and local 
communities with tremendous support from non-governmental organisations (NGOs). For 
example, in Shell v. Isaiah162 the court awarded compensation for environmental damages 
against Shell amounting to 22 million naira which was equivalent to $1million back in 1997. 
Also, in Edamkue & Others v. Shell163the Judge awarded 245-million-naira equivalent in US 
dollar $1.9 million in favour of the Plaintiffs. In addition, Shell was ordered in 2005 to pay 
$1.5 billion to some affected communities.  This trend is also seen in Gbemre v Shell 
164discussed above where High Court judge declared gas flaring illegal and ordered that it 
should be stopped immediately. 
2.5 Conclusions 
It is clear from above cases that the Court’s attitudes have changed towards the oil companies 
particularly on human rights violations and environmental pollution.  In addition, it has been 
established that efforts have been made to regulate the transnational corporation at both 
national and international level but some of the mechanisms are non-binding and voluntary in 
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nature. Nevertheless, states are allowed to enact laws in line with international laws to address 
the challenges faced from the activities of transnational corporations. 
However, examining some of the inhibiting factors in developing countries has shed a degree 
of light on the lack of initiative on the part of the host state. The case of Jonah discussed above 
clearly proved that governments in developing countries preferred economic growth to 
environmental problems resulting in nonchalant attitude. Lack of effort to acquire modern 
technology and train experts in oil exploration were among the reasons that forced the Africa 
leaders to rely heavily on favour of foreign oil companies in order to generate revenue. 









                                               CHAPTER 3 
             CERTAIN FEATURES OF OIL AND GAS CONTRACTS 
3.1 Introduction 
Traditional international investment law carried some controversial features, particularly in the 
oil and gas industries. For example, concession agreements which proved to be unfavourable 
to the interests of the developing states. Oil and gas concession agreements have evolved since 
their inception in the 1859 as one-sided contracts when majority of the resource-rich states of 
today were colonies of other states. This chapter investigates the opinions from literatures 
which suggest that one of the reasons for the lack of success of international arbitration in 
settling investment disputes can be linked to the fact that efforts were made to tie up the 
developing countries’ resources sectors by unequal contracts such as concession agreements 
and the role which international arbitration played in creating atmosphere in favour of the 
transnational corporations.1 Some of the features of oil and gas will be thoroughly discussed 
because efforts to justify the best types of oil and gas agreements have led to controversial 
debates. The issues of granting exclusive rights to transnational corporations to explore oil for 
long-period is seen as a major problem under old concessions and was later replaced with the 
modern concessions which addressed the concerns of large geographical locations linked with 
the old concessions. In addition, the joint venture emerged and was regarded as the best options 
simply because it gives the host state greater control over oil and gas exploration activities. 
However, this chapter examines its features, advantages, disadvantages and several factors to 
be considered by the host state before adopting this type of exploration agreement. Lack of 
funding by the host state due to imbalance in financial capacity among partners is identified as 
major challenges which have prompted countries from the developing world to explore other 
options such as Service Contract and Production Sharing Agreement. Under a Service Contract, 
Transnational corporations are strictly under obligations to explore oil fields in return for 
prearranged fees without profit sharing and with no control over the final product. The chapter 
discusses motive behind this type of agreement and what the host state stand to gain for paying 
the transnational corporations to extract the oil and be asked to leave eventually. This type of 
agreement was once labelled by an academic writer as economically inefficient and prone to 
                                                          





potential loss, 2whilst its supporters claim that it is simple to manage due to its provision for 
tax and royalty. 3 In this regard, the current chapter sheds some light on all types of oil and gas 
agreements including Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) which is the most preferred type 
of oil agreement. It is arguing that PSA model is majorly accepted due to opportunity accorded 
to the host state to uphold national ownership of produced oil and at the same time the 
transnational corporation under this type of agreement will inject capital and bring technology 
with experts to explore oil fields. However, the lack of financial burden for the host states 
before, during and after the exploration activities have been pointed out as one of the 
advantages of PSA. Thus, this chapter explains Production Sharing Agreements in the Nigerian 
context and looks at some of the examples around the world to analyse its features particularly 
the provision of Local Content (LC) which developing countries have been using as a vehicle 
to create job for their citizens. It has led to various inputs from academic writers around the 
world as one commentator argues that LC should never be inspired by nationalist movement 
or policy choice on political motivations.4 She posits further that allowing foreign participation 
may be a good chance for the developments in the host states and it can be a success if the right 
balance is struck. But Njamasi disagrees and maintains that foreign participation kills local 
companies and cited unhealthy competition from foreign investors as an example to buttress 
his point.5 Nevertheless, the chapter critically evaluates LC within the national policy and its 
benefits for the Nigerians before comparing a PSA to other types of petroleum agreements. 
3.2. The Identification of Oil Agreements 
It is affirmed that oil and gas contracts involve three parties: the host state, which owns the 
mineral resources, provides and executes oil and gas contracts with transnational corporations; 
the transnational corporations which provide the capital, personnel and technology with the 
anticipation of making reasonable gain from their investment and lastly the host community 
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which is the third party to the contract and has certain development expectations from 
petroleum exploration activities. However, the host community is regarded as a non-
contracting party with scant legal standing and this is why, Emeka has emphasised the need for 
host community recognition with the justification that “without the host state, transnational 
corporation clearly lack the legal right to operate; without the host communities, similarly they 
lack the social license to operate”.6 He believes that while the relationship with the host state 
is governed by law, it is the relationship with the host communities which lacks a legal or 
regulatory basis that is capable of causing serious challenges to the transnational corporations.    
Efforts to identify the main types of petroleum contracts have raised so many controversial 
arguments with a conclusion by academic researchers7 that there are four types of contracts in 
petroleum exploration and exploitation activities. These include; the concession contract, the 
joint venture contract, the service contract and the production sharing contract.  
3.2.1. Concession Agreement 
Historically, the most popular type of contract was the concession.  The concession agreement 
grants a private oil company the exclusive right to explore, extract, produce and market final 
product of natural resources. As briefly mentioned in Chapter 2, there are two types of 
concession agreements; the old concession and the modern concession. There are two types of 
oil concession agreements, the traditional concession agreement and the modern concession 
agreement. The old concession usually grants International Oil and Gas Company’s exclusive 
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right to explore and export oil for a lengthy period. A good example was the concession 
concluded in 1925 between the Iraqi governments with the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) 
concerning the oil field of Baba Gargar for 75 years. Meanwhile, the modern form of 
agreements only grant exclusive rights from a specified area for a fixed period.8 Concession 
was defined by Blimn as a “contract whereby a transnational corporation is granted the right to 
explore and exploit oil and gas in an exchange for the payment of overall costs and taxes 
associated with the exploration activities”. 9  Similarly, K.S. described the oil concession as a 
system by which the host state grants the petroleum company the exclusive rights to explore 
and produce hydrocarbons in an allocated area of land for a certain time, in an exchange for 
payment of taxes and royalty.10  Evaluating these definitions, one can conclude that the 
concession agreement simply means that the host state is not the owner of the final product, 
that is, petroleum, once it has been extracted.  In addition, many concession contracts between 
developing states and transnational corporations have failed to produce anticipated gains for 
the developing states. It failed partly because the agreements were construct as traditional 
matters of public policy owing to their economic focus and development aspirations. For 
example, Brazil has adopted three contracts model over the years. The service contract was 
adopted in 1975 and Brazil later changed into the concession regime in 1979 and presently 
utilizing Production Sharing Agreements (PSA). The changes were due to the fact that the 
aforementioned service contract failed to produce positive results owing to currency 
fluctuations associated and a drop-in petroleum price. Meanwhile, it is certain now that oil will 
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be found, and the concession was suitable at the time because back then it was not guarantee 
that petroleum would be discovered.  
Furthermore, many of the old concessions have been unilaterally changed when the states 
became aware that the old concession agreements, they had signed were mostly favourable to 
the transnational corporations. They had given transnational corporations exclusive rights to 
search for oil, and when discovered, a further right to extract and exploit in exchange for royalty 
payments which were often little by comparison with the transnational corporations’ gain. The 
old concession agreements were regarded as unbalance because of their lengthy duration and 
the large areas involved. This was the reason for states move to challenge the concession 
agreements following the decolonisation movement in the 1960s. It led to the modification of 
the concession agreements; particularly, clauses which were perceived as too broad and, in 
some cases, states unilaterally changed them. States were capitalising on the provision of 
Principle of Permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR) contained in the 1962 
Resolution. As Schrijver says “the main drive of PSNR was to promote the economic 
independence of developing states through the nationalisation of natural resources previously 
under the control of transnational corporations”. 11 
Evidence has shown that the new concession will surface when it became apparent that the old 
concession was unfavourable to the interest of host states. For example, it was established that 
the Kuwait government was paid small sums for the rights over its natural resources in the 
concluded oil concession of 1934 between the state of Kuwait and the Kuwait oil Company 
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Limited (United Kingdom).12  Additionally, the old or traditional concession was known to be 
very broad in terms of lengthy duration and large geographical area.  Article 1 of 1934 Kuwait 
Oil concession can also be cited as a good example to illustrate this point because the contract 
was to last for 75 years with the oil company given wide freedom in controlling its exploration 
activities.  
In the same vein, the 1933 concession concluded between the Saudi Arabia King and Standard 
Oil of California required the oil company to pay only 50,000 pounds of gold to the King for a 
concession which covered 500,000 sqm for a period of sixty-six 66-year.13 Similarly, in 1939, 
Abu Dhabi concluded a concession agreement which granted a consortium of five oil 
companies the right to carry out exploration activities across the whole country for 75 years. It 
is obvious from these examples that the old concession agreements may be classed as one-
sided contracts which benefitted only the foreign oil companies. Foreign companies were 
granted development rights to cover the entire country and for up to 75 years period, with no 
host state involvement in exploration and exploitation activities except the right to receive gold 
in exchange for their natural resources. However, the development of modern concession 
agreements has addressed these aspects. The emergence of the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), expropriations after nationalisation, the renegotiation of 
contracts, as well as the creation of the International Economic Order have made it possible to 
remove many of the unfavourable features found in old concession. For example, in Nigeria, a 
concession contract was granted to Shell D’ Arcy in November 1937 to explore, produce and 
market petroleum resources throughout Nigeria without limitation in terms of duration and 
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geographical location. 14 Oil and gas operations effectively started in 1956 and this continued 
for a very long time until Nigeria became a member of OPEC in 1971 and took over the control 
of its oil and gas exploration activities in accordance with the OPEC member’s guidelines.  
Modern concessions like traditional concession, grant exclusive rights to the multinational oil 
companies (MOC) to explore, extract, produce and market the natural resources. However, it 
is important to distinguish the modern form of concession from the old one. In modern 
concession, multinational oil companies are no longer permitted to cover large geographical 
area during exploration activities. In addition, the lengthy period that was previously afforded 
to MOC is relatively reduced to reasonable period and majority of newly concluded 
concessions are based on joint and shared responsibilities between the host state and 
transnational corporations. Some OPEC members have renegotiated old concessions and 
replaced them with profit-sharing agreement.  The terms of modern concessions vary 
depending on state involved and the type of petroleum projects as these would determine what 
the best is for the parties. Importantly, the new concessions have made it possible for the host 
states to request that unexplored land should be handed back to the government and so MOC 
cannot leave land unexplored for long periods.  Similarly, with the new concessions, 
transnational corporations cannot expect to be granted exclusive rights to explore over an entire 
country’s geographical location. 
 
Evidence has proven that the modern contracts have rebalanced issues that were regarded as 
excessive in the traditional concessions. For example, Article 4 (a) of Petroleum Working 
Contract Between Indonesia and P.T. Stanvac Indonesia 1964 addressed most of the issues 
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discussed here.  The contract stipulates that the oil company was given only six (6) months to 
commence exploration activities and maximum of 8 years for other related oil exploration 
matters.15 This is equally observed in the concessions contract concluded between Egypt, the 
Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation and Esso Egypt Inc. United States.16 The contract 
dictates the exact amount of money to be spent in the project and the oil companies were given 
a total of twelve (12) years for exploration activities.  
In conclusion, it is observed that modern concessions deal very well with the concerns of large 
geographical locations associated with old concessions, with territory now been carefully 
allocated in form of oil blocks. The issue of exclusive rights granted to the transnational 
corporations to search and produce resources for up to 75 years as discussed in Kuwait’s old 
concession above has also been addressed because the modern concession only allows limited 
contracts with the avenue to extend it if deemed necessary and productive. But if no resources 
were discovered, contract will come to an end within 12 years of its first award as seen in the 
Egyptian contract discussed above.17 In addition, the modern concession creates job 
opportunities for the citizen of host state because transnational corporations are being required 
to employ them during their exploration activities and host state can now exercise control over 
the employees brought from abroad by transnational corporations.  Above all, the host state 
now receives royalties according to the value of produced resources because new concessions 
require that they should be well informed and updated on exploration activities and key 
decisions are collectively made.   
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3.2.2. Joint Venture Agreements 
A joint venture happens when two or more parties in the oil industries enter into a relationship 
with a view to making profit.18 It is important to draw a distinction between a business 
partnership and a joint venture. In a partnership, both parties involved operate jointly and share 
profits jointly. While in joint venture, there is a joint interest in joint operation, but profits are 
shared according to the level of participation and contribution to the joint operations. 19  In 
addition, the liability of a joint venture is not joint unlike a partnership in which both parties 
are jointly responsible for the business liability. JOA parties can sell their share of the 
petroleum separately to make profit. Therefore, in JOA, joint relationship means joint 
investment in production. It does not mean joint sharing of profit while profits and liability are 
shared equally in partnership business.20 Importantly, in Nigeria the JV’s arrangement means 
joint ownership of license, shared capita and reward, joint funding obligations, risk and liability 
are split and above all, each party to the joint venture pay separate tax liabilities. However, the 
benefit of the JV for the host state cannot be overlooked. Under JV, the host state is not alone 
in terms of responsibility for exploration activities and decision making. The host government 
will benefit from the expertise of transnational corporations and share the profits on top of 
royalties and taxes already generated.  
This type of contract is known to be a good option for the host state. Cotula posits that joint 
venture contract provides the host state with a greater control over petroleum exploration 
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projects.21 However, there are several factors to be considered by the host state before adopting 
the joint venture model of contract. Such factors include technical aspects, funding for the 
petroleum projects as well as opportunity to spread and reduce the risks associated with 
petroleum exploration particularly, political unrest in developing countries and environmental 
risks. Each of these considerations usually form the host state’s motive behind joint venture 
contract.22 
In every joint venture, a transnational corporation partners with the host state’s national oil 
company to explore, extract, produce and market natural resources through a joint operating 
agreement (JOA).23 Styles has defined JOA as a framework which defines the proportionate 
interest of the parties and also a functional document that explains the relationship of the parties 
under an appropriate license.24 In addition, the national oil company is the owner of the mineral 
resources, while the transnational corporation only operates and in some cases, provides the 
funding for the project. It is a common practice that when one or more oil companies are party 
to a petroleum licence, they tend to rely on operating agreement to govern their exploration 
activities.  Joint Operation Agreements are being used in a number of countries worldwide. For 
example, a joint operating agreement between British Petroleum (BP) and Imperial Oil 
Resources Ventures Limited (IORVL)/ExxonMobil Canada Ltd (EMCL) was concluded on 02 
August 2010. These three oil companies had formed a joint venture to explore for oil and gas 
in Canada’s Beuafort Sea. Exxon and Imperial each held a 25% share in the joint venture and 
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were in control of explorations. Meanwhile BP held the remaining 50% share.25 Similarly in 
the United Kingdom, the 2009 JOA model is the legal documents which govern joint venture 
operations.26 
In Nigeria, the joint venture model is primarily used in onshore and in shallow water 
operations.27 The petroleum exploration and production activities are majorly operating under 
Joint venture between transnational corporations and the state national oil company, Nigeria’s 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).  Nigeria’s JVs also rely on JOA to govern the 
exploration activities. JOA provides that partners will share the cost of operations and one party 
will be selected as the sole operator. In Nigeria, the NNPC reserved the right to become an 
operator.28 The operator prepares proposals for programme of work and joint budget of 
expenditure annually, which will be shared according to the number of shares.29 
There are currently six joint ventures in Nigeria involving Shell Petroleum Development 
Company of Nigeria Limited (SPDC), Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL), Mobil Production 
Nigeria Unlimited (MPNU), Nigerian Agip Oil Company Limited (NAOC), Elf Petroleum 
Nigeria Limited (EPNL) and Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company of Nigeria Unlimited 
(TOPCON). Theses foreign owned companies are in joint upstream operations with NNPC and 
they are operating mainly in the onshore Niger Delta, coastal offshore areas and recently in the 
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deepwaters. Nigeria’s JV stipulates the level of involvement of each party in managing the 
affairs of the company and it determines the interest, duties and ownership of production 
facilities including assets.30 The largest share older of all these joint venture is the Nigerian 
national oil company NNPC, which owned 60% of the company, while the remaining 40% 
were owned by the multinational oil companies except the venture ran by Shell, in which 
NNPC owned 55%. It is important to note that joint venture contract defers from other forms 
of contract by the way it was structured, which provides means for technology transfer and 
joint decision making between the host state and transnational corporations.  Michael Likosky 
acknowledged this point and explained that “joint venture arrangement puts a premium on 
technology transfer and the aim is to foster eventual genuine independence by the state-owned 
company”31 . 
Some of the problems associated with Nigeria JV cannot be ignored because currently, PSA is 
the preferred choice of oil and gas contract. One of the identified challenges is poor funding 
due to imbalance in financial capacity which is a common problem among joint ventures 
partners. Transnational corporations on one hand may be financially sound while the host state 
on the other hand has other pressures on its resources. Transnational corporations also face 
challenges from host community. For example, in the Niger Delta, people always agitate and 
demand for development programmes in their community and it has led to several disruptions 
and exploration activities have been affected as a result. Consequently, as the oil and gas 
industry is expanding, acreages are being allocated in deep offshore areas requiring more 
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funding and advanced technology. Therefore, exploring other options is perceived as the right 
solution.  
3.2.3. Service Contracts 
This type of oil and gas contract allows the host state to exert more control over petroleum 
exploration and exploitation activities. According to Likosky, under the service contract, 
transnational corporations are brought in to accomplish carefully delimited tasks.32 The host 
state is only contracting the transnational corporation to perform a cautiously delimited 
service.33 Denis also defines a service contract as “a contract by which a contractor 
International Oil Company (IOC) undertakes to explore for hydrocarbons at his own risk and 
expense on behalf of a national oil company (NOC), and by which he is reimbursed and 
remunerated in cash depending on the success of the exploration”.34 Abbas and Cynthia 
explained further that “a service contract is a long-term contractual framework that is used by 
some host states to acquire the international oil companies’ expertise and capital without having 
to hand over the field and production ownership rights to them”.35 Transnational corporations 
are strictly required under this type of contract to explore oil and gas fields on behalf of host 
state in return for prearranged fees without control over the final product and without profit 
sharing provision within the contract. It has been argued that the host states motive behind this 
type of contract is to benefit from transnational corporations’ skills and knowledge in 
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developing oil and gas fields.36  The involvement of foreign oil companies enables the host 
state to gain from their technical know-how which is equally important. Furthermore, the host 
state will learn how capital is invested because transnational corporations are well equipped in 
terms of managing large scale investment such as petroleum projects.  
Some members of OPEC and non-OPEC oil producing states have adopted service contracts 
for various reasons including sovereignty concerns. The service contract allows host states to 
maintain their sovereignty over their natural resources. Under a service contract, the host states 
can maintain field ownership, final product ownership rights while still benefitting from 
expertise of transnational corporations. Eight countries are cited here to illustrate the different 
models of service contract they have adopted.  Venezuela first adopted Operating Service 
Agreements in 1991, Kuwait signed its service contract in 1992, Iran signed a Buy-back 
Service Contract First Generation in 1995, Mexico signed a Multiple Service Contract in 2001, 
Bolivia signed Operations Contract in 2006, Ecuador signed a Service Contract in 2007, Iraq 
signed a Producing Field Technical Service Contract in 2009 and Turkmenistan signed a Risk 
Service Contract in 2008.37 It is important to note that these countries have varied the structure 
of their service contracts which clearly indicate that the model adopted by each country is not 
the same, though they are known as service contracts. There are three main types of service 
contracts; pure service contract, technical service contract and risk service contracts. 
Pure service contracts can be explained as a type of contract where transnational corporations 
are invited to carry out a defined service and be paid accordingly.38 It is important to point out 
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that with pure service contract, the host state bears all the associated risk with exploration 
activities and Omorogbe posits that the transnational corporations also get an interest in the 
extracted resource.39 The risk service contract represents a situation whereby, the host state is 
asking the transnational corporation to bear the associated risk with exploration activities and 
such request is considered out of favour for transnational corporation40 because if the resources 
are not detected they will receive no remuneration. On the other hand, if the resources are found 
they will be paid accordingly. The last main type of service contract is known as a technical 
assistance contract which can be described as a type of oil contract whereby transnational 
corporations are invited for exploration activities and they will be paid according to the contract 
arrangement with no opportunity of acquiring an interest in the resource.41 Michael further 
added that technical service contract is somehow close to partnership arrangement, but the host 
state is the stronger party.42  Importantly, it benefits the host state to certain degree because, as 
posited by Smith, et al, “the technical assistance agreement is one of several types of 
arrangement that can be used to take advantage of the multinationals’ technological and 
managerial expertise and capital resources while allowing the host country to maintain at least 
the appearance that its State oil company has control and ownership” 43 It could then be 
suggested that if host states are seeking to exert greater control over their natural resources, 
service contract may be the solution. Though, the host state may need to be aware of the 
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potential drawbacks of service contract because it has been labelled as economically inefficient 
and prone to potential losses.44 
Furthermore, it is observed from the above that service contracts make it possible for the host 
state to have maximum control over petroleum development within its territory because the 
contract not only allows the host state to secure the service of transnational corporations, but 
also enables it to have easy access to their finance, technology and most highly skilled 
personnel. The transnational corporation simply agrees to be remunerated under service 
contract (pure service contract) to explore and produce the oil for the host state. While under 
risk service contract discussed earlier, transnational corporations bear the risk and the cost of 
exploration activities, if resources are detected they will recover investment costs and 
compensation with interest. But if no resources discovered then contract ends without 
compensation.  Additionally, it is a form of contract that has been regarded as simpler and 
clearer to manage due to its structure and the fiscal system; it is not as complex as other forms 
of contract, particularly in its provision for tax and royalty.45 In this regard, Gao has shed some 
lights where he says that supervisory process under service contract together with 
administrative mechanisms have been narrowed to avoid bureaucracy in the course of 
executing the contract.46 Nevertheless, it cannot be disputed that service contract attracts higher 
income for the host state than other petroleum contracts simply because it has power over the 
produced resources.    
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3.2.4. Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) 
Historically, the PSA was first used in Indonesia in 1966 and is now widely used in the oil and 
gas industry. After Indonesia became an independent nation, feelings of taking control of the 
country’s natural resources were high and transnational corporations operating under the old 
concession contract were targeted and all newly awarded oil concessions were frozen by the 
government. A new oil contract model was introduced because the old concession was 
perceived as a legacy of colonial times and considered too generous to the transnational 
corporations at the expense of the host state. The PSAs model was preferred because it enabled 
the host state to uphold national ownership of mineral resources. Initially, transnational 
corporations opposed the newly created agreement. The major international oil companies were 
reluctant to invest their capital in a business which the contract debarred them from controlling 
or being the owners. In addition, the transnational corporations tried to avoid a situation 
whereby a decision to sign a PSA will set a bad precedent which might affect their business 
interest or oil concessions elsewhere. An independent foreign oil company, a United States of 
America Consortium called IIAPCO eventually signed the first PSA in 1966 and capitalised 
on the big oil companies’ decision not to rush to the new contract. It was an opportunity to 
break the dominance of the big players and gain access to high quality crude oil by simply 
accepting the terms and conditions that had been rejected by the major players in the petroleum 
industry. In reality, and as discussed below, the transnational corporations control and manage 
the oil fields themselves. Consequently, PSAs spread across the world to other oil producing 
countries. 
The PSA grants transnational corporations the right to explore, exploit and produce the natural 
resources. It is based on a sharing formula where the output of natural resources, (oil and gas) 
will be shared between the host state and transnational corporations according to the agreed 





with exploration activities, and derived benefits only if resources are found. Transnational 
corporations are entitled under the PSA to recoup the costs of exploration and to further share 
in profits of oil. The first oil produced is called ‘Cost Oil’ and it will be sold, and the money 
will be used to cover the incurred production cost, service provided and risks that have been 
taken by the transnational corporations47. Peter explains further that the remaining oil and gas 
produced which is called ‘profit oil’ would be shared between the host state through its national 
oil company and transnational corporations in the pre-arranged percentage and according to 
their participation interest.48 Similarly, Brazil’s Bill of law 5938/09   defined a Production 
Sharing Agreement as a: 
…regime of exploration and production of oil, natural gas and other fluid 
hydrocarbons" whereby oil companies will be granted rights to explore for 
develop and produce petroleum reserves, at their cost. In the event of a 
commercial discovery, costs incurred will be reimbursed to oil companies 
through an entitlement to production referred to as "cost oil." The remaining 
petroleum, after deduction of cost oil, is considered "profit oil.49 
Moreover, the transnational corporation’s profits are classed as income and they are taxable. 
While the resources and installations belong to the host state throughout the contract period 
and Michael posits that host government does take a share of the financial largess through 
taxation and royalty. 50 These features were incorporated into the PSC concluded between 
Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and Ashland Oil Nigeria Co (AON), in 1973. 
Consequently, it is important to point out that the number of international oil companies 
involved in PSAs makes no difference or impact on the structure of the Production Sharing 
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Agreement. The contract however recognises the members of joint venture and treats them as 
a single partner to the underline PSCs. Thus, two parties are involved and recognised, the 
transnational corporations and the host state representative or a national oil company. The 
Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) is the state oil corporation which represents 
country interest in petroleum exploration and exploitation activities across the country. 
It is observed that Production Sharing Agreements emerged from the adoption of the UN 
Resolutions 1803 and 3281 discussed in the preceding Chapter.51 The resolutions provided for 
the sovereign rights over natural resources and for the resources to be used for the development 
of their country.  Therefore, it can be argued that UN Resolutions have paved the way for oil 
producing states and their national oil companies to participate in exploration activities. In 
addition, it is clear from the features discussed earlier that this type of oil contract comes with 
risks and it can only attract transnational corporations that are willing to take risks associated 
with exploration activities. Transnational corporations will inject capital and bring technology 
with experts in the field to explore and produce oil, and if resources were discovered the 
transnational corporations are entitled to recoup sunk cost as stated within the underlined 
contract. An Azerbaijan PSA can be cited to buttress this point, Article 11. 2 of the Agreement 
on the exploration, Development and Production Sharing for the Shakh Deniz Prospective Area 
in the Azerbaijan Sector of the Caspian Sea provides that: 
“(a) Contractors shall be entitled to the recovery of petroleum cost as 
follow: 
(i) All Operating costs shall first be recovered from total Production; 
(ii) All Capital Costs Shall then be recovered from a maximum of fifty (50) 
percent of Crude Oil and fifty (50) percent of non-associated Natural Gas 
                                                          





remaining out of Total production after Crude Oil and Non-Associated 
Natural Gas required to recover Contractor’s Operating Costs”.52 
 There was a provision within the same agreement that if resources were not found, the host 
state will be free from the associated risks. Article 2 section 2.2 takes care of that and it states 
that:  
…Except as expressly provided elsewhere herein, in the event production 
resulting from petroleum Operations, upon completion of commercial 
production from the Contract Area at the end of the term of this Agreement, 
inclusive of all extensions provided in Article 4 is insufficient for full 
recovery of Contractor’s Capital Cost and Operating Cost as provided 
hereunder, the contractor shall not be entitled to any reimbursement or 
compensation for any of its costs not recovered. 53 
 
Furthermore, it is noted that the main reason for a host state adopting a PSA was premised on 
nationalism as well as government ownership of the host state’s natural resources.54 Al- Attar 
has added that a PSA is the right option for host states where reserves were large with medium 
exploration costs.55 Lack of financial burden for the host states during the exploration activities 
and after, have been identified as one of the advantages of PSAs. The contract also allows 
flexibility because there is no universal model of PSA, so oil-producing states have over the 
years came up with various models.56 Oil-producing states in this category are Nigeria, Oman, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Brazil, Angola, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Equatorial Guinea just to 
mention a few. 
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Brazil has recently adopted PSA and the only justification for the switch was to ensure a 
maximisation of financial output for the country. PSAs have proven to be a good formula for 
developing countries. Brazil adopted the model owing to the discovery of the sub-salt 
reservoirs off the coast of Brazil. The public oil company in Brazil is known as Brazilian 
Petroleum Corporation — Petrobras. It is observed that the primary aims of the government 
were to increase the revenues as well as controlling and participating in the country’s 
exploration and exploitation activities.  The Brazilian government also acknowledged that the 
concession contracts, which are very common until discovery of sub-salt reservoirs, were not 
appropriate and the model may not allow the country to take full advantage of the newly 
discovered reservoirs. Under the Brazilian constitution transnational corporations are the 
owner of the produced oil because Article 176 provides that: 
Mineral deposits, whether being worked or not, and other mineral resources 
and hydraulic energy sites constitute property distinct from the soil for the 
effects of exploitation or use, and belong to the Union, guaranteeing to the 
concessionaire ownership of the output of deposit.57 
 
According to the above provision, the concessionaire has the sole right to the produced oil, the 
transnational corporation becomes the owner of all the hydrocarbons produced subject to taxes 
and royalties. While under PSAs and as explained by Binder Mann, the host state is the owner 
of the produced oil and part of the produced oil will be shared with transnational corporation 
for the risks involved in exploration and exploitation activities.58 Therefore, with the new 
discovery, the Brazilian government believe that a change was necessary to take full control of 
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country’s natural resources and PSA is the right solution. Petrobras is the national oil company 
and serves as sole operator and held minimum 30 percent equity in all offshore pre-salt oil and 
associated gas fields.59 
Equatorial Guinea relies on oil revenues because petroleum production dominates its economy, 
accounting for over 70 per cent of the national income.60 In addition, the oil and gas industries 
are the force behind the current growth in Equatorial Guinea’s GDP and the country’s quick 
development. It is compulsory to use the production sharing contract model in Equatorial 
Guinea as the contract model allows the host state greater control compared to other types of 
contracts discussed earlier. Meanwhile, the Equatorial government was involved in exploration 
activities directly through her national oil company known as GEPetrol. GEPetrol was 
endorsed as the national Oil Company by Presidential Decree NO.9/2001 to manage the state’s 
participation as a shareholder, acts as agents for the sales of the state’s share of hydrocarbons 
and be responsible for the promotion of open acreage within Equatorial Guinea.61 
In addition, transnational corporations are required by Equatorial Guinea’s law to involve the 
national workforce and local companies in their exploration and exploitation activities. It is 
mandatory under domestic law that companies formed within Equatorial Guinea must give 35 
per cent of its share to local companies and most importantly, the national oil company works 
alongside transnational corporation as a partner to ensure local contents requirements are met. 
This measure was put in place to benefit the country’s economy. It is reported that the country 
gains economic benefits from petroleum exploration in two ways; directly by a way of taxation 
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and licensing and indirectly by enacting law which provides that all foreign companies should 
invest in social projects and allow indigenous companies to take part in petroleum exploration 
and exploitation activities.62 These provisions are fully examined in this chapter under PSA’s 
local content, and the next paragraph explains PSAs in the Nigerian context. 
Joint Ventures are the most common types of petroleum contract in Nigeria, a fiscal regime 
which requires the government to contribute funds towards the exploration activities annually.  
This payment is known as cash calls payment with the International oil companies. However, 
Nigeria is currently using PSA and it covers acreages in the shallow, inland basin and deep 
offshore areas. It is observed that Nigeria adopted PSAs due to its inability to partner alongside 
the transnational corporations because deep offshore exploration involves huge capital and 
prospect risks were significantly high. Therefore, PSA was adopted as a means for achieving 
deep offshore production63. In addition, it is further reported that the Nigerian Federal 
Government, because of other pressing needs, struggled to fund the cash calls for the 
development of joint venture projects with transnational corporations and as a result adopted 
PSC to rescue the country from funding challenges.64 It was also noted that there was a 
significant drop in crude oil production in Nigeria joint venture between NNPC with Chevron, 
Shell and Exxon Mobil. The production dropped by over 50 percent in the previous 10 years 
because of inadequate resources to fund JV by the NNPC. The report also revealed further that 
Nigeria should have been producing 500,000 to 1 million barrels per day more than its current 
production if the government was able to provide the required cash calls for the joint ventures. 
The cash calls have therefore been reported as the major reason for the NNPC’s inability to 
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meet the reserve target of 4 million barrels per day production by the previous government. 
The report later concluded that lack of funding for JV has led to a slash in the Nigeria joint 
venture’s assets while output from exploration activities has risen under PSA by about 700 
percent. The justification for the rise in production is due to the features of PSA explained 
earlier that the host state will not be required under PSA model to contribute any fund as the 
transnational corporations provide all of the risk capital, technical and manpower necessary for 
exploration and exploitation activities. Therefore, Nigeria has benefited from this model and 
the country has so far developed five offshore fields65 without contributing funds towards the 
projects and this has enabled the country to focus on other needs. 
Furthermore, Nigerian PSAs are regulated by an Act of Parliament, the Deep Offshore and 
Inland Basin Production Sharing Contracts Act No.9, Law of the Federation of Nigeria, 
1999.Nevertheless, the initial PSA signed by the parties will still be honoured because the 
rights and duties of the parties to PSA are clearly stated in the underline contract, with the 
relationship governed by the terms and conditions of the contract. Another good aspect of PSC 
is the opportunity afforded to the host state to maintain its local law and at the same time fulfils 
its duties towards the transnational corporations under the contract. Nigerian Law however 
does provide for the tax regimes and applicable royalties. It further stipulates how costs and 
profits are allocated between the transnational corporations and the host state. It is noteworthy 
that the law indicates a payment of 50% flat rate tax on oil profits by PSA operators66 and 
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further laydown various royalty regimes which will be determined by the water depth in which 
exploration activities are taking place. For example, 12 % for water depths in area from 201-
500 metres, 8% for water depths in area from 501 to 800 metres, 4% for water depths in area 
from 801 to 1000 metres and 0% in areas in excess of 1,000m,67 while, the inland basin’s 
royalty is just 10%. 68 Section 4 (2) of the Act also make provision for Investment Tax Credits 
and allowances to the investors, but the rate is 50% of the value of investment.69 Consequently, 
it is argued that transnational corporations prefer PSA than other types of petroleum contracts 
and one of the reasons given is the fact that they have open access to part of the production.70 
Not only that, PSA provides for legal protection and above all, the oil block field can be used 
by the transnational corporations as collateral security for bank loan according to OKoli.71 The 
Production Sharing contract is compared below with the rest of petroleum contracts. 
3.2.5 A comparison between a Production Sharing Agreements and other types of 
petroleum agreements. 
3.2.5.1 Concessions and PSA 
Compared to the old concession agreement, there is a similarity and there are differences 
between the two types. Transnational corporations oversee exploration activities in both, but 
the PSA acreage area is limited and defined in nature. The duration of exploration under PSA 
is also limited because if the allocated area is not explored within the required period and 
around the given phase, then it must be given back to the host state. It is noted from the 
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Kuwait’s old concession that 75 years is granted for exploration while under PSA 20 years may 
be granted for exploration and production and 8 out of the 20 years may be for explorations 
and the remaining years is expected for production. This feature makes PSA attractive to the 
host state according to Peter72. Transnational corporations are the owner of produced resources 
under old concessions but under PSAs, transnational corporation cover the cost of exploration 
and when resources are found, the host states get involved as the owner of produced resources. 
In addition, the PSA has been described as the best type of oil contract that defines better 
income tax regime for the host state than concession and stipulates how the profit of produced 
resources will be shared between the host state and the transnational corporations.73 
Furthermore, it is also possible under PSA for the host state to demand for the deployment of 
local competent, material and human resources as indicated in Nigeria’s Petroleum Act.74 This 
requirement is known as local content (LC) and the reason attributed to this special request is 
that transnational corporations tend to acquire market dominance which favour complex system 
akin to large foreign companies but in turn exclude locals from participation and control of 
operations.75The LC was defined by Berryl as “a legal obligation that comprises requirements 
imposed by host state on an investor to source locally a percentage of the necessary labour, 
good and services as a condition of being permitted to operate in the host country”.76 The 
majority of resources rich states have therefore, taken advantage of this and introduced local 
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content requirements in various petroleum contracts.  For example, Nigeria has a provision 
within the legislation which addresses the issue of local content as well as contractual provision 
in the 1993 PSA model. It is therefore important to look at the provision under Nigeria Law 
before looking at various clauses across the world where local content was included in their 
PSA Models. Section 38 of the First Schedule to Nigeria Petroleum Act 1969 provides that: 
 “the holder of an oil mining lease shall ensure that- 
(a) Within ten years from the grant of his lease 
(i) The number of citizens of Nigeria employed by him in connection with the 
lease in Managerial, professional and supervisory grades (or any 
corresponding grades designated by him in a manner approved by the 
Minister) shall reach at least 75% of the total number of persons employed 
by him in those grades; and 
(ii)  The number of citizens of Nigeria in any one such grade shall be not less 
than 60% of the total; and 
(b) all skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers are citizen of Nigeria77 
(iii) behind it is for the host   which   under the United Kingdom Petroleum 
modern licensing, the Petroleum Act 1998. 
 
Additionally, Nigeria has enacted a new law, the Nigeria Oil and Gas Industry Content 
Development Act 2010.  This Act of Parliament was made to ensure measurable growth of 
Nigerian Content in the oil and gas exploitation activities.  For example, S.7 of the Act required 
that transnational corporations should all submit Nigeria Content plan for oil and gas projects. 
The Section provides that: 
In the bidding for any licence, permit or interest and before carrying out any 
project in the Nigerian oil and gas industry, an operator shall submit a 
Nigerian content plan (“the Plan”) to the Board demonstrating compliance 
with the Nigerian content requirements of this Act.78 
 Section 12 of the Act also states that: 
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Subject to section 7 of this Act, the Nigerian Content Plan submitted to the 
Board by an operator shall contain a detailed plan, satisfactory to the board, 
setting out how the operator and their contractors will give first consideration 
to Nigerian goods and services, including specific examples showing how first 
consideration is considered and assessed by the operator in its evaluation of bids 
for goods and services required by the project.79 
Furthermore, Section 15 of the Act provides that:  
All operators and alliance partners shall maintain a bidding process for 
acquiring goods and services which shall give full and fair opportunity to 
Nigerian indigenous contractors and companies.80 
Similarly, there was a clause in the Nigeria PSA model on the issue relating to rights and 
obligations of the parties. The clause requests transnational corporation to: 
(i) prepare and carry out plans and programmes for industrial training and 
education of Nigerians for all job classifications with respect to petroleum 
Operations in accordance with Petroleum Act 1969;…. 
(k) Employ only such personnel as are reasonably necessary to conduct the 
petroleum Operations and employ qualified Nigerian Nationals to the 
maximum extent possible and in this respect: 
(i) CONTRACTOR shall determine the qualifications and number of positions 
required to conduct petroleum Operations in a prudent and cost-effective 
manner 
(ii) Qualified Nigerians shall be employed in all non-specialized positions. 
(iii) Qualified Nigerians shall also be employed in specialized positions such as 
those in exploration, drilling, engineering, production, and finance. 
CONTRACTOR shall have the right, subject to applicable laws; rules and 
regulations, to employ non-Nigerians in such specialized positions where 
qualified Nigerian are not available provided that CONTRACTOR shall 
recruit and train Nigerians for such specialized positions such that the 
number of non-Nigerian staff shall be kept to a minimum. 
      … 
(I) Give preference to such goods which are available in Nigeria or services 
rendered by Nigerian nationals, provided such goods meet the industry 
standards and such services are of good quality and are offered at 
competitive prices and are timely available.81 
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Equatorial Guinea is also one of the developing states that have adopted PSC and it reserved 
preferences for its citizen in terms of services, employment and training in its domestic 
legislation and PSC model. Article 88 of Equatorial Hydrocarbon Law provides that; 
“The state, and the Contractors shall contribute to the study, design, 
construction, equipment, operation and maintenance of the Hydrocarbon 
Technological Institute of Equatorial Guinea and creation of training centres 
for persons from Equatorial Guinea working in Petroleum Operations or 
operations related thereto, regardless of their promotion, support and 
development of other training centres with similar purposes in existence in 
Equatorial Guinea”82 
Article 92 also states that; 
Contractors shall train and integrate national personnel into all levels of 
their organisation in accordance with this Law and the terms of their 
Contracts. In addition, to the above, each Contractor will likewise contribute 
to the training of Ministry personnel. To that end, the Contractor shall 
annually provide the Ministry with a sum in United Sates Dollars during the 
Exploration and Production periods. This amount shall be determined by 
the Ministry in accordance with its prudent judgement by means of a 
resolution stating the grounds for such decision, and taking into account 
factors such as the phase, whether Exploration or Production, in which the 
Contractor is involved, as well as the level of activity being developed by 
the Contractor within the country. These amounts shall be considered 
Petroleum Operations costs.83 
Article 93 also provides that: 
“Contractors shall cooperate with the Government to identify projects 
which promote the realization of public benefit activities of the broadest 
possible impact on the public welfare. Contractors shall carry out all 
projects designated by the Government and shall submit a proposal for 
approval by the Ministry prior to undertaking any project not designated by 
the Government. To that end, during both the Exploration and Production 
periods, the Contractor shall annually provide the Ministry with an amount 
in United States Dollars. This amount shall be determined by the Ministry 
in accordance with its prudent judgement, by means of a resolution stating 
the grounds for such decision, and taking into account factors such as the 
phase, whether Exploration or Production, in which the Contractor is 
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involved, as well as the level of activity being developed by the Contractor 
within the country. These amounts shall not be considered Petroleum 
Operations costs”.84 
The PSA’s contract provides that:  
From the Effective Date, the Contractor shall ensure priority employment 
for adequately qualified Equatoguinean personnel in all levels of their 
organisation, as the employee’s skill allows, and as provided for in Article 
23.2.2, shall train or contribute in the training of such personnel to enable 
them to qualify for any position relating to Petroleum Operations. Expatriate 
personnel may only be employed if the Contractor and its subcontractors 
have exhausted all possibilities of recruiting adequately qualified 
Equatoguinean personnel in the required area of specialization.85 
 
In addition, there was a preference provision in its PSA Model and it requires that: 
 The Contractor and its subcontractors undertake to give preference to 
Equatoguinean services, materials, equipment, consumables and other 
goods whose quality and time of delivery are comparable to those available 
internationally, provided that the cost in Equatorial Guinea is no more than 
ten percent (10%) above the cost of similar services, material, equipment, 
consumables and other goods available internationally.86 
Mexico also acknowledged the importance of LC and this is reflected in its PSA model where 
it was clearly stated that: 
 “Subject to the applicable Provisions, including the international treaties 
ratified by Mexico, in case of subcontracting of the Works in accordance 
with Clause 16, the Contractor shall give preference to (i) acquiring goods 
of Mexican origin and (ii) hiring services provided by Mexican companies, 
whether private or state-owned, provided such goods and services are 
competitive with regard to price, quality, delivery time and any other 
condition relevant for subcontracting. 
 
… Without prejudice to that provided in the Applicable Provisions, 
including articles 7 and 154 of the Federal Labor Law, in the hiring of the 
Contractor’s Personnel engaged in the execution of the Works, the 
Contractors shall give preference to professional’s workers, and other 
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employees of Mexican nationality when they have the qualifications and 
experienced required for the Works provided in the Contract. 
 
It is noted from the above that developing states are using PSA as a vehicle to enhance local 
content and to create jobs for their citizens. It is clearly shown that transnational corporations 
are required to employ at least 60% of Nigerians either skilled or unskilled and it can be argued 
that PSA offered host states something unique that may not be achieved in other types of 
petroleum contracts.  
However, Local Content provisions have been heavily criticised by Claire who maintains that 
LC can only be successful if the rights balance is struck between local and foreign participation. 
87 The motive for local content should never be inspired by nationalist movement or policy 
choice on political motivations and host state must ensure it is based on economic and 
development reasons. She argues further that transnational corporations in the oil industry have 
competent professional and technical workers in their work force as well as products that are 
new or complex in nature, therefore, allowing foreign participation may be a good opportunity 
for the citizens of host state and local companies to share capital and technology which would 
eventually help to promote capacity-building and develop competence and know-how. 
Nevertheless, foreign participation is often resorted to, at least initially, to train locals to 
eventually take over, at least in part, operations in the industry.88 Clement added that there are 
many reasons to justify the local content policies which include fostering indigenous 
businesses, job creation, capacity building and training, environmental and social protection 
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and to promote industrial strategies.89 Other commentators have viewed foreign participation 
critically and posit that it kills local firms due to the unhealthy competition from foreign 
investors.90 Some argued that it has led to loss of jobs in the privatised parastatals91 and 
endangerment of host community’s fundamental human and worker’s rights92 and the 
degradation of environment.93 
Thus, local content aspiration needs to be backed by law because with no legislative support 
for implementation of local content policy, the transnational corporations may ignore and see 
it as mere policy. Evidence from Nigeria has shown that in the past, most of the works in the 
oil and gas industry were carried out outside Nigeria despite the local content policy and it has 
had a negative impact on job creation, development of local skills and the economy. However, 
the newly created law has seen dramatic changes because the law stated clearly that oil and gas 
industry jobs should be carried out locally to build local capacity and violation of the provision 
will not be tolerated. A recent investigation by the Nigerian House of Representatives to the 
conduct of transnational corporations can be cited as a good example. It was brought to the 
attention of Nigerian lawmakers that transnational corporations refused to engage the services 
of indigenous vessels but prefer to engage foreign vessels that were not flying the Nigerian flag 
and this attitude is considered a violation of the Nigeria law by international oil and gas 
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companies.94 Nevertheless, Nigeria has benefited from LC, particularly, the provisions within 
the national policy which provides that transnational corporations must give a detailed work 
programme for training Nigerians and that money spent towards training and education should 
be catered for by development and production. Numerous positive impacts of the inflow of 
investments on the economy and benefits for the host state have been pointed out in academic 
writeups.  It has been argued that foreign investments have produced positive externalities or 
spill-over benefits such as higher wages, transfer of skills, knowledge and technology and 
quicker productivity growth.95 
3.2.5.2 Joint Ventures and PSA 
Joint-Venture models enable a host state to exercise more control over exploration activities 
because of its direct involvement as a partner through its national oil company. This model was 
preferred by the NNPC until recent times when government struggled to contribute its share of 
the joint venture, the annual cash calls financial commitments. As explained earlier on, JV 
requires that all parties involved in the project do things jointly. JV partners operate through 
joint operation agreement which stipulates how the parties will work with each other. Above 
all, it has certain advantages which include opportunity to work with major oil companies and 
their skilled staff, joint decision on exploration and production activities and shared 
responsibilities in terms of costs and associated risks.  It has however been argued that there is 
a downside of sharing risks and costs with transnational corporations under JV because it will 
put the host state in difficult position, it makes the host state a responsible and direct participant 
in the extraction of natural resources. It comes with a huge responsibility such as liability for 
environmental damage and the principles of international environmental law have established 
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that those who cause harm to environment should pay for the damage resulting from their 
activities. A case in point is the affirmation that the oil industry in Nigeria is contributing to 
environmental pollution in the Niger Delta area.96 In addition, host state participation in joint 
venture projects may have huge impact on the application of necessary laws to address the 
pollution crises and evidence has established that the Nigerian government has about 50 per 
cent stake in joint venture petroleum projects.97 
3.2.5.3 Service Contracts and PSA 
Service Contracts are extensively evaluated in this chapter. it is observed that this type of oil 
and gas contract confer greater control on the host state and its representative National Oil 
Company. On one hand, service contract allows the host state to retain the full control of 
exploration and exploitation activities being produced on its territory, while the transnational 
corporation on the other hand carried out the exploration activities with the anticipation of 
getting paid for the services rendered to the host state. The similarities between this model and 
PSA cannot be overemphasised. In these two contract types, the transnational corporation can 
recover the production cost through the sale of produced natural resources; it is called cost oil 
under PSA. In addition, a service contract is like a PSA in terms of wording, relevant clauses, 
the duration of contract and basic economic structure. For example, both contract types allow 
easy access to transnational corporations’ finances, technology and highly skilled personnel. 
Particularly under the risk service contract, the transnational corporations bear the risk and cost 
of exploration activities, if resources are discovered, they will recover investment costs and 
compensation and if no resources are found, then contract ends, and they walk away without 
compensation. While under PSA, the transnational corporation will invest capital and bring 
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technology with experts in the field to explore and produce oil, and if resources were discovered 
the transnational corporations are entitled to recoup sunk cost as stated within the underlined 
contract. The host state however, under a PSA becomes the property owner of all equipment 
and installation used in exploration and exploitation activities. This factor is significant for 
developing countries which are struggling to fund or invest in petroleum exploration activities 
themselves, so that they may use the retained installations to build an independent oil and gas 
industry. Consequently, the most notable difference with the production sharing contract is that 
the so-called profit oil is kept by the host state under service contract and it cannot be shared 
with transnational corporations as described in production sharing agreement. This often 
happen under pure service agreement in a situation where the cost of exploration activities is 
covered by the host state and the transnational corporations are only paid for their services with 
no claim to the produced oil.   
3.3 Conclusions 
It is observed from this chapter that the use of petroleum contracts for exploration and 
exploitation activities has developed over the years to meet the needs in the oil and gas industry. 
Particularly, the host states in developing countries are now certain that oil will be found and 
have moved on from the era of classic concession whereby a small amount of money will be 
offered to them for exploration across the country. The contract types have helped the host state 
to uphold and benefit from the United Nations General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 
14 December 1962, which established that all states are free to dispose of their natural wealth 
and resources in accordance with their national interests.98 The host states, through oil and gas 
contracts, have taken control over their natural resources. This was a departure from the era 
when exclusive rights were granted to international oil companies to explore and produce oil 
for 75 years with freedom to control exploration activities because there was no certainty that 
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the oil will be discovered. However, the new concession has curtailed IOC’s power to explore 
for indefinite period and removed unfavourable features of the old concession. The host state 
now formed part of the decision-making process with its citizens being allowed to work in the 
oil industry as a result of contract development. Concerns about the lengthy period and 
geographical location were minimised, and territories are now being allocated as blocks. Above 
all, modern concession required the IOC to apply for an extension if deemed necessary. 
Furthermore, it is observed that JV was introduced and considered to be a better option for the 
host state due to the fact that JV model enables the host state to be directly involved in the 
exploration activities through its national oil company (NOC). It is noted that Nigeria adopted 
this type of petroleum contract due to its technical aspects and joint funding for the exploration 
project including shared responsibility for the associated risks. Under JV, the national oil 
company is the owner of the produced oil and is responsible for the preparation of the proposals 
for programme of works. It is further observed that JV arrangements have a unique advantage 
of technology transfer which will ultimately enable the host state to operate independently. 
However, evidence has shown that JV was ineffective and became problematic due to 
imbalance in financial capacity and host state’s inability to live up to expectation when the 
annual cash calls financial requirements were demanded. This factor amongst other things led 
to the adoption of production sharing agreement in Nigeria. 
Several oil producing countries are also using PSAs. For example, the Brazilian Government 
believes that it is the best option for the newly discovered sub-salt reservoir and preferred it 
over the modern concession. The Brazilian government quickly switched to PSAs and argued 
that the change was necessary to take control of the country’s natural resources. It should be 
noted that PSA’s features revealed that the host state is the owner of the produced oil. It was 
also recognised that PSA is a good choice for the host state where reserves were large like 





Additionally, a PSA offers developing countries a great opportunity to create jobs for indigenes 
of host states as seen in different legislation examined in this chapter where the host states 
require international oil companies to source locally a percentage of labour, goods and services 
as part of the conditions of being allowed to explore and produce oil in their territories. 
Amongst others, Equatorial Guinea even made it an obligation for the transnational 
corporations under its PSA to recruit suitable Equatorial Guinean personnel at all levels of their 
organisation and asked that preference should be given to the country’s goods and services.  
Similarly, service contract have over the years made it possible for the host state to acquire the 
transnational corporations’ capital and expertise without transferring production ownership and 
oil field to the IOC. It is further noted that service contract addressed the sovereign concerns 
because the model allowed the host state to take over control of their natural resources and it 
is regarded as simpler and clearer to manage due to its tax and royalty provision. Nevertheless, 
it can be argued that, while the choice of petroleum contract type is a major consideration for 
the continuous development, protection and promotion of host state and transnational 
corporations’ interests, the name of contract or contract types is less important according to 
Solimene.99He posits further that the most important thing is the content of the clauses of the 
contract. In addition, what matter most is host state’s ability to mix and match clauses from all 
types of petroleum contract to come up with a tailor-made contract which can reflect the host 
state and transnational corporations’ needs and balance their rights. However, by evaluating 
the evidence and features of all the contract types presented in this chapter, it appears that PSA 
has many features which make it standout and preferable among stakeholders than other types 
of oil and gas contracts in the industry. PSA features appear to be extremely beneficial and 
advantageous to those host states with very limited resources to invest. 
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                                              CHAPTER 4 
THE CAUSES OF IMBALANCE IN INTERNATIONAL OIL CONTRACTS 
4.1 Introduction 
It is submitted that one of the causes of imbalance in oil and gas contracts are investment 
treaties and this is because treaties focus on states’ obligations towards the transnational 
corporations but none or very little obligations deals with transnational corporations 
obligations towards the states. Problems associated with investment treaties have been fully 
examined in preceding chapters therefore; this chapter addresses the causes of imbalance by 
looking at the long-term contractual relationship particularly the associated risks with oil and 
gas contracts such as political, economic, natural and technical risks.  
The imbalance in oil and gas contracts has been regarded as a deficiency of the investment 
regime.1Sornarajah described it as a “power-base which seeks to secure the rights of business 
over the rights of people” and this underlined the need for an evolution from a host state with 
duties towards the transnational corporations to a host state with rights in relation to the 
investor.2  According to Mato, the host state and the transnational corporations have different 
objectives, host states in one hand aspire to promote their economic growth while the 
transnational corporations on the other hand want to maximise their profits.3 In order to 
evaluate these postulations, the following paragraphs will analyse some of the important 
clauses in oil and gas contracts and critically discuss the risks inherent in exploration projects. 
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The aim of this chapter is therefore, to critically examine the causes of imbalance in oil and gas 
contracts from the perspectives of both the host state and the transnational corporation. It is 
noted that the host states view oil and gas as a patrimonial inheritance4 belonging to the country 
and incoming generations which must be preserved. In this regard, the host state found itself in 
a very difficult position to watch over the natural resources and ensure the transnational 
corporations are not keeping to themselves the “windfall profits” acquired as a result of 
petroleum exploration activities. In achieving this, the host state deemed it necessary to have a 
petroleum contract that can meet its needs and those of its citizens.5 However, clauses in oil 
and gas contracts can put the host state in an unimaginable situation whereby it could be 
deprived of exercising its fundamental rights as a sovereign power. For example, stabilisation 
clauses in oil and gas contract can override domestic legislation or stop the state from enacting 
new law targeted at bringing the petroleum contract in line with the socio-economic realities 
in the country. In the same vein, an attempt to unilaterally alter the terms of contracts or 
introduce new fiscal regime may erode the transnational corporations’ profits and thereby 
affect exploration projects. The important question then is; what can the transnational 
corporations do to ensure economies of the exploration project are protected?  
It is observed from the preceding chapter that oil and gas exploration projects are associated 
with risks from exploration to production. In addition to these risks and the sunk cost, this sort 
of investment requires a lengthy period to start yielding benefits for the transnational 
corporations. Above all, some oil and gas contracts required that the risks of exploration and 
exploitation should be taken all alone by the transnational corporations and if the resources 
were not found, they walk away with no gains. To reduce some of the associated risks, the 
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transnational corporation may enter into a loan agreement with a project lender who will be 
assured that repayment will be made from the profits generated through the exploration project. 
They may also enter into contract with joint ventures and off-takers during exploration project 
with the anticipation of making profits, which makes it important that oil and gas contracts are 
stable, predictable and profitable. This is achievable if the oil and gas contract terms can be 
protected by inserting clauses such as stabilisation and other relevant clauses that will ensure 
the rights and obligations of the parties in the contracts are fulfilled. This chapter therefore 
focuses on some special clauses in oil and gas contracts that transnational corporations may 
consider before entering into agreement with the host state to minimise risks emanating from 
measures which are likely to affect their investment. 
This chapter examines the following clauses namely and in summary, stabilisation, 
renegotiation, force majeure, arbitration and choice of law. In respect of stabilisation clauses, 
the chapter investigates various types of stabilisation clauses and shed some lights on their 
effects and benefit for the host state and the transnational corporations. It is argued that the 
freezing clauses are not suitable, and the transnational corporations may not rely on them 
simply because they cannot prevent the host state from exercising its sovereign power in the 
public interest.6 The chapter concludes that the economic stabilisation tend to strike the right 
balance because under this category the transnational corporations already aware that a new 
law could be enacted but with a promise of compensation to make up for their loss and negative 
effects of the new law on their business. In addition, the hybrid clauses reflect certain aspects 
of freezing and economic clauses.  It does not prevent new law but requires that the 
transnational corporations are excluded from the new law and further provides for 
compensation scheme to put them back to economic condition as it would have been had new 
                                                          
6AFM Maniruzzaman, ‘The pursuit of stability in International Energy Investment Contracts: Acritical 





legislation not been made. The case of Texaco Oversea Petroleum Company v. The 
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic7 is carefully considered in the chapter to establish 
the effects of the stabilisation in oil exploration agreement.  
Furthermore, the chapter looks at academics’ views on renegotiation clauses because it is 
believed that the aim of renegotiation clause is to maintain the relationship between the host 
state and the transnational corporations. It keeps business relationship alive by enabling the 
parties to strike the right balance when it is obvious that circumstances have changed and the 
changes to the underline agreement can be justified. According to Berger using a renegotiation 
as a mechanism to strike the balance will benefit the host state and protect the transnational 
corporation against unexpected changes in the law governing the exploration agreement.8 The 
disadvantages of this clause are highlighted in the chapter because the host state can capitalise 
on the provision and use it unfairly against the transnational corporations. For example, they 
can unilaterally change the law for an event within the control of the host state. Nevertheless, 
the renegotiation clause can be a useful tool if there is a genuine change in circumstances which 
affects the economic viability of the contract as established in this chapter. In addition, the 
chapter reflects the arguments in favour and against the force majeure clauses. The court of 
Appeal ruling on what counts as force majeure clause is also considered in Great Elephant 
Corp v TrafguraBeheerr BV Crudeesky9 where the court is required to ascertain whether the 
clause can exclude a party for unnecessary delay in the performance of its obligation within 
the agreement and if the performance was delayed because of unforeseeable circumstances.  
The chapter further reveals in oil and gas related cases, (JSA) Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran V 
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the Islamic Republic of Iran,10Mobil Oil Iran, Inc, et al v Iran11 and Sylvania Technical 
Sytems, Inc., v the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran12  where the Tribunal gives 
example of events that can justify nonfulfillment of contract’s obligations under the oil and gas 
contract and what may not constitute a condition of force majeure.  
The binding effects of arbitration clauses are carefully considered in this chapter. Apart from 
provision under s.54 of ICSID that makes it a compulsory for contracting member to recognise 
its award as final and biding. It further provides that any obligations imposed by the award 
must be enforced as the final judgement in member state’s court. Nigeria is among the 
contracting members around the world that have favoured arbitration to settle investment’s 
disputes and created many laws to promote arbitration, particularly, for the settlement of 
dispute in oil and gas industry. However, the chapter contained information which highlight 
that certain disputes are excluded from arbitration in Nigeria. Some of the decisions which 
emanated from tax related cases in Nigeria establish that tax related matters are not arbitrable 
despite the provision under the Nigeria Oil Pipeline Act, 1990 which provides that dispute 
arising out of oil and gas agreement should be referred to arbitration.13 The chapter examines 
a number of principles applied by the judges in Nigeria which show that tax related arbitration 
in the country cannot be predicted. 
The governing law of the agreement plays an important role in arbitration and its proceedings 
therefore, the chapter focuses on the factors to be considered by the parties in establishing the 
applicable law in the agreement. The choice of law determines what law applies to oil and gas 
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agreement but where the choice of law is omitted, the parties may struggle to have a legal 
certainty when disputes arise. Therefore, this chapter examines related cases from different 
jurisdictions to establish the court approach to settle the dispute in the absence of choice of 
law. And whether oil and gas agreement should be subject to local law of the host state in which 
the oil will be extracted.   
It is worth noting that clauses in oil and gas contracts play vital roles and evidence have shown 
that the host states in developing countries are unilaterally taking measures which affect the 
rights of transnational corporation and thereby reducing the value of their investment. The 
justifications for such measures are varied and can be attached to rise in oil prices which 
prompted the host state to secure more profits than what they agreed when the contract was 
concluded.14 Fabio posits further that expropriations and nationalisations increase when the 
price of oil increases and some countries in the developing world were making new law to 
legalise expropriation by arguing rights over country natural resources.15 This was clearly 
illustrated in Venezuela in 2007 when the country adopted a law which allowed them to 
expropriate the two U.S. largest oil companies, ExxonMobil Corporation and Conoco Phillips, 
which then had no option but to abandon their multi-billion dollar investments in Orinoco basin 
in Venezuela.16 The report further revealed that four other transnational corporations, including 
BP, Total S.A., Statoil and Chevron from the US accepted contracts that increased the Petroleos 
de Venezuela (‘PDV’) share in their exploration projects from 40 per cent to about 78 per 
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cent.17 This unusual measure reflects the imbalance of power between the host state and 
transnational corporations. Most nationalisations happened when prices of oil were high in the 
1970s but when prices dropped in 1980 and the ‘90s, nationalisation vanished, only to resurface 
whenever prices were historically at high level.18 
The petroleum contracts’ concept was developed in international investment law to protect the 
interest of host states and transnational corporations and on this point, Bertrand argues that 
exploration and exploitation contracts have shown to be an effective way of ensuring 
transnational corporations are protected by minimising the host state power to set standards in 
terms of substance through administrative and legislative measures and jurisdiction through 
arbitration.19  He argued further that the aforementioned measures have been challenged with 
the claim that the host state should be granted sovereignty in its relationship with transnational 
corporations. It is therefore important to reiterate that after the emergence of New International 
Economic Order (‘NIEO’) as well as the principle of sovereignty over natural resources, oil-
rich producing countries began to sign a policy to take over their natural resources with the aim 
of getting benefit from their extraction. However, transnational corporations were not totally 
happy with such a measure because they too want to maximise their profits and the policy of 
nationalism led to conflicts between them and host states. Invariably, exploration contracts 
between the parties stipulate a long-term relationship regardless of the oil and gas contract 
types in recognition of three common features.  Firstly, the associated risk that the relationship 
may be affected by contingent events such as political unrest or economic instability with 
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impact on the underlined exploration contract. Secondly, the projects involved intensive capital 
and lastly, the contracts are linked with high risks. For example, a change in government or 
law may lead to expropriation of the project and host states often capitalise on this. Bertrand 
added that the host state may make use of the inventors’ expropriation dilemma to press for 
changes in the contractual equilibrium in its favour because of the awareness that investors 
have invested so much and would be unreasonable to abandon a large amount of sunk costs.20 
In addition, the principle of law of contract, the sanctity of contract is applicable to oil and gas 
agreements and it implies that contractual terms and conditions must be honoured while the 
minimum international standard of protection to be provided by host states to transnational 
corporations includes the requirement of good faith.  This principle forms the basis of civil law 
obligations and provides  that “ the contract is the law of the parties, agreed to by them for the 
regulation of their legal relationship, and generates not only the obligation of each party to a 
contract to fulfil its promises, but also the obligation to perform them in good faith”21   Pier 
pointed out that it is generally accepted that oil and gas contracts are capable of being breached 
under international investment law and cited expropriation as an example that is of primary 
concern for transnational corporations.22 Expropriation is, amongst other things, one of the 
factors for the aim to stabilise the contractual obligations between parties to exploration and 
exploitation contracts. It is therefore pertinent to first discuss some of the associated risks with 
petroleum exploration activities before evaluating relevant clauses that need to be considered 
by the host state and transnational corporations in their respective oil and gas contracts. 
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4.2 Risks inherent in Oil Contracts 
It is not disputed that the oil and gas contracts are vulnerable, and that unanticipated change of 
circumstances may occur to justify non-performance of a party’s obligation under a petroleum 
contract. There are a number of potential risks associated with international petroleum contracts 
and these risks may not be comparable to risks in other types of agreement around the world. 
For example, geopolitical and technical problems may lead to unexpected delay particularly 
technical failure in oil and gas contract which may extend the life-span of exploration activities. 
It is noted that political unrest, revolutions, wars and embargoes amongst other things are 
causes of major interruptions in majority of oil-producing countries, including Arab states.23 It 
is also argued that the host state participation in international petroleum contracts is the source 
of political risk because the outcome of such long contractual relationship is attached to the 
stability of the host state.24 In addition, the likely risks from the host state’s involvement may 
not be directly attributable to the state but to public interest requirement aspect of the contract 
which is always an issue in the oil and gas industry. Therefore, identifying the potential risks 
in international oil and gas contract which may affect the parties’ ability to fulfil their 
contractual obligation is significant. 
4.2.1 Political and economic risk 
According to Onyejekwe, one of the challenges in oil and gas contracts are political and 
economic crises and the impact of this on the host state, in the absence of sustainable economic 
growth and development, a primary responsibility of government to its citizens.25 To achieve 
this, a motivating environment for transnational corporations must be created by the host state 
and investment obstacles and impediments must also be eradicated. Perry posits that 
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transnational corporations want to be assured of two important things; certainty and efficacy. 
She argues further that an inefficient legislation increases transaction costs and presents 
uncertainty and barriers to transnational corporations.26 
Political risk has been described by academic writers as “the risk that a foreign government 
action will negatively affect the cash flows of a company conducting an international 
investment”27 In another broad definition they say it is the risk that the country’s government 
actions or imperfections of the country’s executive, legislative, or judicial institutions adversely 
affect the value of an investment by a foreign firm in that country”.28Similarly, Stephen argues 
that “political risks arise from the actions of national government which interfere with or 
prevent business transactions, or change the terms of agreement, or cause the confiscation of 
wholly or partially foreign owned business property”29 It is observed from the above definitions 
that political risks can occur in various ways. It can be in form of a host state-initiated 
confiscation of transnational corporations’ assets or output popularly known as expropriation, 
for example unexpected changes in the law to raise tax and petroleum royalties. This had been 
the case as consequences of independence after colonisation in the 1960s and 1970s as 
evaluated in chapter three under petroleum concession agreement. Besides, expropriation is 
regarded as the most popular of all the political risks that transnational corporations are 
vulnerable to in exploration project. It has been posited that expropriation may come in 
different forms such as new regulations, forced renegotiation, confiscatory taxes, changes in 
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exchange rates and limit on the repatriation of currency.30 Undoubtedly, identifying and 
understanding the potential risks that are likely to hinder the fulfilment of contractual 
obligations may help parties involved prepare for every eventuality and perhaps adopt 
appropriate methods to mitigate likely risks.  
The case of Ecuador, Venezuela and Kazakhstan can be cited to show how host states have in 
the past expropriated oil operations. The President of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, in 2007 issued 
a Decree requesting multinational oil companies in the country to sign a new contract with the 
national oil company known as Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PADVSA) and he was ready to 
expropriate their business interests if they fail to agree to new contractual terms. Venezuela 
eventually expropriated the business interests of ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips mentioned 
earlier. Toeing the same line, Ecuador had in the past required transnational corporations 
operating within its territory to sign new subcontracting contracts designed to terminate the 
existing joint venture and with a clause aimed at preventing them from submitting appeals to 
the (ICSID).31 Ecuador further increased tax rate up to 50 per cent on crude oil prices and 
expropriated occidental Petroleum’s interest in an oil field.32  It is also noted that the following 
oil producing countries; Algeria, Angola, Russia, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea and Kazakhstan 
have increased taxes and royalties on oil and gas revenues substantially.33 Anderson also added 
that Kazakhstan has taken some drastic measures by enacting a law that gave the host state 
power to unilaterally void or amend oil exploration and production contracts based on national 
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security.34 Consequently, measures such as these are capable of changing the economic 
equilibrium of a petroleum contract, a clear indication of an imbalance in the contractual 
relationship between the host state and the transnational corporations. In any exploration 
project, the parties have the responsibility to ensure the right balance is struck. 
Furthermore, political risk covers the instability of a host state’s legal system and policies as 
well as internal and external struggles, such as civil war, strikes and terrorism.  It is not disputed 
that exploration projects are vulnerable to political risks regardless of any assurance provided 
by the host state in the underlined contract to protect transnational corporations against negative 
effect of political changes. Political risk occurs in different forms as understood from the above 
definition which makes it impossible for the host state to prevent the occurrence of certain 
aspect of political risks. Besides, other actors particularly the indigenous community are also 
involved in petroleum exploration apart from the host state and transnational corporations and 
these actors pursue different interests. The local community for example wants its needs to be 
considered and met in exploration projects. They may seek a fair distribution of oil wealth and 
might even demand to be involved in control of the oil sector. The Niger Delta in Nigeria can 
be cited as a good example to buttress this point. 
The Niger Delta region is Nigeria’s largest wetland, and the third largest wetland in the world. 
It has the highest crude oil resources in the Gulf of Guinea countries. The oil was first 
discovered in the area in commercial quantity at Olobiri in 1956.35 However, Niger Delta 
people live below the poverty line despite the massive natural resources in the area. The report 
                                                          
34 Scot W Anderson, Expropriation, Nationalisation and Risk Management, Exploration & Production- Oil & 
Gas Review- OTC Edition, Touch Briefings (2008) at page 20.  
35 Available at 
<https://www.nnpcgroup.com/NNPCNusiness/BusinessInformation/OilGasinNigeria/IndustryHistory.aspx> 





has further shown that the region has the largest unemployment and illiteracy rates in Nigeria 
and one of the largest in the world. The quality of life is reported to be very low due to the lack 
of health facilities and other important amenities. As a result, the local people have developed 
doubts regarding the Nigerian government’s intention to meet the region’s needs and 
accordingly transferred the aggression that had led to disruption of exploration activities 
towards the Federal Government.  It is further reported that the instability in the Niger Delta 
region has prompted a negative reaction from multinational oil companies with significant 
numbers of oil production shut-down at oil fields and force-majeure declared due to the 
incidents of sabotage, oil theft, kidnapping, attacks and supply disruptions.36 The Shell 
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd (SPDC) declared force majeure on the 10th 
of October 2011 due to a sabotage of the Forcados pipeline. Another report further confirmed 
that a total of 189 crude oil thefts were dealt with between January and September 2013 alone, 
forcing SPDC to raise alarm on the rapid trend of crude oil theft which has led to constant 
closures of two pipelines within the same year.37 The SPDC Managing Director also expressed 
the company’s concerns over what he described as a social tragedy and a waste of the country’s 
resources, confirming in his statement that Shell Nigeria finds it difficult to safely operate their 
pipelines without shutting down to prevent illegal connections.38 Nevertheless, it can be 
asserted that cases of pipeline sabotage, theft, vandalism and supply disruptions can be avoided 
if the local people are convinced that the host state has not overlooked their interest in oil and 
gas contracts. They may then support the relevant contract, minimise associated political risk 
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and invariably help the transnational corporations maximise their out-put with the extant 
stability.  
However, economic risks are attributed to unanticipated circumstances that are likely to 
increase the cost of exploration projects. Alternatively, it could lower anticipated profits 
because exploration and production projects involve massive capital investment and require a 
long-term duration to be effective and profitable. Therefore, a fluctuation in oil price, a rise in 
the technical costs of exploration and recession or inflation in a host country may change the 
economic equilibrium of exploration project to the disadvantage of transnational corporations 
involved.   
4.2.2 Natural and technical risks 
Certain categories of risks may not be completely prevented and might even be beyond the 
control of either party to the petroleum contract. One can refer to cases of unexpected natural 
disasters to illustrate that some of the risks could not be reasonably avoided but can be 
controlled through clauses in the underlined contracts. For example, the unanticipated 
devastating flood, earthquake, storm and tsunami that struck the coast of Indonesia in 2004 
which disrupted the shipment from LNG Plant in Indonesia to South Korea and Japan.39 
Similarly, in the case of Hilton Oil Transport v Oil Transport Co40where the court affirmed 
an award of damages due to the destruction of the vessel by the storm. In respect of technical 
risks, it is observed from the Total publications41 that exploration activities particularly the 
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development of oil and gas fields, the drilling of production, construction of facilities and 
injection of wells requires advanced technology and are capital intensive. In addition, the oil 
company’s ability to find or acquire and develop new oil reserves is not guaranteed and can be 
hindered by specific factors and risks such as unexpected drilling conditions, irregularities in 
geological formations, dry holes or failure to find anticipated commercial quantities of oils. 
There may also be cases of equipment failures, fires, blow-outs or accidents and lack of new 
technologies which may enhance access to previously inaccessible fields. It is further noted 
that any of these factors can easily lead to cost overruns for transnational corporations with 
great impact on exploration project which may adversely affect results of operation, financial 
condition and profits.42 
 The previous sections have demonstrated that the parties to the exploration contracts are 
known with specific types of risks and parties do not have equal standing, therefore a balance 
needs to be struck by allocating the associated risks among the two parties, the host state and 
the transnational corporations. The parties should consider inserting a number of clauses in oil 
and gas contracts so that they will be able to share future risks among themselves. The 
following paragraphs evaluate some of the relevant clauses in oil and gas contracts. 
 
 
4.2.3 Stabilisation clauses 
It is observed that the associated risks with the petroleum exploration and exploitation can be 
manged in different ways and it is normal for transnational corporations to protect their 
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investment against risks. One of the ways this can be achieved is to spread the risk by involving 
other parties in the venture such as banks and industry partners or alternatively by diversifying 
operations according to Pier.43 He recommended that transnational corporations should insert 
stabilisation clause after exploring and exhausting all other possible means to minimise the 
associated risks. One of the possible means is by obtaining political risk insurance from 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (‘MIGA’), a member of the World Bank Group. 
The role of this institution is to promote and protect transnational corporations against non-
commercial risks in developing countries and so far the organisation have issued more than 
$28 billion in political risk insurance for project not only in oil and gas industry but in a wide 
variety of sectors across the world.44 In addition, the transnational corporations may maintain 
a low profile and involve the host state, through its national oil company, in the management 
of the project while demonstrating that they understand the host states’ economic and social 
problems. However, it is significant to point out that including stabilisation clause in oil and 
gas contracts create a stable business environment.  
From a scholars’ perspective, stabilisation clauses are those clauses in private contracts 
between investors and host states that address changes in law in the host state during the life of 
the project45 Fabio described it as the one which protects transnational corporations from 
sudden legislative change that can be enacted by the host state and have massive impact on the 
transnational corporations’ investment.46Bernaedini also added that stabilisation clauses aim at 
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safe-guiding transnational corporations by restricting the administrative or legislative power of 
the state to amend the contractual regulation or to annul the contract. Additionally, it is argued 
that the host states have seen stabilisation clauses as a means to create a favourable investment 
climate.47 It is therefore, pertinent to examine categories of stabilisation clauses  from 
transnational corporations’ perspectives because these clauses contain certain risk-mitigation 
provisions to protect investment from likely risks such as expropriation, nationalisation or other 
circumstances on which the host state can capitalise to impose new law on foreign investors 
and their investments. 
Stabilisation clauses are classed into three categories and they offer different protection to the 
transnational corporations. The first one freezes the law of the host state concerning the 
exploration and exploitation operation over the life of the contract and is known as freezing 
clauses. The aim of this clause is to ensure that the law applicable to the contract remain the 
same over the life of exploration and exploitation project. This puts on hold the fiscal regime 
on the day that the contract was concluded and stops any new law from being applied to the 
investment and investor. Maniruzzaman has pointed out that freezing clauses are not reliable 
because they cannot prevent the host state from exercising sovereign power in the public 
interest. Nevertheless, freezing clauses may enable the transnational corporations to receive 
compensation for breaching the clause and violation of their rights in underline contract.48 It is 
worth pointing out that when exploration contract is governed by local law, the transnational 
corporations’ interest could be at risk as the host state may change its law minimising the effect 
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of clauses like stabilisation, particularly when the clause concerned is a freezing clause and 
stands on its own .49 
The second category is economic stabilisation clauses which provide that the transnational 
corporations agree with new legislation with a promise of compensation to cover the cost and 
effects of the new law on their investment. This clause, also called economic balancing 
provisions,50 does not prevent the subsequent new law rather it strikes the balance between the 
transnational corporation and the host state. For example, the clause requires that where the 
host state makes a new law which then affects the cost of the project in any form, the two 
parties engage in a dialogue to find a solution to the effects of the sudden changes and they can 
revisit the terms and conditions of the contract and make any necessary adjustment and the 
transnational corporation receives compensation accordingly. Similarly, the host state 
sovereign’s power to legislate in the public interest may not be denied in the context of 
economic balancing provision particularly in investment relating to the extraction of natural 
resources. Thomas and George affirmed that the effects of host states exercising their 
sovereign-power for the public benefit in the presence of stabilisation clauses will depend on 
the type of clauses and the applicable law. They explain further that if the clause is invalid 
under the domestic law of the host state, international law may not resolve the problems.51 
Finally, the hybrid clauses are the third category and reflect some aspects of the previous ones 
because the host state is required to put the transnational corporations in the same economic 
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condition as it would have been had the new law not been created and to exclude them. Some 
of the clauses outlined here and their effects on investments are examined below from oil and 
gas model of production sharing agreement from selected countries namely, Azerbaijan, 
Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Georgia, Nigeria and Turkey as well as relevant decided cases on 
stabilisation clauses.   
The case of Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company v. The Government of the Libyan Arab 
Republic52 is a good illustration of the stabilisation clause and its effects. The clauses say: 
“The Libyan Government, the (Petroleum) Commission and the competent 
authorities in the Provinces shall take all the steps that are necessary to 
ensure that the Company enjoys all the rights conferred upon it by this 
concession, and the contractual rights expressly provided for in this 
concession may not be infringed except by agreement of both parties “53 
“In case of modification to the tax regime, including the creation of new 
taxes, or the labour participation, or its interpretation, that have 
consequences on the economics of this contract, a corresponding factor will 
be included in the production share percentages to absorb the increase in the 
tax burden or in the labour participation of the indicated contractor. This 
correction factor will be calculated between the parties and approved by the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines”54 
“The tax regime, benefits, privileges and exemptions provided in any of the 
articles hereof, which shall be recorded in the special operation contract, 
shall remain invariable for the duration thereof”55 
“Should the income of the state or the Contractor be materially altered as a 
result of new laws, orders or regulations then, in such an event, the Parties 
shall agree to make the necessary adjustments to the relevant provisions of 
this contract, observing the principle that the affected party shall be restored 
to substantially some economic condition as it would have been in had such 
change in laws or regulations not occurred. The cost of such restoration to 
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the other party may not exceed the benefit received by such other party as a 
result of such change”56 
 
“the tax regime, benefits, privileges and exemptions provided in any of the 
articles hereof, which shall be recorded in the special operation contract, 
shall remain invariable for the duration thereof”57 
 
“ … the State Authorities [ i.e. the host government, local authorities and 
state controlled or owned entities] shall take all actions available to them to 
restore the Economic Equilibrium established under the Project Agreements 
if and to the extent that the Economic Equilibrium is disrupted or negatively 
affected, directly or indirectly, as a result of nay change (whether the change 
is specific to the project or of general application) in [Azerbaijan, Georgian, 
Turkish] Law (including any Azerbaijan Laws regarding Taxes, health, 
safety and environment) occurring after [ date of the HGA or its 
ratification]… The foregoing obligation to take all actions available to 
restore the Economic Equilibrium shall include the obligation to take all 
appropriate measures to resolve promptly by whatever means may be 
necessary, including by way of exemption, legislation, decree and/or other 
authoritative acts, any conflict or anomaly between any project Agreement 
and such [Azerbaijan, Georgian, Turkish] Law”58 
 
“in Article 52 of the Hydrocarbons Law, the system of royalties and permits 
to apply to this contract shall remain fixed throughout its term”59 
 
By incorporating the above clauses into oil and gas contracts, the host state has accepted that 
it will be bound by the terms of the contract. The host state also accepts that by exercising its 
legislative-power it will not take any measures or policy that will unilaterally change the 
conditions already agreed with the transnational corporations. The Libyan government in this 
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case issued a Decree which nationalised the 51 per cent of the properties, rights and assets 
relating to the deeds of concession of the companies and the Decree declared further that the 
companies concerned were liable for all the liabilities and debts or obligations arising from 
their exploration activities. However, it was stated in the Decree that committee should be 
appointed to determine the companies’ compensation, but no committee was formed. The case 
was referred to the arbitration according to the provision of the deeds and a sole arbitrator was 
appointed. 
The sole arbitrator60 first established the binding nature of the Deeds of Concession and he 
explained that, for the purposes of interpretation of and performance of the contract, it should 
be noted that a private contracting party has specific international capacity and he also 
considered the principles of Libyan Law as well as the principles of international law. The 
arbitrator found that the principles of Libyan law were in line with international law and 
eventually considered the concept of sovereignty and nature of nationalisation. The arbitrator 
reaffirms that the right of a state to nationalise is unquestionable. The question was whether 
the act of sovereignty which constitutes the nationalisation allows a state like Libya to disregard 
its international commitments expected by it within the context of its sovereignty. A distinction 
was made between nationalisation concerning citizens of the host state which is usually 
governed by the national law and nationalisation involving foreign party in respect of 
international contract that is governed by international law. Therefore, the arbitrator found that 
Libya had undertaken international obligations and as a result it cannot capitalise on its 
sovereignty to disregard commitment willingly undertaken through the exercise of sovereignty. 
The arbitrator pointed out that “the recognition by international law of the right to nationalise 
is not sufficient ground to empower a State to disregard its commitments, because the same 
                                                          





law also recognises the power of a State to commit itself internationally, especially by 
accepting the inclusion of stabilisation clauses in a contract entered into with a foreign party”.61 
The Arbitrator held that Libyan Government had granted a concession of 50 years minimum, 
and stabilisation clause 16 above does not affect the sovereignty of Libyan to make law in oil 
and gas activities in respect of other persons, the stabilisation only makes the new law 
inapplicable to the companies concerned for the duration of the concession, Libyan was then 
ordered to pay the companies $152 million of Libyan crude oil. 
The binding nature of stabilisation clauses and its legality was maintained by the arbitrator 
inGovernment of the State of Kuwait v American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil), Ad 
hoc Award.62 One of the issues before the arbitrator was to consider whether Kuwait’s 
nationalisation was lawful considering the stabilisation clauses contained in the concession. On 
19 September 1977, the Kuwait government issued a decree which terminated the oil 
concession and company’s property was ordered to be reverted to the host state. Arrangement 
was made for the compensation committee to be set up to assess the compensation due to the 
American company and its outstanding obligation to Kuwait, the host state.  There were certain 
provisions in the concessionary agreement through which a decision to nationalise can be 
legally challenged and the provisions to be considered are detailed below: 
The period of this Agreement shall be sixty (60) years from the date of 
signature”63 
“The Shaikh shall not by general or special legislation or by administrative 
measures or by any other act whatever annul this Agreement except as 
provided in Article 11. No alteration shall be made in the terms of this 
Agreement by either Shaikh or the company except in the event of the 
Shaikh and the Company jointly agreeing that it is desirable in the interest 
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of both parties to make certain alterations, deletions or additions to this 
Agreement”64 
(A)  Certain events … in which the Ruler of Kuwait would be entitled to 
terminate the concession”65 
(B)  Save as aforesaid this agreement shall not be terminated before the 
expiration of the period specified in Article 1 thereof except by surrender as 
provided in Article 12 or if the company shall be in default under arbitration 
provisions of Article 18.66 
 
The tribunal found that there was a breach of the stabilisation clauses and held that the 
stabilisation clauses rendered expropriation67 or nationalisation unlawful. In addition, the 
concession agreement concluded between the parties did not forbid nationalisation, but the 
stabilisation clauses prohibit nationalisation because Kuwait had undertaken from the 
provisions above, Art 17 not to modify the terms of the agreement or annul it. However, it 
eventually took a unilateral decision and terminated the concession which constituted a breach 
of the agreement. Consequently, the decision which emanated from this case reaffirm that 
stabilisation clauses cannot be overlooked, it must be honoured otherwise the expropriation 
will be unlawful.  
4.2.4 Renegotiation clauses 
Renegotiation clauses are defined by Patrick as a “contractual mechanism which enables the 
parties to review, discuss and adapt the terms of the contract either during an event specified 
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in the said clause or during intervals specified”.68 Similarly, Sornarajah simply put it as clauses 
which allow the parties to the underlined contract to renegotiate the terms and conditions of 
the agreed contracts in the event of major financial or physical changes in their circumstances 
which are likely to affect the business activities.69 In addition, another writer defines 
renegotiation clauses as provisions in an agreement which provide when certain unforeseen 
circumstances oblige parties to the contracts to revisit the terms and condition of their 
contract.70 Al-faruque also added that renegotiation clauses are necessary in international 
investment contracts between host state and transnational corporations because petroleum 
contracts are meant to cover long duration and there is a possibility that economic, political 
and social climate could change unexpectedly during the period and changes may alter the 
economic benefits that the parties had thought would flow from the contracts.71 For example, 
when the prices of oil are high, the host state can decide to exert influence on the manner in 
which its oil and gas are exploited and sold. Particularly, when the host state perceived the 
underlined contract as unfavourable because of its weaker position at the time of negotiation 
and later discovered that the contract terms and conditions are too rigid and found itself in 
situation where it is very unlikely to fulfil its obligations, it can therefore, unilaterally cancel 
the contract. A renegotiation clause can then be relied upon to bring the transnational 
corporations back to the negotiating table to agree new terms and conditions. Therefore, this 
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type of clause enables the host state and transnational corporations to accommodate changes to 
the underlined contract. 
Furthermore, it is pertinent to point out that renegotiation clauses are strikingly different from 
stabilisation clauses whose primary objective is to freeze the law for the entire duration of 
operation regardless of any changes in circumstances. On the other hand, the aim of 
renegotiation clause is to keep the relationship moving and alive by enabling the host state and 
the transnational corporations to strike the balance when it became apparent that circumstances 
have changed and there is justification for changes in the original obligations of the contract.72 
Professor Berger on this point posits that using a renegotiation as a tool to strike the right 
balance will benefit the host state because state’s sovereignty will be intact and at the same 
time protect the transnational corporation against sudden changes in the law governing the 
petroleum contracts.73 However, he further emphasised the possible drawbacks of renegotiation 
clauses from transnational corporations’ perspectives. Firstly, they can refuse to have it in the 
contract and argue that such clauses reduce stability in the contract, increase overall cost of the 
transaction and could be used unfairly to amend the contract particularly, if the renegotiation 
clauses are triggered because of an event within the control of the host state.74 He believes 
renegotiation clauses should not contradict the provisions of stability clauses for example, 
renegotiation clauses may allow the host state to unilaterally change the law whereas stability 
clauses prohibit such a move and if that happened, transnational corporations will be left with 
no option than to invoke the renegotiation provision. However, the supporters of the 
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renegotiation clauses have different views as one argued that they prevent the event of extreme 
consequences, a situation where the host state could not uphold its obligations stipulated in the 
agreement and took unilateral decision to terminate the contract. The renegotiation clauses may 
then come to their rescue because it would enable the parties to find a solution which will 
eventually facilitate trust and reliability between the host state and transnational 
corporations.75In addition, other commentators suggest that it is sensible to insert renegotiation 
clauses in a contract in a way to introduce flexibility by requesting that parties negotiate to 
resolve the problems where a change of circumstances happened.76 However, in the absence of 
renegotiation clauses, the parties may still be allowed to renegotiate their agreement, either 
party would need to rely on the principle of changed circumstances also known as ‘rebus sic 
stantibus’. It is argued that this principle is recognised under international law, Article 62 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 which provides that:77 
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to 
those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not 
foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or 
withdrawing from the treaty unless: 
(a) parties to be bound by the treaty; (b) the effect of the change is radically to 
transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty. 
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for 
terminating or withdrawing from a treaty: 
(a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or (b) if the fundamental change is the 
result of a breach by the party invoking it either of an obligation under the 
treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the 
treaty 
3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental 
change of circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a 
treaty it may also invoke the change as a ground for suspending the 
operation of the treaty.   
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Under the above principle, the parties to a contract may be under an obligation to renegotiate 
the terms of the underlying contracts if there is a genuine change in circumstances which affects 
the economic viability of the contract. Importantly, the above principle can only be applied in 
certain circumstances to prevent misuse. The International Court of Justice applies the 
principles only in exceptional circumstances. Similarly, the principle is recognised under the 
common law system, this is established through the doctrine of frustration when parties will be 
discharged due to circumstances78 which made it impossible to fulfil their obligations under 
the contract. Lord Radcliffe however, shed some light on what could be classed as frustration 
where he says: 
 … frustration occurs whenever the law recognises that, without default of 
either party, a contract obligation has become incapable of being performed 
because the circumstances in which performance is called for would render 
it a thing radically different from that which was undertaken by the contract. 
Non haec in foederaveni. It was not this that I promised to do.79  
Similarly, it is noted from law literature that the application of doctrine of frustration requires 
question of law and fact as seen in the case of Edwinton Commercial Corporation v Tsavlris 
Russ80 where the Court of Appeal held that before the doctrine can be applied a range of factors 
and approaches must be considered; such as the terms and conditions of the contract, matrix of 
facts, their context, parties expectations and knowledge as well as their contemplations and 
assumptions about the certain risk. Thus, detailed analysis of terms of agreements and facts is 
                                                          
78  Non-exhaustive list of common causes of frustration are change in the law or supervening illegality, 
impossibility, delay, death, War or strike as interruption, incapacity of a party and illness just to mention a few. .  
79 Per Lord Radcliffe in Davis Contractors v Fareham Urban DC, House of Lords [1956] 3 W.L.R. 37. 
80 Edwinton Commercial Corporation v Tsavlris Russ (Worldwide Salvage & Towage) Ltd (The Sea Angel) 





necessary before applying the doctrine of frustration. In addition, under the English common 
law, there are situations where parties’ claim for frustration will be rejected. For example, self-
inducement and when it became apparent that the frustration is foreseeable. 
Frustration can be perceived as self-induced in a situation where it is clear that the frustration 
occurred as a result of an act or election of the claimant. For example, when a party signs a 
number of agreements and is prevented from performing one or some of the contracts81 as 
established in the case of Lauritzen A.s V Wijsmuller B.V (The Super Servant Two).82This 
case involved a shipment of an oil-drilling rig from Japan to Rotterdam. The claimants were 
the right owners of an oil drilling rig that needs to be transported and defendant had signed a 
contract to transport it. Meanwhile, under the conditions of the contract, the defendants could 
ship the oil rig using one of either two ships called Super Servant One or Super Servant Two. 
The defendant chose the Super Servant Two because the other ship was being used for other 
purposes. However, the chosen ship sank in Congo 1981 while doing another contract. The 
defendant claimed that the contract had been frustrated due to the destruction of Super Servant 
Two, but the claimant argued that it was self-induced, and they should not be discharged. The 
Court of Appeal however ruled in the favour of the claimant and held that the defendant had 
chosen Super Servant Two and that the alleged frustration was caused by their selection and 
concluded that” it is within the promisor’s own control how many contracts he enters into and 
the risk should be his”.83 In addition, the foreseeability factor needs to be considered because 
it makes it impossible to rely on doctrine of frustration; the challenge is to find what is and 
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what is not foreseeable at the time of contract.  The court also considered a claim of frustration 
in W J Tatem Ltd v Gamboa.84 In this case, the court looked into a charterparty of thirty days 
duration and the purpose of charter was to help evacuate the civil population fron North Spain 
to Ports in France from 1st of July 1937 to 1st of August the same year.  The ship successfully 
completed one voyage before it was seized by the Nationalist on 14 July and kept until 
September 7 and redelivered to the owner on 11 September.  Tatem then took the matter to the 
court claiming payment from 1st of August until 11 September. Gamboa however declined the 
liability and argued that the contract had been frustrated by the actions of Nationalists. The 
court found that the performance of the charter was frustrated from the moment the ship is 
seized and that the detention of the ship was unforeseeable, and the contract was frustrated 
because it was obvious that the foundation of the agreement had been removed as soon as the 
ship was confiscated by the Nationalists and nothing could be done to take it back. But the 
court found in Edwinton Commercial Corporation v Tsavlris Russ85 that the contractual risk 
was foreseeable and held that the contract was not frustrated even though the ship was 
unreasonably seized for three months. Although the multi-factorial approach discussed above 
was applied, the court pointed out that unlike in the World War I cases where the confiscation 
was of permanent bases, in this case the detention was mere a temporary one which can be 
resolved by negotiation between the vessel-owner and the authority which detained the ship 
for unpaid port dues. Frustration therefore must not be the fault of neither party and any 
supervening event must be unexpected. For a negotiation clause to be enforceable in English 
law, the courts expect a certain degree of precision and the clause must clearly state the 
circumstances which it will cover. The courts also require the clause to have a provision which 
stipulates the parties are negotiating in good faith about a specific issue, for example; the price. 
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The decision which emanated from the following case Petro Inc, Petro-Deep Inc, 
SocietaArmamento Navi AppogioSpA V PetroleoBrasilero Sa Petrobras, Braspetro Oil 
Services Company, Den Norske Bank ASA86  confirmed the courts’ position. The court held 
that in order for an agreement to be enforceable, there must be sufficiently complete and certain 
agreement on all eventual terms, which was not the case here. It is noted from the above case 
that the common problem with renegotiation clauses is the requirement of completeness and 
certainty according to English Common law. It is mandatory for the clauses to be clear and 
explicit in clarifying what needs to be renegotiated and its circumstances otherwise the clause 
is void and unenforceable as seen in House of Lords’ decision in G Scammell and Nephew v 
HC&JG Ouston.87 In that case, it was held that the clause in the contract’s terms between the 
parties was vague without precise meaning derived from it and it cannot be enforced. Similarly, 
the Court of Appeal decision in Mamidoil-jetoil Greek Petroleum Co SA V Okta Crude Oil 
Refinery AD (NO.1) 88  reaffirmed the court’s position in a matter related to an agreement to 
agree and implied terms to award the contract for full term. In addition, there was a dispute 
resolution mechanism in the contract which provided that if there is any disagreement in 
connection with the contract and the parties fail to resolve it amicably, the matter should be 
referred to arbitration in London.  
This case concerned the handling of crude oil in which Jet oil appealed against a judge at first 
instance decision89 asserting that he had erred to conclude that ten years term in clause 7 of the 
initial contract was binding, the company wanted the matter related to the handling fee in future 
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to be decided by the court. Meanwhile, Okta argued that the initial decision was right because 
the 10 years term was not binding, and he argued further that the contract should not continue 
beyond 31/12/1994 unless the issue relating to handling of crude oil fee for future years could 
be agreed. However, they failed to agree, and the contract was terminated. The court allowed 
the appeal and explained that where no contract exists, the adoption of an expression such as 
to be agreed concerning important terms of the contract can prevent the contract from coming 
into existence because it was not certain.  It simply means you cannot agree to agree. 
Meanwhile, the arbitration clause played a vital role in court’s findings because the court stated 
clearly that where a contract left specific issues such as price to be settled over time, the 
presence of an arbitration clause can help the court to hold sufficient certainty by implying 
what was reasonable and the crude oil fee handling was resolved in favour of Jet Oil. 
Consequently, an enforceable renegotiation clause would make provisions for a remedy if there 
was a breach in the underlying contract. 
Furthermore, it is also possible to renegotiate the terms of an oil contract where the contract 
does not provide such a clause to deal with a change in the equilibrium of the agreement by 
looking at force majeure clauses because they always provide for an obligation to negotiate 
and to overcome situations beyond human influence.90 Pier added that force majeure clauses 
are inserted to extend the period of contract performance and as a precaution against risks 
associated with political, social and unforeseeable economic crisis. It is therefore important to 
look at example of this provisions below in Iraq’s concession agreement concluded in 1999. 
In the event that the Petroleum Operations are delayed, curtailed or 
prevented due to Force Majeure for a period exceeding ninety (90) 
consecutive days, then the Term together with all rights and obligations 
hereunder shall be extended accordingly, subject to the provisions of Article 
8, and the Parties shall meet shortly after a notice sent by the Contractor to 
SOC to, in good faith, agree on modifications to this Contract which will 
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enable the Contractor’s rights and obligations to be restored. If the Parties 
are unable to reach an agreement on the possible modifications to be made 
to this Contract within thirty (30) days, such disagreement shall be 
submitted to arbitration in accordance with provisions of Article 37.4 to 
37.8.91 
 
It is observed that provision like the above can only benefit the host state which can rely on 
force majeure clause to renegotiate. This has led a commentator to express his concerns over 
the imbalance of such provision because the transnational corporations will be denied reliance 
on the contractual force majeure if there is force majeure event on the part of the foreign 
investors.92 The dispute will be quickly referred to arbitration, however arbitrators are not ready 
to vary the agreements in the absence of contractual provision and the justification for that is 
the sanctity of contract, a common idea that once a contract is duly concluded between the 
parties, they must honour their contractual obligations. Whereas, a fundamental principle is 
that if an agreement cannot be honoured or fulfilled for any reason then it should not be 
unilaterally terminated by either party. All involved should resolve it amicably or take it to the 
arbitration. Nevertheless, force majeure can be relied upon if it occurred as a result of war, 
rebellion and strike. But a mere claim that contract has become unprofitable is not enough.93 
4.2.5 Force majeure clauses 
It is claimed that the two words ‘Force Majeure’ are borrowed from the French and literally 
means superior force, it is also known as casus fortuitous or chance occurrence.94 According 
to the law dictionary, force majeure clauses can broadly be described as follows: 
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The phrase is used particularly in commercial contracts to describe events 
possibly affecting the contract and that are completely outside the parties’ 
control. Such events are normally, suppliers or subcontractors to supply the 
suppliers under the agreement and strikes and other labour disputes that 
interfere with the supplier’s performance of an agreement. An express 
clause would normally excuse both delay and a total failure to perform the 
agreement.95 
 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Canada also defined a force majeure clause in Atlantic 
Paper Stock Ltd v. St Anne-Nackawic as “An act of God clause or a force majeure clause… 
generally operates to discharge a contracting party when a supervening, sometimes 
supernatural, event, beyond control of either party, makes performance impossible. The 
common thread is that of the unexpected, something beyond reasonable human foresight and 
skill.96  An academic writer says: 
Force majeure occurs when the law recognises that without default of either 
party a contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed 
because the circumstances in which the performance is called for would 
render it impossible. I promised to do this but I cannot due to some 
irresistible unforeseeable and uncontrollable event.97 
 
 Force majeure is therefore, a clause that can be included in an agreement that is capable of 
freeing the parties to the contract from obligation and liability when contingent event occurred 
or circumstances which are beyond the control of the parties which may prevent them from 
fulfilling their obligations in the underlined contract.  
It is pertinent, at this point, to look at the Court of Appeal’s judgement on what counts as force 
majeure clause and whether the court of first instance had been right in the interpretation of the 
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clause.  In Great Elephant Corp V Trafigura Beheer BV Crudeesky98 the appeal court was 
required to study the operation of a force majeure clause whether the clause can exclude a party 
for unnecessary delay in the performance of its obligation within the contract and if 
performance was delayed by an unforeseeable act. The court ruled that if an act was with a 
party’s control, it was likely that it was foreseeable. Therefore, the court held that they could 
not rely on a force majeure clause because it had been foreseeable that if necessary, documents 
to load the oil vessel were not obtained, the vessel would not be permitted to depart until right 
official clearance had been presented. The decision which emanated from this case established 
that parties may be able to rely on the force majeure clause if they could show that relevant 
events had been beyond the control of the parties. In addition, force majeure was described by 
Delaume as one of the many occurrences which is capable of calling for the adjustment of 
economic development contracts to new circumstances.99 It is noteworthy that many grounds 
can trigger a force majeure clause in any concluded agreement as detailed above in the 
dictionary of law, therefore, it is necessary to look at these clauses in oil and gas concluded 
contracts before analysing its effects on host states and transnational corporations. Article 31 
to 31.5 of the Iraq Technical Service Contract for the Rumaila oil field 2009 provides that; 
“The non-performance or delay in performance by either Party of its 
obligations or duties under this Contract shall be excused if and to the extent 
that such non-performance or delay is caused by Force Majeure”.100 
” The Party affected by force Majeure shall notify the other Party thereof, 
in writing within fourteen (14) days, stating the cause and the extent of 
effect of such Force Majeure and shall keep the other Party informed of 
significant developments. The affected Party shall use all reasonable 
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diligence to remove or overcome the Force Majeure situation as quickly as 
possible in a cost-effective manner”.101 
Force Majeure shall mean any cause or event, unforeseen or beyond the 
reasonable control of the Party claiming to be affected by such event, and 
shall include , but without limitation, Act of God, war ( whether declared or 
undeclared), force of nature, insurrection, riot, fire, and with respect to 
Contractor only legislation/order of the Government and other acts or 
circumstances beyond the control of either Party affected by it, provided 
always that such acts or circumstances are not attributable to the Party 
invoking Force Majeure or its Affiliates. The inability to pay monies due 
shall not constitute a condition of Force Majeure. 102 
It is agreed by the Parties that the security conditions prevailing in the 
Contract Area on Contract signing date shall not constitute a condition of 
Force Majeure for either Party. The Parties also agree that the security 
conditions generally prevailing in the Republic OF Iraq on the Contract 
signing date shall not constitute a condition of Force Majeure for either 
Party unless these conditions prevent the implementation of Petroleum 
Operations.103 
 
 These examples are significant not only because they stipulate the parties’ duties towards each 
other, but also because they serve as a reminder as to what may not constitute a condition of 
force majeure. The agreement was signed when the host state (Iraq) was in the process of 
rebuilding its country after the war so the clause made it clear that none of the parties can 
capitalise on the security issues and declare force majeure. However, some of the occurrences 
in the oil and gas industry can be cited to analyse force majeure clauses particularly arbitration 
related cases where tribunals had resolved contractual relationships hindered by man-caused 
incidents such as revolutions, wars, strikes, economic crises and supervening illegality. The 
revolutions in Iran can be cited as good example to explain circumstances to justify non-
fulfillment of contractual obligations under the oil and gas contract.  In (JSA)Phillips 
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Petroleum Co. Iran V the Islamic Republic of Iran,104 the oil company claimed compensation 
for the expropriation, by the host state, of its contractual rights under the 1965 concession 
agreement known at the time as Joint Structure Agreement. The Tribunal found that 
revolutionary circumstances in 1978 to 1979 had rendered contract performance impossible 
and the parties were released from their obligations.  Similarly, in Mobil Oil Iran, Inc, et al. v 
Iran,105 the court followed the same approach and held that the revolution which happened 
between 1978 and 1979 created conditions of force majeure. However, the tribunal made a 
different decision in Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc., v the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran106 which is non-oil and gas related case; however, the Tribunal’s approach 
and reasoning cannot be overlooked.  The claim in this case relates to a breach of contract in 
the so-called IBEX project. The company (Sylvania) was contracted to provide related secret 
military intelligence operations for Iranian Airforce Personnel to operate an electronic 
intelligence gathering data but Sylvania claimed that Iranian Government breached and 
repudiated the contract in 1979. The Iranian Government tried to allege force majeure due to 
the revolution’s disruptive effects. However, the Tribunal argued that Iran could not be 
excluded from its contractual obligations because the non-performance of a contract had 
happened during the revolution. The claim was rejected because the revolutionary conditions 
had extended beyond expectation, five months after the new government had taken over the 
control of the country. The Tribunal examined whether revolutionary events were the major 
reason for the Iranian Government inability to perform its legal obligation but found that non-
performance in this case was caused by the Iranian Government policy “not to continue with 
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American contractor in a project related to secret military intelligent operations”. The Tribunal 
subsequently refused to accept Iranian Government’s claim of force majeure. 
A claim for force majeure also failed in National Oil Corporation (Libya) v Libyan Sun Oil 
Company, Inc. (U.S.A.),107 where the host state (Libya) was awarded damages for the oil 
company’s non-performance of the exploration project. The parties signed an Exploration and 
Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA) on November 20, 1980 and the contract indicated that 
the Sun oil was to bear the cost of oil exploration. Sun Oil commenced exploration activities 
in 1981 and declared force majeure the same year 0n 18th of December 1981. The company 
invoked the force majeure provision on the EPSA due to the United State of America order 
which prevented U.S citizens from traveling to Libya with American passport. Therefore, the 
Sun Oil argued that the order made it impossible for its workers, all of whom were American 
citizens to go to Libya and as a result it could not continue with exploration activities. In 
addition, the Sun oil relied on another ground to justify the force majeure claim. There was a 
regulation in America in 1982 which banned importation from Libya and at the same time 
prohibited exports from America to Libya. The regulation further introduced an export licence 
for the export of some goods and technical information, and Sun Oil claimed that its export 
licence application was rejected and therefore capitalised on export regulation and refusal of 
licence as an extra event of force majeure. On the other hand, the Libyan National Oil Company 
disputed the force majeure claim and demanded continued performance. The Arbitral Tribunal 
held that, there had been no force majeure according to the exploration contract and awarded 
the host state twenty million U.S. dollars. The Tribunal found that Sun Oil was unable to 
provide proof that it could not be possible to employ non-America citizens’ personnel either 
outside the Sun Oil’s group or within. In addition, Sun Oil could not argue that it was not 
                                                          





possible to add non-US scientists to its scientific workforce and to deploy them to Libya when 
necessary to monitor the local work.108 
War might be relied upon as a force majeure condition by the host state, thereby excluding it 
from contractual obligations, but the process is complicated because the court will be more 
cautious particularly, if a claim of force majeure is alleged by the host state in commercial 
contracts. The decision which emerged from the Serbian109 and Brazilian110 Loans cases 
established the court’s approach. The court ruled that it cannot be satisfied that the war alone, 
despite its grave consequences on the economy, affected the parties’ obligations in the contract.  
Similarly, the court is not willing to accept a claim of force majeure when the invoking host 
state is involved in a suspected war as seen in Michel Macri Case.111 The host state (Turkey) 
in this case sought to be freed from its obligations under the contract which the war had 
rendered its performance impossible. The tribunal examined the case and rejected the claim 
because of the host state’s direct involvement in the alleged hostility.  The court concluded that 
force majeure claim may succeed if it can be justified that performance of contractual 
obligations is impossible, but the mere assertion of greater burden would not suffice.  
Nevertheless, the host state claim for force majeure may succeed if civil or international war 
could constitute vis major conditions as established in Spanish Zone of Morocco claims.112The 
court held in this case that revolts and mob violence can create cases of vis major. 
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Consequently, it is observed from all the cases discussed above that force majeure clauses are 
important, particularly in oil and gas contracts; it can protect both parties from contingent 
events and unforeseen circumstances outside usual exploration risks. It is established that the 
clause has some important implications when circumstances preclude fulfilment of an 
obligation under the contract as seen in Tribunal’s decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran V 
the Islamic Republic of Iran113 where both the host state and foreign oil companies were 
released from the contractual obligations due to revolutionary circumstances. Cases have also 
shown different approaches taken by tribunals to strike the right balance between the host state 
and transnational corporations. A claim of force majeure was unsuccessful in National Oil 
Corporation (Libya) v Libyan Sun Oil Company, Inc. (U.S.A.) because the tribunal found that 
Sun Oil had failed to justify the non-performance of exploration projects. Similarly, the host 
state failed to invoke a force majeure clause in IBEX Project examined earlier because the 
court found that non-performance of contract was due to Iranian government’s policy not to 
work with American contractors. A force majeure clause is therefore an essential mechanism 
that can be relied upon to minimise the associated risks with a long-term contractual 
relationship in petroleum agreement. In addition, both the host state and transnational 
corporations can rely on the force majeure clause to absolve themselves of liability from an 
event of force majeure conditions. What matters most however is the careful drafting of the 
force majeure clause; the triggering events should be clearly defined with the circumstances of 
the parties and the detailed subject matter of the petroleum contracts. For example, information 
of interruptive events that are likely to occur in the context of exploration and exploitation 
contracts. Academic writers suggest that a force majeure clause should not be used as an escape 
clause; therefore the list of triggering events should be specific to allow the parties avoid 
                                                          





obligations that cannot be fulfilled for reasons which lawfully could not be prevented.114 They 
explain further that the list of triggering events must also not be so broad as to create an escape 
route to avoid obligations for which the party should be reasonably held liable. Additionally, a 
broad phrase of force majeure triggering events, if too broad, are likely to create ambiguity 
which the court can easily interpret against the party trying to escape liability as seen in the 
case of M.A. Hanna Co. v Sydney Steel Corp.115 In that case, the Supreme Court examined a 
force majeure clause in the contracts between the parties drafted by the claimant- M.A Hanna 
and invoked by the defendant- Sydney Steel. The court found that the claimant had inserted 
some broad phraseology in its description of force majeure events and therefore applied the 
contra proferentem rule, that is, where there is a doubt about the meaning of a clause in 
contract, the words will be construed against the party who drafted the clause.116 The courts 
expect the party who imposes terms on the other party to make it simple and clear otherwise 
he would suffer the consequences. The court held that the broad wording of the clause create 
ambiguity which was eventually interpreted against the claimant and relieved the defendant 
from obligations. This case shows the effect of employing a broad phrase to define the force 
majeure triggering conditions whereas a carefully drafted clause may provide innovative 
solutions to address the consequences of such events. This is particularly relevant in a long-
term petroleum contract that needs extra care with regard to the effects of force majeure due to 
the long period of the relationship between the host state and transnational corporations.  It is 
therefore important that force majeure clauses reflect the accurate intentions of the parties 
whatever that intention may be. The force majeure clause must ensure triggering condition is 
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beyond the party’s control and such condition must be capable of rendering the performance 
of the contract impossible. 
4.2.6 Arbitration clauses 
Disputes in exploration projects arise even when the contracts are carefully drafted. The host 
states and transnational corporations should therefore, include arbitration clauses in their 
agreements to minimise the associated risks. If the breach is too costly, this mechanism can be 
relied upon to get a fair and final judgement. Final judgement reflects the binding effects of 
arbitration.  
As defined in Halsbury’s Laws of England, “arbitration is a process by which a dispute or 
difference between two or more parties, as to their mutual legal rights and liabilities, is referred 
to and determined judicially and with a binding effect by the application of law by one or more 
persons (the arbitral tribunal)”.117 Halsbury’s definition is in line with provision of the ICSID 
Convention. Article 53 of the Convention states that an ICSID award is binding and final, it 
cannot be annulled or subject to any appeal  unless the provisions under Article 52 of ICSID 
are satisfied.118 Article 54 further provides that the ICSID contracting member must recognise 
an award as final and binding; the obligations imposed by the award must also be enforced as 
the final judgement in member state’s court.  In addition, Bradgate and White define arbitration 
as “a process whereby parties voluntarily refer their disputes to an impartial third person, an 
arbitrator, selected by them, for a decision based on evidence and arguments to be presented 
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before him”.119 Similarly, Aust describes arbitration process as “the submission of a dispute to 
a judge or judges, in principle chosen by the parties, who agree to accept and respect the 
judgement”.120 
The above definitions highlight the features of arbitration as a consensual process which 
provides finality, involves private process and enables the parties to select their own arbitrator 
based on speciality in certain areas of investment. This aspect is significant as it raises concerns 
if arbitrators are not specialised in the oil and gas field, however, arbitration process allows the 
parties to select their own arbitrator, fashion their terms, conditions and rule of process which 
accommodate flexibility. This is why commercial arbitration is preferred to the adjudication 
scheme through a host state’s national court particularly in Nigeria where litigation takes longer 
than usual as seen in the case of Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation v Clifco Nigeria 
Limited.121 In that case, the national court failed to make a decision on the disputed matter for 
three years, but the same case lasted only for twelve months at arbitral tribunal.122 
Notwithstanding, there is a need to strike a balance between the host state and transnational 
corporations in oil and gas contract related disputes.  It is noted that the host state would want 
disputes to be settled according to the local law in their local courts believing that judgement 
therefrom. Accordingly, countries like Ecuador argued that the submission of disputes to 
Arbitration engaged their sovereignty rights and eventually denounced the ICSID Convention 
                                                          
119 Robert Bradgate and Fidelma White, Commercial Law, Legal Practice Guides, (2009) Oxford University 
Press at page 123. 
120 Anthony Aust, Handbook of International law, (2005) Cambridge University Press at page 442. 
121 Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation v Clifco Nigeria Limited (2011) Suit No: SC.233/2003. 






in 2009.123  It is argued that bias exists with one commentator pointing out that majority of 
disputes resolved by various international tribunals tend to prove biased against the host state 
particularly in developing countries.124 Therefore, it is important to counter-balance the likely 
effects of arbitration in relation to the host state because the host state should enjoy the rights 
to regulate within its country regardless of any contractual relationship with transnational 
corporations. But Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that 
domestic law cannot prevail over a treaty, and it must be respected regardless of the changes 
in local law.  It is equally important to look at this from transnational corporations’ 
perspectives. They are motivated by business interest and may not feel comfortable regarding 
disputes arising from their investments in a host state to being heard in that state following the 
host state law. Ximena however, concludes that it is difficult for arbitrators in investor-state 
disputes to guarantee fair treatment between the competing interests to the arbitration.125 
Nevertheless it is a requirement under the treaties that disputes arising under exploration 
contracts between the host state and transnational corporations be referred to the ICSID 
arbitration for settlements. For transnational corporations to begin ICSID arbitration against 
host state, that state must have been a member or party to the ICSID Convention, a separate 
legal mechanism which is totally different from BITs (1965). It is further observed that consent 
to ICSID is required before an action can be initiated, thus the host state must have given the 
consent to the transnational corporations in exploration agreement and the investor on the other 
hand must have expressed its consent by simply requesting arbitration otherwise the ICSID 
would not have jurisdiction to hear the case. Invariably, for a Tribunal on behalf of ICSID to 
                                                          
123 Available at <https://www.unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia2016_en.pdf> accessed on 11 March 2018. 
124 Ximena Herrera-Bernal, Arbitral jurisprudence: the arbitrator’s concerns about treating the parties equally 
and taking into account the needs of the state/or concession authority, International Business Law Journal, 
(2013) page 306. 





have jurisdiction some conditions must be satisfied. These include that the dispute concerned 
must arise out of an investment, the transnational corporation must be a national of another 
ICSID member State which also applies to the host state and that there must be consent from 
both parties regarding the dispute which is referred to as “perfected consent”.126  In furtherance 
of the foregoing, it is pertinent to examine some of Nigeria’s legal mechanism for arbitration 
in the petroleum industry. 
4.2.7 Arbitration in the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria 
It is noted from the database of ICISD member states that Nigeria is among the contracting 
members around the world that have opted for arbitration to settle disputes arising from 
investments. Specifically, Nigeria signed ICSID on July 13th, 1965, ratified it on August 23rd, 
1965 and it came into force on October 14th 1966.127  Apart from been a contracting party to 
the ICSID, Nigeria has further enacted many laws to give effect and promote arbitration, 
particularly, for the settlement of disputes in the petroleum industry. Some of the Nigerian Acts 
of Parliament are as follows; Oil Pipeline Act 1958, Petroleum Act 1969, Nigerian LNG Fiscal 
Incentives Guarantees, Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1990, Assurance Act 2004 and the 
Nigeria Investment Promotion Commission Act 2004 128 just to mention a view. These laws 
are recognised and applied throughout the thirty-six (36) States across the country with the sole 
purpose of providing a unified legal mechanism for the efficient and fair settlement of 
investment disputes. Some of the Acts declare that Arbitration should be chosen for settlement 
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of investment disputes. For example, Section 26 of the Nigeria Investment Promotion 
Commission Act provides that: 
(1) Where a dispute arises between an investor and any Government of the 
Federation in respect of an enterprise, all efforts shall be made through 
mutual discussion to reach an amicable settlement.  
(2) Any dispute between an investor and any Government of the Federation in 
Respect of an enterprise to which this Act applies which is not amicably 
settled through mutual discussions, may be submitted at the option of the 
aggrieved party to arbitration as follows- 
 
(a) in the case of a Nigerian Investor, in accordance with the rules of procedure 
for arbitration as specified in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act; or 
 
(b) in the case of a foreign investor, within framework of any bilateral or 
multilateral agreement on investment protection to which the Federal 




(c) in accordance with any other national or international machinery for the 
settlement of investment disputes agreed on by the parties. 
 
(3) Where in respect of any dispute, there is disagreement between the investor 
and the Federal Government as to the method of dispute settlement to be 
adopted, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Rules shall apply.129 
 
Similar provisions to the above can be found in the leading legislation regulating the petroleum 
industry in Nigeria. The Petroleum Act. S.11 (1) and (2) of the Act provides that: 
 
(1) Where by any provision of this Act or any regulations made thereunder 
a question or dispute is to be settled by arbitration, the question or 
dispute shall be settled in accordance with the law relating to arbitration 
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in the appropriate State and the provision shall be treated as a 
submission to arbitration for the purposes of the law. 
(2)  In this section “the appropriate State” means the state agreed by all 
parties to a question or disputes to be appropriate in the circumstances 
or, if there is no such agreement, the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.130 
 
The Nigeria Oil Pipeline Act also provides that: 
Every licence shall be deemed to include a provision that any question 
dispute arising between the President or the Minister and the holder of the 
licence or any matter connected therewith shall if it cannot be resolved by 
agreement be referred to arbitration.131 
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 2004 has had a tremendous impact on oil and gas 
agreements in Nigeria. This Act is the national arbitration law of Nigeria,132 it was enacted and 
solely based on the United Nations Commission on the International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
with slight differences. Having signed the New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (ACA) 
incorporated Nigeria’s obligations under the Convention. Nigeria also signed other regional 
conventions such as Economic Community of West Africa States Energy Protocol which 
provides that disputes between the host state and transnational corporations should be referred 
to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) provided that the 
host state and the country of origin of transnational corporation are parties to the ICSID 
Conventions.133The ACA is however the only legislation in Nigeria which governs both 
national and international arbitration. There are many arbitral institutions in Nigeria including, 
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the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators UK, Nigeria Branch, the International Chamber of 
Commerce, the Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration Lagos (RCICAL),134 
the Lagos Multi-door Courthouse,135  the Nigeria Institute of Chartered Arbitrator and the 
Lagos Court of Arbitration just to mention a few. It is important to point out that each of these 
institutions are operating respectively under their rules covering arbitration and disputing 
parties may choose any of them and be governed by their respective rules rather than the ACA 
rules. However, for the arbitration agreement to be valid under ACA, it must be written and 
signed or contained in an agreement entered by the parties.136 The parties need to have legal 
capacity to sign the agreement and the agreement must relate to a business relationship. As 
stated in Section 48 of the Act, the arbitration agreement must relate to a dispute capable of 
settlement by arbitration under laws of Nigeria.137 This provision makes it clear that the 
arbitration agreement must be valid and enforceable under the law to which both parties have 
chosen. Otherwise, the court may set aside an arbitral award aside by virtue of s.48 (a) (ii) of 
ACA.138 In addition, ACA provisions exclude certain categories of disputes, for example 
domestic disputes, anti-trust disputes, nullification of patent rights and competition disputes, 
all of which are not arbitrable. Therefore, only disputes arising from business activities may be 
referred to arbitration and they are clearly stated in the definition of commercial disputes and 
arbitration.  S.57 of the Act provides that: 
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…commercial means all relationships of a commercial nature including any 
trade transaction for the supply or exchange of goods or services, 
distribution agreement, commercial representation or agency, factoring, 
leasing, construction of works, constructing, engineering licensing, 
investment, financing, banking, insurance, exploitation, agreement or 
concession, joint venture and other forms of industrial or business co-
operation, carriage of goods or passengers by air, sea rail, or road.139 
 
As noted above, certain disputes are excluded from arbitration, it is therefore, pertinent to visit 
some decided cases in oil and gas to explain the categories and perhaps some of the exception 
to the rules. The Federal High Court of Nigeria ruled in Federal Inland Revenue Service V 
Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation & 2 ors140 that an arbitral award under a Joint 
Operating Agreement between the host state (Nigeria) and transnational corporations was 
voidable on the ground that the main  disputes of arbitration which include  application and 
interpretation of  Company Income Tax Act, Petroleum Profit Tax Act, Education Tax Act and 
Deep  Offshore Act are not arbitrable and held that  it was a tax dispute and that the arbitral 
tribunal had no jurisdiction to rule on the case. The Court then declared that a tax dispute was 
government’s function which must be executed exclusively by the Federal Inland Revenue 
Service.  The decision which emanated from this case indicated that tax related disputes are 
not arbitrable under ACA but decisions taken in recent similar cases have revealed that the 
Court had taken a different view. In Esso Petroleum and Production Nigeria Limited & Anor 
v. NNPC141 and Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production &Ors v FIRS & Anor142 it was 
decided that disputes arising out of the parties’ rights and contractual obligations were 
contractual disputes not tax related disputes, therefore arbitrable.  The Esso case involved a 
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Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) concluded between the transnational corporations (Esso 
Exploration and Production Limited, Shell Exploration and Production Limited) and the host 
state through its national oil company (Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation) to explore oil 
from an oilfield. The PSA stipulated how the petroleum produced from the oil field was to be 
allocated. It further stated that oil tax and royalty tax was to be lifted by the host state and by 
virtue of the contract, transnational corporation was to lift the cost oil and both parties were 
responsible for the lifting of profit oil according to the lifting allocation unilaterally prepared 
by the transnational corporations within the contract.  In addition, the transnational corporation 
also had the exclusive right under the PSA to prepare tax return and pass it on to the host state 
for submission to the Federal Inland Revenue Service. But despite the provision under the PSC, 
the host state was lifting unilaterally more tranches of oil and tax oil than it was allocated by 
the transnational corporation in the contract. The act was considered to be a fundamental breach 
of contract and transnational corporation took the matter to arbitration for declaratory order 
that there had been a breach. They sought an order to stop the host state from further unlawful 
over-lifting of oil cargoes and from submitting further tax returns which are made-up and 
contradicted the one that was prepared by the transnational corporation. In addition, they 
further demanded that the host state should be ordered to refund the over lifted crude oil. The 
Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) challenged the jurisdiction of arbitration and argued 
that the case was tax related matters which were within the Nigerian court’s jurisdiction. FIRS 
further applied for court declaration that a judgement of the award by the arbitral tribunal would 
have negative impact on its ability to collect tax and therefore sought an order to exclude tax 
related issues from arbitration agreement.  The transnational corporations however argued that 
the Federal Inland Revenue Service was not a party to the underlined exploration agreement 
and that the arbitration action was initiated against the transnational corporation not against 





the Nigerian Federal High Court decided the case in favour of FIRS concluding that the case 
was a tax related matter therefore was not arbitrable. But the transnational corporations 
appealed against the ruling and took the matter to the Appeal Court and argued that the judge 
had erred and contended that the arbitration claim was a contractual matter not a tax related 
case. They pointed out that the PSA stipulated how produced oil was to be shared between the 
parties and that the arbitration was initiated against the host state because of its breach of PSA, 
by unilaterally lifting extra cargoes of produced oil than it was supposed to lift under the initial 
lifting allocation prepared by the transnational corporations. The host state argued that it was a 
tax related matter. The filing of Petroleum Profit Tax returns (PPT) which was required under 
the Nigeria Petroleum Profit Tax Act 1990.143 Section 3 (1) (a) of the PPTA provides that; 
 … the due administration of this Act and the tax shall be under the care and 
management of the Board which may do all such as may be deemed 
necessary and expedient for the assessment and collection of the tax and 
shall account for all amounts so collected in a manner to be prescribed by 
the Minister.144 
It was further submitted that the transnational corporations’ claim against the host state was 
mere argument that they have been over taxed in relation to royalty and tax oil which was a 
statutory duty and if the case is decided in their favour, it would affect the host state’s statutory 
duty and contractual obligation under the PSA to file correct Petroleum Profit Tax returns as 
required by law. The Court of Appeal held that the dispute in this case involved contractual 
obligations of the parties and the court noted that there had been a breach of contract. 
Additionally, the host state through its representative, NNPC had violated the agreement 
provisions by unilaterally preparing the Petroleum Profit Tax returns contrary to the provision 
of PSA, so it cannot be argued that the dispute was only a tax dispute. Therefore, the primary 
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issue before the arbitral tribunal was to establish the breach of the host state’s obligations under 
PSA. The court also pointed out that some of the disputes referred to arbitral tribunal for reliefs 
relate to tax disputes and therefore upheld the decision on ESSO above that some of the claims 
raised tax issues and therefore, were not arbitrable. The Court further explained that the 
transnational corporations sought an order that would debar the host state from making tax 
returns and such relief engages the rights and discretionary power of Federal Inland Revenue 
Service to fulfil its duties and obligations vested by the country’s Petroleum Profit Tax Act 
stated above. 
The above case established that disputes arising out of petroleum exploration agreements such 
as PSA in this case can be referred to arbitration unlike the court’s position in Esso v NNPC 
and SNEPCO V FIRS discussed earlier, where the court ruled that the disputes were tax related 
matters and were not arbitrable. In addition, the ruling in this case offers a glimmer of hope for 
transnational corporations in relation to arbitration clauses particularly, Nigeria PSAs which 
may raise concerns about tax implications due to allocation of tax oil and many tranches of 
produced oil. Relying on this case, it could be suggested that arbitral tribunal will be allowed 
to investigate disputes arising out of oil and gas contracts even if the disputes concerned related 
to tax obligations. However, it was made known from this case that tax disputes are not 
arbitrable but the fact that the present case was not entirely tax dispute, it involved contractual 
obligations under the contract, as a result, the court was able to distinguish it and deviated from 
its previous position that tax related disputes were not arbitrable. This position has temporarily 
changed in the case discussed in the next paragraph. 
The exception to the above rule emerged from the case of Statoil (Nig) Ltd v Nigerian 
Petroleum Corporation,145 where the court of Appeal ruled that jurisdiction of arbitration 
                                                          





depends on the provision under the underlined agreement between the parties and their consent. 
The court highlighted in this case that it does not matter if disputes are related to tax matters, 
as far as the parties agreed to refer the case to arbitration the parties’ wishes should be honoured 
and respected. The position of the court on this case was also upheld in Nigeria Agip 
Exploration Ltd v NNPC & Anor. In this case the appellant (Agip) and respondents are parties 
to an exploration contract, Production Sharing Agreement 1993. The agreement contained an 
oil sharing formula and further provided that disputes relating to the interpretation or 
performance of the contracts should be referred to arbitration according to the provision of 
ACA. So, when disputes eventually arose, the arbitration clause under the agreement was 
initiated asking the arbitral tribunal to interpret the performance under the PSC and 
accordingly, the arbitral tribunal ruled in favour of the appellant and issued partial award on 
the issue of liability. On the issue of monetary reliefs, the arbitral tribunal requested for an 
updated and revised damages in order to issue final award. However, the respondent was not 
pleased with the partial award and was concerned about the likely subsequent final award. The 
respondent tried to block the award and applied for an injunction to stay further proceedings in 
relation to the arbitration and an order that will stop arbitral tribunal from taking any steps or 
obtaining information that will enable them to issue final award. However, the court declined 
to grant an injunction relying on the Provisions of s.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 
and argued that proceedings of arbitral tribunal should not be blocked by a court order. It is 
noted from this decision that the NNPC tried hard to frustrate the arbitral proceedings because 
the decision was not favourable, meanwhile the objective and purpose of arbitration would 
have been defeated if the injunction was granted. The court’s attitude in this case point towards 
a positive development and effort to make arbitration an alternative to litigation. However, it 





oil and gas related disputes in Nigeria would be subjected to arbitration. The following case 
demonstrates the country position. 
The Court of Appeal in Nigeria ruled in Statoil (Nigeria) Limited & Anor v. Federal Inland 
Revenue Service & Anor146 that a third party had right to challenge an arbitration award. It is 
obvious that FIRS was not a party to the exploration agreement which contained arbitration 
clauses but successfully frustrated arbitration proceedings. This case concerned dispute over 
tax payment concerning oil lifted under the exploration agreement (Production Sharing 
Agreement 1993). NNPC was initially granted an injunction against the arbitration proceedings 
since tax disputes cannot be referred to arbitration under Nigeria law. However, the injunction 
was overturned by the Appeal Court in Lagos State. But the Federal Inland Revenue Service 
(‘FIRS’) was not happy with the Court of Appeal decision and decided to challenge the validity 
of arbitration agreement between the NNPC, Texaco and Statoil. In addition, FIRS was not a 
party to the arbitration agreement but claimed that the arbitration was initiated to avoid the 
proper calculation of taxes accruable to its account. The Court of Appeal in Abuja accepted 
FIRS argument and recognised that FIRS had right (locus standi) to challenge the arbitration 
agreement. The court argued further that if the transnational corporations were successful with 
arbitration proceedings, the FIRS would be affected and loses income with the arbitral award. 
The significance of the court decision in this case is that it showed how judges are deviating 
from their primary function which is to apply and interpret the law. They have attempted to 
create new law with such a decision and the only justification was that subsequent arbitral 
award would impede FIRS constitutional and statutory power to collect tax. The decision was 
not stated in any of Nigeria statute not even the leading Act of parliament on arbitration matters, 
                                                          





The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 2004. It is however noted that court’s decision in the 
above case appears to go against provisions of the law; s.34 of ACA provides that: 
“a Court shall not intervene in arbitral proceedings in any matter governed by this Act except 
where so provided in this Act”147 
 
The above cases have shown that Nigerian courts have applied a number of principles to 
consider the arbitrability of tax related disputes. Nigeria arbitration law failed to provide 
excluded activities in terms of arbitration and there is no binding international law except New 
York Convention which outlines disputes that are capable of settlement by arbitration and can 
be referred to arbitral tribunal.  It is noted from dispute cases in Nigeria that only commercial 
transaction disputes are arbitrable but tax disputes in the petroleum industry are not subject to 
arbitration. Therefore, arbitration in the country cannot be predicted since judges can overturn 
the decision overnight. Accordingly, transnational corporations should be aware of the 
associated risks with Nigeria arbitration when negotiating exploration agreement particularly 
the arbitration clauses. The governing law of the agreement plays a key role in arbitration and 
its proceedings; thus, it is pertinent to discuss the significant of law applicable to the contracts. 
This is now considered.  
4.2.8 Choice of Law clauses and considerations in oil agreements 
This section discusses choice of law clauses which determine what law applies to a petroleum 
agreement and any disputes arising out of the agreement. The distinction between governing 
law and jurisdiction cannot be overlooked. It is pertinent because it is certain that agreements 
will produce disputes from time to time and when this happens the likely questions is where to 
sue, which country’s court is authorised to hear the case and which country’s law will be 
applied to settle the dispute. Thus, this research focuses on the factors to be considered by the 
                                                          





host states and transnational corporations in establishing the applicable law in oil and gas 
agreement. According to Vickers “the choice of law clause indicates a body of law to govern 
the contract in the event of legal problems between the parties”.148 It is noted from Vickers’ 
definition that the choice of law clause is not a dispute resolution mechanism; it does not state 
how disputes between the parties will be settled, but provides information about the applicable 
law to be applied when disputes arise on the parties’ rights and obligations under the contracts. 
It is also observed that choosing the appropriate law is very significant and if properly 
considered, the choice of law clause can be an important mechanism to strike the right balance 
between the host state and transnational corporations particularly in oil and gas agreements. It 
may help to provide some certainty when settling commercial disputes. Choice of law clauses 
contribute to their harmonious relations and assures more predictable litigation results.149 In 
addition, where  the choice of law is not mentioned in an agreement, the parties may find it 
difficult to have a legal certainty when disputes arises about which law is applicable to settle 
the disputes and where to sue, that is, which state’s court has jurisdiction to hear the matter. 
Inserting an arbitration clause in oil and gas agreement may not necessarily assure a certainty 
on its own as established in decided cases under arbitration above where local courts have 
developed numerous principles to frustrate the arbitration proceedings despite clear indication 
in the exploration agreement that disputes should be referred to arbitration for final settlement. 
However, it is important to point out that parties to exploration agreement are free to decide 
what laws would be applicable to their agreement under the principle of autonomy. 
4.2.9. Party autonomy 
The above doctrine is embraced by the United Kingdom and United States of America 
including developing countries and is viewed as contractual freedom. It is submitted that most 
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of the legal systems in developed countries recognise the concept of party autonomy. For 
example, in the United States of America, The Second Restatement of the Conflicts of Laws 
and Uniform Commercial Code give due regard to party autonomy. In addition, under English 
Common Law for example, the intention of the parties to the agreement determines the proper 
law of the agreement. However, it is pertinent to note that the common law approach would be 
appropriate if the contract was entered into prior to 1st of April 1991 but if the contract was 
entered into after this date and up to 2009 the contract will be governed by the Rome 
Convention and subsequent contract after December 2009 is governed by Rome I Regulations 
as examined below. Therefore, party freedom is beneficial by allowing the parties to choose a 
law that can meet the needs of their contractual relationship. One academic writer defined party 
autonomy as a doctrine which allows the intention of the parties to govern validity of an 
agreement.150 However, critics argued that party autonomy is not in the best interest of 
developing countries and the justification for this argument was the unequal bargaining power 
between the parties. The transnational corporations however have always succeeded in that 
respect due to their bargaining strength. Additionally, allowing transnational corporations to 
choose any law can lead to a situation whereby the outcome will benefit the transnational 
corporations but against economic interests of the host state. It was further submitted that 
transnational corporations who are willing to engage in transnational business activities should 
also surrender to host states laws, they should understand that the host states are typically 
familiar with domestic legislation and perhaps have little or no knowledge of other system of 
law.151Therefore, exploration agreement that fails to give considerations to the domestic laws 
and policies of the host state should be avoided. 
                                                          







On the other hand, supporters of party autonomy have expressed contrary views. For example, 
Roffe posits that exploration agreement cannot be treated as a domestic business activity; 
therefore, the host state should live up to expectation and operate in accordance with 
international acceptable standard. Any disputes arising out of petroleum agreement should not 
be tied down to one law; parties should be free to select what law to govern their oil and gas 
agreement. 152 He argued further that the national courts are likely to be biased in favour of the 
host state, they may give preference to their local laws and thereby discriminate against the 
transnational corporations. The concept of national sovereignty over natural resources and 
ability to make law beneficial to the state have been regarded as driving force behind the host 
states preference of domestic law as the applicable law to the exploration agreement. 
Transnational corporations often believe that the commercial laws of host states particularly, 
the developing countries are commercially restrictive and temporary.153  Lynch added that there 
is an underlying attitude of doubt on the part of developed countries concerning the settlement 
of dispute in host state’s courts. The host state laws are perceived to be very weak compared 
to Western concepts of procedural and due process.154 She explains further that the local judges 
are not competent enough to handle technical and specialist cases therefore choosing a different 
law to the host state will safeguard the parties’ economic interests. Thus, the developing 
countries should prepare to surrender some of the historic arguments of sovereignty to attract 
transnational corporations to invest and develop their countries and to adopt a choice of law 
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clause that is just and fair for all the parties. Nevertheless, party autonomy to select the 
applicable law is recognised by international conventions.  For example, Article 3.1 of the 
Rome Convention provides that: 
…a contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice 
must be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms 
of the contract or the circumstances of the case. By their choice the parties 
can select the law applicable to the whole or a part only of the contract.155 
 
Similarly, Article 1, 301 of the US Commercial code states that: 
 …an agreement by parties to an international transaction that any or all of 
their rights and obligation are to be determined by the law of this state or 
another state or country is effective, whether or not the transaction bears a 
relation to the state or country designated.156 
 
Section 187 of US Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides that: 
 
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights 
and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties 
could have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to 
that issue. 
 
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights 
and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the 
parties could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement 
directed to that issue…157 
 
Section 188 of Restatement of the law Second Conflict also states that: 
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are 
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, 
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has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under 
the principles stated in s6 
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, the contracts to 
be taken into account in applying the principles of s 6 to determine the law 
applicable to an issue include: 
(a) the place of contracting. 
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract, 
(c) the place of performance, 
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and 
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of 
business of the parties. 
These contracts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance 
with respect to the particular issue. 
(3)  If the place of negotiating the contract and place of performance are in the 
same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied… 
 
 
 It is observed that the different provisions above provide guidelines which established that the 
parties’ choice of law should be honoured. Section 188 above also indicates that the law of the 
state with the most significant relationship to the matter will govern that matter where a choice 
has not been made. An academic writer posits that, the terms and obligations of the parties 
under the agreement may not be stated clearly, occasionally, the terms may need to be 
interpreted in accordance with the applicable law,158 therefore, choice of law clauses cannot be 
overlooked in international commercial activities. It is also observed from the majority of 
concluded oil and gas agreements that the host state local laws were the applicable laws that 
governed the agreements. Al-Emadi posits further that one of the reasons behind the intention 
to choose the domestic law to govern contractual obligations and rights is the fact that the host 
states are familiar with their laws compared to other laws.159Jazrawi and Zalewska added that 
applicable law is the key issue of dispute between parties to the petroleum agreement because 
it determines whether the place where the disputes occurred is decisive of the law to be 
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applied.160 Qatar’s exploration agreement (Joint Venture) can be cited as an example to 
illustrate this point, the contract contained a choice of law clause and it states that: “the laws 
of the state of Qatar shall apply to the rights and obligations of parties under this agreement 
and to the construction and interpretation hereof”.161 
4.3 The English courts’ approach to determining the applicable law in the absence of a 
choice of law. 
The court approach depends on the time and year when the agreement was signed, and this will 
be examined in turn. Firstly, and as briefly mentioned above, if an agreement was entered 
before 1st of April 1991 the right approach would be by common law. The English common 
law approach to settle the disputes in the absence of choice of law was established in P & O 
Steam Navigation Co v Shand162 where the court agreed that, it was necessary to consider by 
what general law the parties had wished their agreement to be governed. The parties to the 
agreement in this case had failed to use express words and the court concluded that their 
intention could be inferred in accordance with the terms and nature of the agreement. The court 
considered if there had been an implied choice. Similarly, in Compagnie d’ArmenentMartime 
SA v Compagnie Tunisie de Navigation SA,163 the court was required to determine the 
governing law of the parties’ agreement. In this case, the agreement was negotiated in France 
(Paris) between French shipowner and Tunisian Company for the shipment of oil from Tunisia 
port and the agreement indicated that “this contract shall be governed by the laws of the flag 
of the vessel carrying the goods”. It is pertinent to point out that the clause failed to stipulate 
the name of the vessel and no flag was nominated. However, the clause clearly provided for 
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arbitration in London. The matter before the court was to determine whether the clause which 
provided for arbitration in London carried an inference that the intended law was an English 
Law or purporting to specify proper law capable of application where it was observed that no 
flag and no vessel is specified in the contract. Lord Wilberforce concluded that an arbitration 
clause “must be treated as an indication, to be considered together with the rest of the contract 
and relevant surrounding facts”.164  The decision means that the presence of arbitration clause 
in an agreement is not the only determinant, other surrounding facts will be considered. 
Therefore, dicta from this case emphasised why parities must pay attention to governing law 
clause. It further illustrates that parties’ intention to refer disputes to arbitration in certain 
country may mean the parties have indicated that the applicable law is to be the law of that 
country as seen in this case.  
Accordingly, parties to the oil and gas agreement should specify the applicable law because 
failure to specify the proper law may have huge impact when disputes arise. The case of Tzortis 
v Monark Line AB165 can be cited to buttress this point. This case involved the sale of a ship 
and the contract was signed in Sweden and was to be performed there. The buyer however was 
a Greek and the seller was a Swedish while the contract provided for arbitration in London. 
Meanwhile, the arbitration clause in this agreement was the only connection with England. The 
Court of Appeal found that English law was the governing law of the agreement, despite the 
absence of provision in the underlined agreement and there was no connection with England 
except the arbitration clause. The decision which emanated from this case further emphasised 
that the court were willing to draw an inference as long as a choice of law is left for the court 
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to be determined. Bowen L.J in Jacobs v Credit Lyonnais explained that this approach was 
appropriate so that the court can apply what he described as; 
“sound idea of business, convenience and sense to the language of the contract itself, with a 
view to discovering from it the true intention of the parties”.166 
However, Haynes opposed this approach, especially where it applies to international banking 
contracts. He posits that: 
…in so far as international banking contracts are concerned, it will be 
difficult to find an implied choice since many of the factors, such as 
language, terminology and currency, which might otherwise indicate an 
implied choice, are commonly used to comply standard market practices 
which have developed over many years, and not because of any preferences 
by the parties.167 
 
It is further established that the English court would adopt the above factor as a last result, after 
other means such as express and implied choices to determine the governing law have been 
exhausted.  Morris added that only in case of absence of choice, whether implied or expressed, 
have the English courts determined the law of contract by selecting the law that, with reference 
to certain transaction, had the closet and most real connection.168 Other factors to be considered 
by the court include the choice of forum, the language to be used in the agreement, the currency 
and finally, the place where the contract will be carried out. 169 It is observed that the courts 
can apply three tests to determine the parties’ choice of law in the absence of choice, but it is 
never a requirement for the court to apply these tests accordingly. The English court can decide 
to apply any relevant test as deemed fit. For example, the case of ArmadoraOccdental SA v 
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Horace Mann Insurance Co170 can be cited as an example. This case involved a US company 
which part insured a claimant’s fleet of vessels under a contract of insurance which was 
negotiated and issued in the United State of America and provided for insurance premium and 
claims to be paid in America under dollar policies. Nevertheless, the remaining cover in 
relation to the fleet were insured by different insurers situated in London including Lloyds but 
there was a clause in the contract which stated, “Follow London” It means other insurers were 
expected to follow Lloyd’s underwriters or other Insurers located in London in respect of 
settlement of claims, amount, terms and conditions in every issue concerning the insurance. In 
addition, there was another clause which stipulated that New York City in America should be 
chosen, and all other related disputes should be determined in accordance with US Law in the 
US Court. This contract provision was disregarded by the claimant who initiated an action 
against the defendant in London, demanding for compensation for damages and losses under 
the agreement. But the defendant alleged that the English Court had no jurisdiction because the 
contract stipulated that American law was to govern the contract and therefore, the contract 
was not governed by English Law neither by its terms nor by any implication. The court 
however ruled that inference can be drawn from the clause which indicated “Follow London”. 
The court emphasised that the clause was of paramount importance and indicated that the 
agreement was to be construed, interpreted and applied in accordance with English Law. The 
Court further argued that the suable clause had not been followed instead the claimant had 
opted for the “Follow London” clause to issue a writ. Similarly, in non-oil and gas related case 
Sulamerica Cia De Seguros SA V EnesaEngenharia SA,171 the court was required to establish 
the governing law of an arbitration agreement within construction policies. It was made clear 
within the policies that the contract was subject to law of Brazil and jurisdiction but there was 
                                                          
170Armadora Occdental SA v Horace Mann Insurance Co [1977] 1 WLR 520. 





arbitration clause within the same agreement which selected London as the seat of arbitration. 
The court applied three tests to determine the applicable law; the express choice, the implied 
choice, and the closet and most real connection. The court found that arbitration clause is 
legally different from the governing law of the agreement but confirmed that the law of the seat 
in London should be applied. It was pointed out that the agreement indicated Brazilian Law as 
governing law of the agreement and at the same time satisfied the implied choice part of the 
test. However, the court argued that the parties must have known that by choosing another 
country as the seat of arbitration they have inevitably accepted that the arbitration law of 
England will apply. In addition, the court found that under the arbitration law of Brazil, the 
consent of defendant, Enesa, in this case would be required otherwise arbitration agreement 
would not be enforced. The court concluded that the parties would not have anticipated that, 
and it would undermine the purpose of arbitration agreement. Thus, English law was the 
governing law because the arbitration clause in the agreement had its closet and most real 
connection with London which the Court believed would ensure fair and just out come for the 
parties. The decision which emanated from this case added some clarity to a situation where 
an agreement contains conflicting law and arbitration clauses. It is therefore essential for the 
parties to state in the agreement which set of laws they wish for the contract to be governed as 
this would enable the court to establish which law should be relied on to interpret their 
obligations.  
 4.3.1 The Recast Rome I Approach (Regulation (EC) NO 593/2008) 
Rome I covers similar grounds as the Rome Convention in its recast form, it changes the 
existing presumption into a fixed rule and the fundamental rules were kept but they can only 
be applied to contracts signed on or after 17 December 2009. Article 3 expects the court to 
check whether an implied choice of law can be found in the absence of an express choice.  It 





made expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of 
the case. By their choice the parties can select the law applicable to the whole or part only of 
their contract”.172 It is observed that Article 3 (1) agrees with English Common law approach 
by adopting a restrictive approach to ascertain an implied choice as established in common law 
cases discussed above. In addition, in the absence of choice of law, the place where the party 
that is supposed to perform the obligations of the agreement lives would apply.  
The provisions under Article 4 of Rome I cannot be overlooked. It splits the contracts into eight 
categories and laid determinative factors to designate the applicable law. Article 4 (1) (a) deals 
with contracts for the sale of goods, Article 4 (1) (b) for contracts for the provision of services, 
Article 4 (1) (c) provides for franchise contracts and Article 4 (1) (c) addresses distribution 
contracts. These categories are governed by the law of the country where the service provider, 
franchise, seller or distributor has his habitual residence. Other contracts not mentioned in the 
above categories are governed by the law of the country where the party expected to effect the 
characteristic performance of the contract has his habitual residence.173 
It is noted that the above approach slightly differs from the earlier Rome Convention, which 
provided that contract must be governed by the law of the country “with which it is mostly 
connected”174 subject to presumptions regarding “characteristic performance”.175 However, if 
the characteristic performance could not be found, or the agreement was confirmed to be more 
closely connected with another country, then presumption could be rebutted in favour of that 
country.  It is obvious from Rome I provisions that the presumption of the Rome Convention 
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in respect of characteristic performance was changed into two rules concerning the applicable 
law. It has prompted the academic writers to express their concerns. For example, Hart and 
Charles pointed out that the harmonisation of applicable law rules within the European Union 
cannot prevent intra-EU forum selection from impacting on the decision of disputes.176 The 
justification for this argument is that, procedural and evidential issues are guided by the law of 
the forum and such rules are not the same between member states unless efforts is made to 
harmonise that too.  It is further argued that the court tend to favour local law when it is required 
to rule whether national law or foreign law applies.177 Thus, a party trying to rely on particular 
law as governing law will be better off to bring an action in that state due to some practical and 
commercial considerations, such as language differences, enforcements of the award, 
geographical convenience and familiarity of the parties with chosen forum. Consequently, it 
could be suggested that applicable law in an exploration agreement should be subject to local 
law of the host state in which exploration activities are taking place due to the sensitive nature 
of some of the petroleum agreements. For example, a Production Sharing Agreement in Nigeria 
is recognised and governed by a Nigerian Act of Parliament, regardless of terms and conditions 
of exploration agreement. Some of Nigeria’s laws cannot be overruled by terms of agreement 
and the provision of local content in Nigeria. PSA is subject to Nigeria local law; the royalty 
and taxation are also subject to domestic law. Issues surrounding taxation have been identified 
as major obstacles in Nigeria arbitration as highlighted above. Courts in Nigeria have relied on 
a number of principles to overturn arbitration award in tax related disputes and it is established 
that oil and gas disputes are not subject to arbitration. Temple, has given his support for host 
state law to be the applicable law of oil and gas agreement. He posits that natural resources 
                                                          







agreement will almost always be subject to the appropriate host-state domestic law.178 In view 
of these points, transnational corporations must understand what the local law of host state 
provides in relation to exploration activities, they should look closely at the relevant provisions 
because some of them may not be overridden by petroleum agreement, they will still apply.  
4.4 Conclusions 
It has been established in this chapter that both parties to exploration agreements have key roles 
to play in ensuring that their behaviour does not have a long-term effect on contractual 
relationships, particularly their set goals. The host state in one hand aspired to promote the 
economic growth of the state and to achieve that; they must have petroleum agreement that can 
meet the needs of the state and those of its citizens. The transnational corporations on the other 
hand had the intention of maximising their profits and to achieve the set goals. They must 
protect terms and conditions of exploration agreements so that their investment can be as 
profitable, predictable and stable as anticipated and they wanted to be assured of certainty and 
efficacy. It has been noted that the exploration agreements created rights and obligations for 
the parties which they must fulfil as expected. In order to identify the causes of imbalance in 
oil and gas agreements, the chapter began with a discussion on the long-term contractual 
relationship of the parties and shed some lights on potential risks in international oil and gas 
agreement that are likely to affect parties’ ability to fulfil their contractual obligations. The 
chapter pointed out the various ways in which political risk can occur and if it occurred as a 
result of state’s measure such as expropriation then the consequences may hinder the fulfilment 
of contractual obligations and put transnational corporations in most difficult position as 
illustrated with references to the cases of Ecuador, Venezuela and Kazakhstan. It has been 
observed in this chapter that host state measures such as expropriation can be mitigated by 
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having a stabilisation clause in the oil and gas agreement to ensure the economic balance of the 
contracts and creates a stable business environment.  In addition, the chapter posited that 
political risk can be internal and external struggles such as civil war, strikes, terrorism, 
vandalism, oil theft, sabotage, kidnapping, attacks and oil supply disruption. Some of the 
incidents referred to here have prompted negative reaction from transnational corporations in 
the past and the evidence revealed that oil fields were shut-down, and force majeure were 
declared on numerous occasions. The chapter suggested that cases of vandalism, oil theft and 
supply disruption can be managed by involving local people in control of the oil sector and by 
assuring them that the host state has not overlooked their interest in oil and gas contracts. The 
local people support will help to minimise associated political risks even the transnational 
corporations may as well maximise their out-put. Additionally, natural and technical risks were 
critically examined, and it was noted that technical risks can lead to cost overruns and adversely 
affect out-put of oil and gas operations. However, the host state and transnational corporations 
can manage all potential risks by inserting a number of clauses in oil and gas contracts, such 
measure would enable the parties to share future risks among themselves. It was noted that 
certain risks are beyond the control of parties to oil and gas agreement and it may be difficult 
to prevent unexpected natural disaster or an Act of God therefore relevant contractual clauses 
must be considered. Force majeure clauses are largely adopted by majority of oil-rich countries 
to mitigate the effect of unforeseen circumstances. The chapter briefly touched other measures 
that can be taken to reduce the non-commercial risk by transferring certain risk to a third party 
that was not involved in underlined agreements such as Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency, a member of the World Bank Group (MIGA). Though, this may offer little help if the 
risk concerned is related to political changes. 
The binding nature of some of the special clauses in international oil and gas are critically 





like stabilisation clause, renegotiation clause, force majeure clause, arbitration clause and 
applicable law clause to minimise the risks of an unanticipated circumstances which are likely 
to affect the fulfilment of parties’ obligations. As noted in the chapter that if the host state 
willingly agreed and inserted stabilisation clause in the petroleum agreement, then the host 
state has accepted to be bound by the terms of the agreement not to unilaterally make sudden 
changes in the law that would breach its obligations under the agreement. However, 
renegotiation clauses play a different role, it does not freeze the law, but the aim is to keep the 
relationship moving and alive by ensuring the parties strike the right balance when it is obvious 
that circumstances have changed and that changes can be justified. Therefore, a renegotiation 
clause can be relied upon to invite the other party to negotiate to resolve the problems. 
However, the chapter pointed out that renegotiation clause must not be used to the detriment 
of the transnational corporations. 
Arbitration clauses cannot be excluded even if the parties carefully drafted the petroleum 
agreement. The chapter pointed out that an arbitration clause ensures parties’ interests are 
protected. The host state prefers the disputes to be settled according to the domestic law, in 
their local courts so that they can get fair judgement from local tribunals. Transnational 
corporations may not feel comfortable for disputes arising from their exploration activities to 
be settled by the law of that state. Nevertheless, it is recommended by the provisions of ICSID 
that investment disputes should be referred to arbitration. The majority of host states have opted 
for arbitration for settlement of disputes including Nigeria even though tax related disputes are 
not arbitrable in Nigeria as seen in decided cases evaluated in this chapter. Only commercial 
transactions disputes are subject to arbitrations despite the provisions under Arbitration and 





                                       CHAPTER 5 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND 
THEIR APPLICATION BY HOST STATES 
5.1   Introduction 
This chapter examines international environmental laws which have been developed to 
safeguard the environment in relation to oil and gas exploration activities. Environmental 
problems are not limited to air pollution. It includes oil and gas spillage, chemical accidents 
and hazardous materials, gas flaring, global warming and acid rains, just to name a few.  It is 
noted that, some of these identified problems were present because of human activities and can 
be managed if not completely eradicated. International organisations including the United 
Nations have attempted to minimise the causes and put them under control by coming up with 
several international agreements to tackle environmental challenges. Some of the agreements 
were formulated to deal with natural resources and emphases were on territorial waters, fishing 
rights and navigations. Some focus on nuclear issues which are beyond the scope of this 
research. This chapter however investigates the major principles of international environmental 
laws and their application at a national level. 
 
Part of the chapter also examines the principles of international environmental law and analyses 
UNCLOS III, the United Nations Law of the Sea 1982, which is regarded as the most effective 
international agreement. It is pertinent to point out that some Articles of the UNCLOS III have 
been thoroughly examined in Chapter 2 of this research.1 However, the relevant environmental 
provisions under UNCLOS III will be discussed here because this convention defines rights 
and obligations of member states in relation to the Oceans, gives guide-lines and covers 
                                                          





international business activities. Article 159 provides for state’s responsibilities in respect of 
individual activities which are likely to cause environmental problems while Article 153 
stipulates that if a member state fails to live up to expectation then that state will be held 
responsible for breach of its expected international obligations under UNCLOS III. In addition, 
Annex III, Article 4 and paragraph 4 takes care of exploration and the host state’s 
responsibilities. 
The Precautionary Principle is one of the principles which means assuming action prior to 
activities being implemented and before its outcome is discovered.2 The majority of 
international agreements recognised and applied this principle and it was criticised by some 
academic writers. One argues that precautionary principle puts undue restrictions on life and 
creates problems3 but supporters of the principle believe that precautionary principle can work 
if applied correctly. The principle of prevention is also considered in this chapter and there are 
mixed comments on this as will be discussed. However, it is highly respected for its potential 
to address the environmental problems.  
The Polluter Pays Principle in the Rio Declaration of 1992 is another relevant one; it entails 
the responsibilities of the host state and shed some lights on the rights and obligations of the 
host state concerning transnational corporations’ exploration and exploitation activities. 
This chapter answers the question: to what extent have the principles of international 
environmental law been utilised at a state level and whether developing countries have been 
able to overcome the pressures from transnational corporations on the issue of environmental 
law?  It further looks at how the principles have helped the oil-rich countries in Africa to create 
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their own environmental laws to minimise environmental problems associated with exploration 
activities. Nigeria particularly has enacted several environmental laws in accordance with the 
provisions of United Nations Conventions upon which premise it could be argued that the 
Conventions have helped to some extent countries in Africa to invest on environmental 
developments.4 
In addition, the chapter further discusses internal and external challenges faced by the host 
state, particularly, the implementation of principles of international environmental law. A lack 
of public awareness and lack of governmental initiative are regarded as the key factors which 
made environmental laws ineffective. Academic writers’ views on this point are critically 
analysed. Some believe that host state’s involvement in certain types of oil contracts, 
specifically, joint ventures have hindered the implementation of domestic legislation on 
environmental issues. Consequently, the role of action groups and their efforts to obtain justice 
for the victims of environmental disaster in Niger Delta area in Nigeria are examined. The 
relevant case laws are considered and the case of Social and Economic Rights Action Centre 
and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria5has been critically analysed. This 
case revealed some unknown shortcomings of the transnational corporations in Delta Nigeria 
where the oilfields were contaminated after exploration activities with serious environmental 
degradation and negative health consequences for the local people. With the support of external 
organisations, the court ruled against Nigeria and concluded that the Africa Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights had been engaged. The enforcement of environmental law will be 
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considered as an important principle of justice and responsibility of the host state. The host 
state must ensure victims of environmental problems are compensated.   
The chapter further sheds some light on enforcement for the local people and considers whether 
the victims of the Delta region in Nigeria could have obtained a fair judgement they deserved 
if liability for pollution is regulated by global treaty. The representatives’ locus standi is 
identified as one of the problems.  It is observed from one of the cases dealt with in this chapter 
that a claim for compensation for pollution was delayed for 14 years and there was no 
explanation for the unnecessary procrastination. Nevertheless, it is concluded that 
environmental problems created by human activities require joint efforts from developed and 
developing countries, at every level both local and international to minimise, since there is limit 
to what can be done to prevent natural disasters. 
5.2 The identification of international laws and principles 
Historically, much legislation and a range of principles exist to phase out environmental 
problems in the world with provisions for the improvement of air quality and reducing 
environmental degradation. In spite of this, cases of environmental pollution and gas flaring 
continue unabated in Nigeria. It is argued that environmental problems can be linked to oil and 
gas operations, from exploration and extraction via processing and distribution to 
transportation, consumption and disposal of natural resources used in oil production.6 It is also 
observed that despite the emergence of environmental liability legislation, and a number of 
cases connected to oil pollution, the victims of oil pollution are in some cases left without any 
remedy.7 Prior to 1900 there were few international agreements to deal with environmental 
issues and the existing ones were created to protect national sovereignty over natural resources. 
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Some focused on territorial waters, fishing rights and navigations but left environment 
problems unsettled. However, things began to change from 1950 to 1972 because at that time 
ecological problems were being noticed and addressed. Many environmental laws were passed, 
some regulating nuclear issue from civilian use and sea pollution from oil. Those laws created 
liability for oil pollution and oil control particularly in North Sea area. The Stockholm 
Conference was held in 1972 by the United Nations and further environmental laws were made, 
principles of environmental law also emerged from international treaties, customs and 
agreements. These treaties include; the Antarctic Treaty 1961, the Great Lakes Treaty 1954, 
the Kyoto Protocol 1973, the Polar Bear Treaty 1973, the Outer Space Treaties of 1967 and 
2011, and the Treaty banning nuclear weapon testing in the atmosphere under water and outer 
space 1963. In addition, we also have the Rio declaration on Environment and Development  
1992, the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity 1992,  International Convention 
for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil 1954, International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 (MARPOL) and its Protocol, London Dumping 
Convention 1972, London Protocol, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change 1992, International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of 
Oil Pollution Casualties 1969, High Seas Conservation Convention 1958, International 
Convention on Civil Liability for oil Pollution Damage 1969 and  above all, 1982 witnessed 
the birth of UNCLOS III8 which formed the basis for  the existing international environmental 
law. 
Some international environmental principles were briefly mentioned in the introduction of this 
chapter. However, it is pertinent to assert that the Precautionary Principle was introduced by 
international treaties to protect the environment and human health from pollutants. It also came 
                                                          





to be in recognition of the urgent need to protect the environment and the people from being 
exposed to harmful substances. The ‘Polluter Pays’ Principle is another popular one which was 
created to ensure that whoever caused damage to the environment should be held accountable 
for the cost of that damage. Omukoro affirmed that legal systems around the world have 
identified the principle that whoever causes foreseeable harm to others should be held 
accountable for the damage resulting from their omissions or actions.9 It is noted that this 
principle was incorporated into European Treaty, treaty of Rome. Subsequently, the 
‘Prevention Principle’ was also made to tackle environmental problems. This principle requires 
that state make law to reduce the risk of transboundary harm and it has been applied in majority 
of international agreements as evaluated below.  
5.3 A Critical Evaluation of Environmental Laws  
UNCLOS III 
UNCLOS III is an international agreement which emerged after the third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea 1982. It provides for a comprehensive legal mechanism on 
tacking environmental challenges and facilitates the protection of the environment through the 
general environmental protection principles and principle of state responsibilities. Under its 
provisions, states are required to have measures which can control, prevent and reduce 
pollution of the marine environment and ensue jurisdiction’s activities are carried out in a 
manner that will not cause damage by pollution to the environment of other states.10  Part I, 
Article 1 (1) (4) of UNLOS III defines pollution as follows: 
Pollution of the marine environment” means the introduction by man, 
directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment, 
including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such deleterious 
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effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, 
hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses 
of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of 
amenities.11 
 
Furthermore, Articles 192, 193,194,197,199,206,208 and 235 deals with States’ general 
obligation. Article 192 provides that: “States have the obligation to protect and preserve the 
marine environment. “Article 193 says that: “States have the sovereign right to exploit their 
natural resources pursuant to their environmental policies and in accordance with their duty to 
protect and preserve the marine environment.” Article 194 addresses measures to be 
implemented by the states to reduce and control pollution: 
1- States shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures 
consistent with this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce and 
control pollution of the marine environment from any source, using for 
this purpose the best practicable means at their disposal and in 
accordance with their capabilities, and they shall endeavour to 
harmonise their policies in this connection. 
2- States shall take measures necessary to ensure that activities under their 
jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by 
pollution to other state and their environment, and that pollution arising 
from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control does not 
spread beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign right in 
accordance with this convention. 
 
In view of the above provisions under UNCLOS III, States are required to put in place measures 
to safeguard marine environment otherwise they may be breaking international law and be 
liable according to provisions under Section 9 of UNCLOS III. Article 235 provides that; 
1- States are responsible for the fulfilment of their international obligations 
concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment. 
They shall be liable in accordance with international law. 
2- States shall ensure that recourse is available in accordance with their 
legal systems for prompt and adequate compensation or other relief in 
respect of damage caused by pollution of the marine environment by 
natural or juridical persons under their jurisdiction. 
 
                                                          





Academic writers have expressed concern regarding the lack of provisions for liability for 
pollution and clean-up cost under UNCLOS III.12 It is argued that the Convention has failed to 
deal with a series of vital issues relating to the exploration. In addition, it is further criticised 
that there were no environmental conditions under which operations should be carried out and 
the liability that should follow in case of accidents caused by exploration and exploitation 
activities or technical failures.13 However, offshore productions are contributing to the 
economic growth and development of petrol around the world but there is no global treaty to 
address a situation where offshore petroleum development results in accidental pollution. Cases 
of offshore petroleum pollution around the world can be cited to buttress this point.  Pollution 
assessment was carried out in the Gulf of Guinea and the result revealed that exploration 
activities in Nigeria had contributed to heavy pollution of the area. Similarly, there was oil 
leakage from a pipeline (Cameroon-Chad) operated by COTCO, Cameroon’s national oil 
company which resulted in heavy pollution in Cameroon. The US BP Gulf of Mexico spill and 
petroleum disasters that occurred in 2010 as well as Montara Australia blowout of the 80-
metre-deep well in waters of the Timor Sea in 2009 are other major examples of offshore 
petroleum pollution with no international agreement dealing with such occurrences. This 
problem cannot be resolved if individual states are encouraged to regulate petroleum 
development to cover their jurisdictions as provided for under UNCLOS III. Evidence have 
shown that offshore petroleum pollution transcends national boundaries therefore, collective 
effort is needed to find a lasting solution.   Efforts have been made in the past to adopt an 
international convention to control offshore petroleum development, but the move was 
opposed.  There was a negotiation in 1977 for civil liability for oil pollution damage arising 
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from exploration for and exploitation of seabed mineral resource but it failed to receive four 
signatories needed for ratification to come into force.14 Similarly, it is claimed that states were 
not interested in subsequent Convention on Offshore Mobile Craft, 1994 and Canada Draft 
known as thedraft convention on offshore units, artificial islands and related structures used in 
the exploration for an exploitation of petroleum and seabed mineral resources.It is argued that 
such conventions could have made significant contributions to the coordination of international 
maritime law because the objective was to foster the universal application of international law 
to reduce the vulnerability of developing countries in negotiation for oil and gas development 
arrangements with transnational corporations.15 It was advanced further that the conventions 
contained some special provisions likely to close the gap in global regulation of offshore oil 
and gas development and in particular, cleaning up liability and costs.16 
In relation to this challenge, the London Convention on Marine Dumping also emerged as a 
result of a United Nations conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm 1972.  
The London Convention is one of the first international conventions to control dumping and 
pollution of the sea from human activities and came into force on 30 August 1975. It addresses 
the disposal of waste deliberately at sea, it also covers aircraft, vessels and oil platforms. Article 
of 1 the convention provides that: 
 Contracting Parties shall individually and collectively promote the 
effective control of all sources of pollution of the marine environment, and 
pledge themselves especially to take all practicable steps to prevent the 
pollution of the sea by the dumping of waste and other matter that is liable 
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to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, 
to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.17 
Article III (i) (a) (ii) says: 
(a) “Dumping” means: 
(i) any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, 
platforms or other man-made structure at sea; 
(ii) any deliberate disposal at sea of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-
made structure at sea.18 
 
 The Convention makes unlawful the dumping of waste and pollutants that can pose risks and 
hazards to marine life, living resources and human health. It is established that the purpose of 
the London Convention is to control all sources of marine pollution of the sea through 
regulation of dumping into the sea of waste material. It is pertinent to point out the significant 
of the word “deliberate” because the convention emphasised that deliberate dumping is 
prohibited. Parities which deliberately dump objectionable materials must be held liable for 
any damage arise as a result of intentionally dumping. However, dumping of certain material 
requires an authorisation from designated and appropriate authority under strict control and 
certain conditions must be met. Thus, materials or substances can be dumped once a permit is 
granted. This signals improvement over the previous provisions and earlier conventions. This 
convention applies to all vessels and it provides the list of prohibited and restricted materials. 
It introduced the use of a licensing system because of the ocean’s ability to handle some of 
waste material and made a recommendation for strict evaluation of the environmental impact 
of the dumping before damage occurred.  In addition, in 1996 the parties to the London 
Convention renegotiated a restrictive approach to move from the permissive dumping approach 
under London Convention and thus the London Protocol was created.  The conventions have 
to some extent helped the parties to stop unregulated dumping and incineration activities at 
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sea.19 Therefore, most dumping is now subject to permit and dumping prohibitions have been 
extended to include dumping of radioactive and industrial waste.20 However, there is no 
provision for pipeline discharges from land, offshore installation and operational discharge 
from vessels within the scope of London Convention and subsequent London Protocol. In other 
words, the agreements failed to regulate the disposal of waste arising from offshore activities 
such as release of toxic substances during exploration and exploitation processes. It was clearly 
stated under London Convention that dumping does not include: 
The disposal at sea of waste or other matter incidental to, or derived from 
normal operations of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made 
structures at sea and their equipment, other than wastes or other matter 
transported by or to vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures 
at sea, operating for the purpose of disposal of such matter or derived from 
the treatment of such wastes or other matter on such vessels, aircraft, 
platform or structures;21 
 
The disposal of wastes or other matter directly arising from or related to the 
exploration and associated off-shore processing of sea-bed mineral 
resources will not be covered by the provisions of this convention.22 
In view of the above provisions, it could be summited that neither the London Protocol nor 
London Convention regulates offshore pollution arising from exploration activities. Similarly, 
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) adopted another convention known as the 
International Convention for the Prevention of pollution from ships (MARPOL) amended by 
Protocols. It is argued that this Convention has seen significant decrease in pollution and it has 
contributed greatly to the control of environmental problems arising from international 
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shipping.23 However, it was criticised for focusing only on pollution of the marine environment 
from the shipping industry but created an impression that offshore exploration activities were 
covered within the MARPOL. For example, the ship was defined, and it identified offshore 
installations such as floating platforms, fixed and floating craft but later excluded harmful 
substances arising from petroleum offshore exploration activities as detailed below. 
Article 2 (4) sates that: 
…ship” means a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine 
environment and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, 
submersibles, floating craft and fixed or floating platforms. 
 
Article 2 (3) (b) (ii) provides that: 
(b) “Discharge” does not include: 
(ii) Release of harmful substances directly arising from the exploration, 
exploitation and associated offshore processing of sea-bed mineral 
resources.24 
 
Moreover, an attempt was made to create uniform rules and procedure for assessing liability 
and compensation for oil pollution damage across the globe the Civil Liability Convention 
(CLC) and 1992 Fund Conventions were created. The objectives of these conventions were to 
have measures to compensate the victims of oil pollution damage at sea. They imposed strict 
liability on the oil-tankers owners for pollution damage irrespective of fault except for force 
majeure circumstances. However, CLC and Fund Conventions like previous conventions 
discussed failed to provide for upstream offshore installations and the insurance scheme does 
not cover offshore pollution clean-up liability as well as the compensation of offshore oil and 
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gas development. It is clear from it provisions and under definition of ship in Article I (I) that 
offshore petroleum pollution is exempted from the list. 
 
…Ship means any-seagoing vessel and seabome craft of any type 
whatsoever constructed or adapted for the carriage of oil bulk as cargo, 
provided that a ship capable of carrying oil and other cargoes shall be 
regarded as a ship only when it is actually carrying bulk as cargo and during 
voyage following such carriage unless it is proved that it has no residues of 
such carriage of oil in bulk aboard. 
 
Fixed offshore oil and gas structures are missing from the definition which only included 
floating storage units. Therefore, this convention also failed to address the environmental 
problems arising out of oil explorations. Equally, the International Convention on Oil Pollution 
Preparedness, Response and Co-operation 1990 was adopted after the 1989 disaster of Exxon 
Valdez off the Alaskan coast where oil tanker released gallons of crude oil into the sea. It was 
reported that Exxon Valdez had dumped 11 million US gallons (41.8m litres) of crude oil and 
contaminated around 1,300 miles 2,080 km of coastline.25 The IMO Assembly realised that it 
was necessary to adopt an international convention on oil pollution preparedness and response 
to urgently deal with serious threat to the sea by oil pollution involving ships. The Convention 
provides for parties to prepare oil pollution emergency plan26 and to present the report of oil 
discharge without delay to sea ports and coastal authority.27 The coastal authority is required 
under the provision to carry out the necessary assessment of the incidents and to inform other 
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state parties of action needed to deal with incidents,28which must include training, technical 
assistance, information system, research and development on incidents involving oil spill and 
pollution.29 However, it is argued that the Convention only mitigates part of offshore oil and 
gas pollution as far as the title indicates. The provision focuses on mitigating loss and damage 
arising out of oil pollution through preparedness and prompt response and on how to prevent 
pollution by encouraging rescue.30Ayamdoo added that the Convention covers accidental parts 
of offshore oil and gas pollution but failed to regulate forms of pollution occurrences such as 
environmental disturbances, seismic surveying which determines the location and size of oil 
and gas reservoirs and decommissioning where there is no apparent discharge of oil.31 
Consequently, it is observed that this convention does not provide for environmental problems 
resulting from oil and gas exploration activities but successfully addressed the incidents of oil 
pollution involving ships. It is therefore pertinent to examine other relevant principles and 
customary international law to establish how they have been used to control oil and gas 
associated environmental problems. 
5.4 Customary International Law  
Historically, customary international law was established in the twentieth century and was 
defined in the Statute of the International Court of Justice as “evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law”.32 It can be determined in two ways. Firstly, by general practice of states as 
observed from the definition and secondly by what the states have known and accepted as law.   
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Customary international law provides that state should not encourage activities within their 
territory or control to cause harm to other states. Lingjie suggests that emergence of this 
principle can be linked to the Trail Smelter Arbitration which asserts that: 
No state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner 
as to cause injury in or territory of another or of the properties or persons 
there in, when the case is serious consequence and the injury is established 
by clear and convincing evidence.33 
It is observed from Schrijver’s comment that the rights of states under the principle of 
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources in international law are bound since they imply 
certain duties such as a duty to ensure every indigenous and ethnic people benefit from the 
exploration and exploitation of natural resources and the resulting national development. In 
addition, a duty to ensure a due care is given to environment, which includes the customary 
obligation not to cause harm to the area and to ensure natural resources are utilised for 
sustainable production and consumption.34 The Corfu Channel case can be cited to buttress 
this point where Albania deliberately placed mines within its water and eventually caused 
damage to two naval vessels of the UK’s navy. The international Court of Justice analysed the 
territorial situation of the North Corfu channel which connected two high seas together. 
Evidence showed that the water had been regularly used for international navigation, the court 
then ruled that the water should be perceived as belonging to international highways whereby 
an innocent passage would not be required to seek approval and cannot be prevented in time 
of peace by the coastal state. The court held that Albania was responsible for the explosion 
resulting from the mines which caused damages and loss of life in the British naval vessels 
under international law. The fact that the UK had breached the sovereignty of Albania’s 
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exclusive territorial waters did not justify Albania’s action. This case therefore establishes that 
each state has a duty “not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the 
rights of other states”35 The North Corfu Chanel principle affirms the one which emanated 
from the Trail Smelter arbitration discussed earlier. Similarly, Arbitration in the case of Lac 
Lanoux36where the Arbitral Tribunal is required to settle a water course dispute between 
France and Spain cannot be overlooked. France began a development process to divert water 
to generate hydroelectric energy with a promise not to alter the volume of water flowing to 
Carol River, but the Spanish Government believed that the proposed works would affect its 
interests and alleged that France’s plan would breach its water exclusive rights under a number 
of treaties entered into in 1886. Spain further claimed that it was unlawful under the treaty to 
undertake such work without the mutual agreement of both countries. The Arbitral Tribunal 
concluded that, there was no foreseeable injury to Spain and reaffirmed that every state has a 
duty, when exercising its right, to respect and consider the rights of another state. In addition, 
the Tribunal explained in respect of 1886 treaties that the French government did not violate 
any of the treaties’ provisions. Besides, the provision under the treaties did not constitute a 
genuine reason to override the general rule considered as a rule of customary international law.   
5.5 The Precautionary Principle  
Historically, the precautionary principle has been around since the early days of civilisation 
with some customs and tradition of indigenous community having the perception of precaution 
embedded in them.37 However, the modern Precautionary Principle was first introduced in the 
1970s in German’s Vosorgeprinzip clean air legislation, in an effort to minimise damage to the 
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environment from smog acid rain.38 It was defined in layman’s word as better safe than sorry.39 
The principle also means assume action before an activity is implemented and before its results 
are identified. 40  The Principle has been applied in numerous international agreements. For 
example, Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration 1992 on Environment and Development provides 
that:  
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation. 41 
 
In the view of the above provision under the Rio Declaration, Nliam posits that the 
precautionary principle is relevant to oil and gas exploration and production.42 He argues 
further that the principle put transnational corporations on the high alert for contingent 
environment risk in relation to exploration activities because environment impact may not have 
been foreseen at the beginning of upstream oil and gas development.43Therefore, the principle 
increases the chance of successful operations and helps to put in place technologies to deal with 
unforeseen environmental risks.  In addition, references were made to its application in 
numerous international agreements, treaties, conventions, international environmental 
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instruments and EU policies. For example, the London Ministerial Declaration 1987, the North 
Sea Ministerial Conferences in 1984 and European Union Policy in relation to the environment 
where Article 191 of the Lisbon Treaty asserts that: 
Union policy on the environment shall aim at high level of protection taking 
into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Union. 
It shall be based on the precautionary principles that preventive action 
should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified 
at source and that the polluter should pay.44 
It is noted that the above provision recognised the importance of the precautionary principle 
for an improved environmental protection and it could be submitted that the objective of the 
principle is to encourage prevention of harm to the human health and environment. It is 
pertinent to explain the legal nature of the conventions examined in this section. The Stockholm 
Declaration was not accepted as a treaty and is not legally binding. However, most of its 
principles contained certain considerations to be taken into account in resolving identified 
environmental problems. Despite its non-binding character, the Declaration is significant 
legally. It stimulated collective action globally, as it encouraged cooperation and planning 
necessary for the needs of developing countries. Similarly, the Rio Declaration was not adopted 
as legally binding agreement, but it was accepted as a statement of customary international law 
and contained fundamental principles for the achievement of sustainable development. In 
addition, its principles had great impact at the international level because majority of the 
international convention relating to multilateral cooperation included environmental protection 
as one of the aims and objectives of the state parties. In addition, the Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous waste and their Disposal 1989 was known 
with non-binding character. Still, one of its most significant contributions over the years is the 
                                                          





elaboration of number of policy instrument within the framework of the convention. Numerous 
national and regional capacity building and training projects have been implemented.45 
Furthermore, the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992 (UNFCCC) 
is known with non-binding character. However, it sets the parameters for global discourse and 
provides an essential forum for dialogue and decision making on climate change matters. It 
forms basis of the climate change regime and urges action to ensure human safety and the 
stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations which prevents dangerous interference with 
climate change.  It is established that Kyoto protocol emerged as a result of UNFCCC and sets 
out legally binding emission reduction obligations for developed country parties. Additionally, 
the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, 1992 
emerged at the time when it was necessary for further international action to prevent and 
eliminate pollution of the sea and marine environment. It was not binding like other agreements 
discussed early but nevertheless, it addressed all sources of pollution of the marine and adverse 
effects of human activities upon it. The convention stressed importance of precautionary 
principle and encouraged regional cooperation in dealing with marine areas which have been 
adversely affected. However, applying this to the offshore petroleum pollution, it has not been 
established whether the application of the principle is sufficient and effective at preventing the 
causes of environmental degradation from oil and gas exploration activities. Therefore, it is 
pertinent to examine some special burdens which the principles impose on the users of ocean 
in general. Sadeleer asserts that the principle held a presumption in support of human health 
and environment and as a result creates burden of proof on whoever engages in any activity 
that can threaten the environment and human health.46Weintraub added that users of the ocean 
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are required to take extra caution, to undertake appropriate research and develop non-polluting 
technologies, and to avoid activities that can pose risk to the ocean.47 The policy makers are 
also required to be more alert to likely risks of environmental pollution. No wonder, it was 
suggested by Freestone that the greater the possible harm to the environment, the more rigorous 
the requirement of alertness, effort and precaution.48  Another commentator, Hey, asserts that 
the principle has a dynamic element which requires all users of the sea to develop non-
burdensome and non-polluting technologies.49 She argues further that burden of proof 
continues as far as precautionary principle is concerned and concluded that “when scientific 
information is in doubt, the party that wishes to develop a new project or change the existing 
system has the burden of demonstrating that the proposed changes will not produce 
unacceptable adverse impacts on existing resources and species”50A supporter of the principle 
justifies why the principle receive tremendous support by affirming that firstly; it aims at 
avoiding harm to the environment as well as human beings and secondly, it has the tendency 
to maintain natural ecosystem without which less well-off populations would be worse off.51  
However, the arguments and views of the critics of this principle are also examined in the next 
lines. 
It is argued that the interpretation of the precautionary principles is untenable and creates 
problems. This was supported by an academic writer, Sustein, who posits that, one can question 
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whether the principle can be classed as absolute, an absolute adherence to the extent that the 
principle will prohibit every activity that can cause harm and if that is the case, it will be 
ineffectual and creates undue restrictions on life.52Sadeleer also believes that, the precautionary 
principle is a mere prescriptive and guiding principle which cannot bind.53 While Artfield 
argues that the principle is basic and not overriding.54 But the supporters of the principle 
disagreed and argue that it is not important whether the principle is prescriptive, basic, 
overriding or absolute, what is necessary is the principle’s application. They affirm that some 
of the critics’ arguments were unfounded. Besides, most of the claimed problems are not caused 
by the principle itself rather they are associated with misunderstanding of application.55 He 
then suggested that the principle should be applied with extra caution and reasonable measure 
to avoid serious threat to the environment including human health. Consequently, and in view 
of both arguments, one can conclude that, the precautionary principle plays an important role 
considering the world-wide acceptance of the principle and its application by various 
international agreements, conventions and European policy; it also contained preventative 
measures to deal with contingent circumstances and uncertain risks.  
 
5.6 The Principle of Prevention 
It has been argued that the principle of prevention has the greatest potential to address the 
environmental problems. It was incorporated into a number of international conventions and 
mainly focuses on state’s obligation not to engage in activities that can cause harm to the 
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environment of other states. This is also known as duty of diligence in the sense that it makes 
it an obligation for the state to legislate and have policies to prevent harm and minimise the 
risks of transboundary harm.56 Bullard added that the principle of prevention had been 
implemented when state makes environmental laws including national and EU law.57 States 
are under an obligation to take necessary action to prevent environmental pollution before the 
damage occurs. He explains further that state must not wait until conclusive proof or causation 
is established58 as indicated under Article 1 of Directive of the European Parliament that states 
have obligation to handle waste in a way that does not have a negative impact on human health 
and the environment.59 
In the light of the foregoing, it is pertinent to evaluate related international agreements in the 
next paragraphs. It was provided under Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration that; 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the 
principle of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own 
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do 
not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction.60 
 
It is observed that the above principle has become a popular customary law and it applies to all 
states and parties to the conventions. It is also noted from the principle 21 that the provisions 
emphasised state obligation on transboundary harm. Equally, Principle 2 of the Rio declaration 
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focuses on state responsibility but expanded the responsibility to cover “environmental 
development”.61 
Application of principle of precaution is found in Article 3 of the United Nation Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 1992 (UNFCCC) which states that:“The parties should take 
precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimise the causes of climate change and 
mitigate its adverse effects”.62 
The provision under Article 2 (1) (a) of the Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North-East Atlantic (1992) cannot be overlooked. It provides that; 
The contracting parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of the 
Convention, take all possible steps to prevent and eliminate pollution and 
shall take the necessary measures to protect the maritime area against the 
adverse effects of human activities so as to safeguard human health and to 
conserve maritime ecosystem and, when practicable, restore marine areas 
which have been adversely affected.63 
Similarly, The Basel Convention on the control of Trans boundary Movements of Hazardous 
wastes and their Disposal 1989requires that state take necessary steps to prevent pollution and 
to: 
Ensure that persons involved in the management of hazardous wastes or 
other waste within in take steps as are necessary to prevent pollution due to 
hazardous waste and other wastes arising from such management and, if 
such pollution occurs, to minimise the consequences thereof for human 
health and environments.64 
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The Basel Convention prohibits transportation of hazardous waste as a criminal and illegal act. 
However, enforcement was not covered by the provision, the parties are required to adopt 
protocol and rules to enforce liability for the transportation of hazardous waste in accordance 
with provision of Article 12. 
The parties shall co-operate with a view to adopting, as soon as practicable, 
a protocol setting out appropriate rules and procedures in the field of 
liability and compensation for damage resulting from trans boundary 
movement and disposal of hazardous waste and other waste. 65 
 
The Basel Convention was heavily criticised even though majority of developed countries 
ratified the convention. The United State of America has not incorporated the Basel Convention 
into its local law and it is argued that the US remains one of the largest generators of hazardous 
waste. To further support this argument, it is noted that hazardous waste in the US accounted 
for three quarters of total annual production.66 In addition, one critic of the Convention posits 
that it lacks enforcement mechanism and fails to ensure that waste traders are held responsible 
for damage which occurs as a result of their trading activities. Thus, it has failed to attain 
environmental justice particularly in developing states.67 The definition of “hazardous waste” 
under the Convention is regarded as uncertain and too broad because it was left to the parties 
to give interpretation and this can be capitalised on to avoid liability. For example, a party 
could argue that the exports (hazardous waste) are products and not hazardous. Above all, the 
rejection of a total ban on the international movement of hazardous waste was not in the best 
interest of developing countries because they advocated for a total ban not limited ban and 
                                                          
65 ibid Article 12. 
66 M. Bradford, the United States, China and Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous 
Wastes and their Disposal, (2011) 8 (2) Fordham Environmental Law Journal 1-47.  
67 Kenneth I. Ajibo, Transboundary hazardous wastes and environmental justice: Implications for economically 





developed countries supported a limited ban and argued that adoption of total ban would be 
economically disadvantageous.68 
Furthermore, the provision of Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) is also relevant here 
as it encourages parties to embark on an environmental assessment before signing a contract 
which may have adverse impact on biological diversity. Biological Diversity definition is found 
in United Nations Earth Summit 1992 as follows; “Biological Diversity” means the variability 
among living organisms from all sources including, iter alia, terrestrial, marine and other 
aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity 
within species, between species and ecosystem.” In addition, the International Court of Justice 
pointed out the importance of environmental impact assessment in Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay.69 This case involved Argentina and Uruguay concerning breach of an obligation 
under the Statute of the River Uruguay, a treaty between the two countries mentioned. 
Argentina alleged that Uruguay had unilaterally authorised a construction of two pulp mills on 
the River Uruguay without following the consultation and notification procedures within the 
treaty. Argentina further argued that the construction on the river posed a significant threat to 
the environment, quality of the river waters and was likely to cause transboundary damage. 
The court found that Uruguay had violated the treaty for failure to inform the Administrative 
Commission of the River Uruguay known as (CARU) of proposed plan of work before 
embarking on environmental authorisation of the pulp Mills and for not communicating the 
plans to Argentina through CARU. The Court reaffirmed that the environmental Impact 
assessment is:  
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…A requirement under general international law to undertake an 
environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed 
activity may have a significant adverse impact in a trans boundary context, 
in particular, on a shared resource. Moreover, due diligence, and the duty of 
vigilance and prevention which it implies, would not be considered to have 
been exercised if a party planning works liable to affect the regime of the 
river or the quality of its waters did not undertake an environmental impact 
assessment on the potential effects of such work. 70 
 
With respect to the allegation that the construction had caused transboundary damage to 
Argentina or would have an adverse impact on the quality of waters, the court relied on the 
parties’ arguments and concluded that there was no conclusive evidence to indicate that 
Uruguay has failed to act with due diligence, therefore there was no breach of substantive 
obligations under the Treaty.  
Furthermore, states can use their resources as they like but they should ensure their activities 
do not violate the rights of other states in accordance with the provision of Draft Articles on 
the Prevention of Trans Boundary Harm from Hazardous Activities. The International Law 
Commission adopted the draft in 2001. The draft addressed state responsibility and provided 
some principles to be complied with including the Principle of Prevention. For example, Article 
3 of the Draft states that “The State of origin shall take all appropriate measures to prevent 
significant transboundary harm or at any event to minimise the risk thereof”71 In addition, the 
International Court of Justice reaffirmed in the Chozou Factory’s case72 that it is a fundamental 
rule of international law that efforts should be made for reparation for any wrong a state has 
done including breaking the international law. This case involved Germany and Poland and is 
related to violation of international agreement and the court is required to consider whether 
Poland had breached bipartite agreement. Germany agreed to handover the control of Silesia 
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Upper area to Poland on condition that Poland would not damage German’s property and 
Poland agreed. However, Poland breached the agreement and forfeited two of Germany’s 
companies located at Upper Silesia area. The Court held that Poland had breached the 
international agreement between the two countries and therefore, liable to compensate 
Germany for the loss. Equally, it is an established principle of international law that a breach 
of an international agreement creates a duty to make reparation. The court however concluded 
that: 
…it is a principle of international law, and a general conception of the law 
that any violation of an agreement involves an obligation to make 
reparation. Reparation is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply 
convention, and there is no need for this to be mentioned in the convention.73 
 
Consequently, this fact is recognised by European Union and it has reflected in the Treaty on 
the functioning of the European Union. It is pertinent to point out some of its relevant article 
to this research before discussing Polluter Pays Principle.  Article 191 (2) indicates that: 
 Union policy on the environment shall aim at high level of protection taking 
into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Union. 
It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that 
preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a 
priority be rectified at source and that the polluter pays.74 
 
It is observed that the above Article incorporates two elementary principles of sustainable 
development law, the principle of a sensible use of natural resources as well as the 
precautionary principle. Additionally, the article referred to other two important elements, the 
polluter pays principle and the principle of prevention. Frances on this point argues that Article 
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191 TFEU formed the basis of European Union environmental law and laid down interpretative 
base for the European Court of Justice”.75 
5.7 The ‘polluter pays’ principle 
The above mentioned principle was introduced by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (‘OECD’) as a recommendation on international economic aspect of 
Environmental law in 1972.76 Initially, the principle began as a principle of economic thinking 
and its objective was to avoid economic distortions of the market, not to  tackle environmental 
problems and it was not created for the sake of the environment.77 The objective was to reduce 
the pollution to a certain degree accepted by governments and therefore limit it to partial 
internationalisation. He justifies his argument by referring to the text of the Recommendation 
which specifies that: 
 …allocation of costs of pollution prevention and control measures to 
encourage rational use of scarce environmental resources and to avoid 
distortions in international trade and investment is the so-called “Polluter 
Pays Principle”. This principle means that the polluter should bear the 
expenses of carrying out the above-mentioned measures decided by public 
authorities to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state. In other 
worlds, the cost of these measures should be reflected in the cost of goods 
and services which cause pollution in production and / or consumption. 
Such measures should not be accompanied by subsidies that would create 
significant distortions in international trade and investment.78 
 
Furthermore, the ‘polluter pays’ principle has been extended to cover the issues of liability. It 
was utilised as a principle of liability and rectification in accordance with the principle of delict 
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and tort, in addition to being regarded as principle of cost allocation as argued above. For 
example, it was adopted by the council on OECD’s recommendation concerning the 
Application of the polluter pays principle to accidental pollution.79 The Recommendation 1989 
provides under application of the Polluter-pays principle that: 
In matters of accidental pollution risks, the polluter-pays principle implies 
that the operator of a hazardous installation should bear the cost of 
reasonable measures to prevent and control accidental pollution from that 
installation which are introduced by public authorities in conformity with 
domestic law prior to the occurrence of an accident in order to protect 
human health or the environment.80 
 
It is noted from OECD Recommendation 1989 that for the Recommendation to be more 
effective, the polluter is required to bear the cost of preventive measures of accidental pollution 
of hazardous installations. Public funds can therefore be used for a State’s other needs. 
Environmental justice campaigners believe the above provision signalled a complete 
internalisation of costs related to polluting activities since governments have been empowered 
to legislate to tackle environmental problems. Additionally, the polluter pays principle has 
further appeared in various environmental laws, EU Directives and agreements as briefly 
mentioned above under Article 191 (2) of TFEU. In addition, this principle is globally 
reaffirmed in Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration which provides that: 
National authorities should endeavour to promote the internationalisation of 
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into 
account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of 
pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting 
international trade and investment.81 
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It is observed that the polluter pays principle is introduced as a control and command 
approaches and was included in the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment 
of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention) 1992. This Convention provides that the cost 
of reduction measures and pollution control or prevention should be paid by the polluters. It is 
argued that this Principle’s objective is to ensure the polluter is responsible directly or 
indirectly for the pollution costs and therefore, applies to the person, either legal or natural, in 
charge of the polluting activity.82 It has also been argued that the ‘polluter pays’ principle has 
evolved to allocate the cost of pollution to potential polluters by the authorities of the state 
concerned to ensure polluters compensate the victims of pollution and to require that the 
polluters cover the clean-up cost and pay for emergency response.83 However, it worth noting 
that the principle does not signify a civil liability even though it has developed into a principle 
of international environmental laws. Nevertheless, Bleeker posits that its interpretation can be 
found in both a broad sense and a strict sense. 84He clarifies further that in the principle’s strict 
sense, it requires that the polluter pays the cost of pollution control and prevention. While in 
the broad sense, it extends the polluters responsibility to cover other costs such as taxes, 
charges, compensation for the victims and clean-up costs.85 Some scholars posit that the 
polluter pays principle possesses certain functions such as redistribution function, an economic 
integration, a curative and a preventive function.86 
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As analysed above, the polluter pays principle plays a crucial role and it has been regarded as 
cornerstone of environmental regulation and principle of liability.87  The principle indicates 
that the cost of environmental pollution and the externalities shall be integrated and borne by 
the polluters. This is welcomed by environmental justice campaigners because the principle is 
seen as a response to the demand for effective equitable distribution of the burden and damages 
linked with polluting activities,particularly, the provision which makes it an obligation for the 
polluters to bear the costs of pollution prevention including social costs.88 
As analysed above, the precautionary principle, like the preventive principle and polluter pays 
principle are three main principles of environmental laws. It is observed that the precautionary 
principle is closely linked with the principle of prevention which is regarded as a sort of golden 
rule and a beacon of environmental law.89 It is further observed that the principle of prevention 
on the international level brought about the state obligation not to cause harm to the 
environment of other states as established in principle 2 of the Rio Declaration and the principle 
21 of the Stockholm Declaration as well as decision of the Trail Smelter case which addressed 
the issue of states’ obligation to prevent transboundary harm and invoked the polluter pays 
principle. It is noted that prior to this case, the polluter pays principle had never been used or 
applied in an international context. 90 Therefore, in national and international context, as well 
as European Union Law, it can be argued that numerous legislation and environmental laws 
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have implemented the principle of prevention. The EU Directive on wastes has been carefully 
considered in this chapter as well as TFEU which required state members to take precautionary 
measures to prevent harm to human health and the environment.  Above all, it has been argued 
that legal mechanism such as principles of environmental laws have laid down certain rules 
that those who cause foreseeable and significant harm to the environment and to others should 
be held responsible for the damage resulting from their activities or omissions.91 
5.8 The extent to which environmental principles have been used by the state 
It is pertinent to discuss how the existences of principles and environmental laws have helped 
some of the host states to reduce environmental problems. This section focuses on how selected 
countries have shown their commitments and implemented their environmental obligations as 
required by international law for the running and preservation of their natural resources.  
Nigeria 
Nigeria signed the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCC) in 1992 and 
ratified it 1994.92 This Convention was regarded as the first global agreement to address the 
problem of climate change arising out of greenhouse gases. Equally, Nigeria signed the Kyoto 
Protocol and ratified it 1998 but only became effective in 2005. In addition, there are several 
legal mechanisms contained in different Acts of Parliament regulating environmental problems 
and liability in Nigeria. However, this section discusses the most relevant pieces of law on oil 
because the sector has been regarded as the major cause of environmental pollution in Nigeria.  
Some of these legislations will be evaluated and references will be made to other relevant laws, 
where appropriate. 
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As analysed below, Nigeria has enacted many laws to protect the environment and to improve 
the quality of air. Associated Gas Re-injection Act and Regulations 1979 makes gas flaring 
unlawful and stipulated that oil companies should end the practice by 1984, otherwise they 
would be liable for a fine if the activity continued beyond the deadline. However, the Act was 
amended in the same year and provided for an exemption for gas flaring in certain 
circumstances, but the Minister of Petroleum Resources’ consent must be obtained. Similarly, 
the Associated Gas Re-injection Act of 2004 demands for detailed programme of oil 
companies’ activities relating to gas in oilfields in Nigeria. The Act of 2004 has similar 
provision as previously mentioned Act which prohibits gas flaring. In addition, the Nigeria 
Management Act on Environmental Draft 2000 is another piece of legislation formulated to 
deal with gas flaring cases in Nigeria. The Act makes it unlawful for individuals and oil 
companies to flare gas while making it an obligation for the Minister of the Environment to 
ensure gas flaring is banned, even though, the Minister can use his discretion to permit gas 
flaring in certain circumstances.  
 The importance of the Oil Pipeline Act 1956 cannot be overemphasised because it addresses 
the issue of liability and compensation to be given to victims of oil pollutions.  However, one 
critic has argued that this Act was created to protect the interests of oil companies from the 
unnecessary burdens that such legislation might impose on them.93 It was clear from the text 
of the Act that it was created “to make provision for licences to be granted for the establishment 
and maintenance of pipelines incidental and supplementary to oilfields and oil mining and for 
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the purposes ancillary to such pipelines”.94 Section 11 (5) of the Act addresses the issue of 
compensation and provides that:  
…the holder of a licence shall pay compensation- 
(a) To any person whose land or interest in land (Whether or not it is land 
respect of which the licence has been granted) is injuriously affected by the 
exercise of the rights conferred by the licence, for any such injurious 
affection not otherwise made good; and  
(b) to any person suffering damage by reason of any neglected on the part of 
the holder or his agents, servant or workmen to protect, maintain or repair 
any work structure or thing executed under the licence, for any such damage 
not otherwise made good; and  
(c) to any person suffering damage (other than on account of his own default or 
on account of the malicious act of a third person) as a consequence of any 
breakage of or leakage from the pipeline or an ancillary installation, for any 
such damage not otherwise made good.  
 
 
It is noted from the above provision that the oil company’s interest is protected when the 
pipeline incident is related to an act of vandalism or sabotage. The law has made it clear that 
compensation would be payable to the victims, if the injuries occurred because of direct activity 
of the oil company, otherwise, the licensee would not be held liable. This provision shows a 
degree of unfairness towards innocent victims of pipeline sabotage, it means the victims of oil-
spills resulting from an act of vandalism by the third party are not protected under the law. The 
Act makes no provision for innocent victims, rather it denies them the opportunity to benefit 
from the provision under the Act. It could, therefore, be argued that oil companies are exempted 
by law from paying compensation in the event of any oil-spill incident. Omukoro posits on this 
point that sabotage of oil pipeline which resulted in oil spill on water or land has the potential 
to leave several communities without the means to cater for themselves and with no remedy in 
law.95Eben added that this provision has been hijacked by most transnational corporations 
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operating in the Niger Delta region as an exit window through which victims affected by oil 
spills are neglected without compensation.96 It is reported that land and water in the Delta 
region are widely contaminated by Oil spills, negatively affecting aquatic and terrestrial 
creatures.97 The indigenous communities see incidents of pollution as a threat and violation of 
their fundamental rights in connection with the management and use of water, land and natural 
resources that they believe belong to them by way of usage and tradition. It is further reported 
that the Niger Delta region of Nigeria is rich in biological diversity and to be specific, marine 
life which is perceived as a source of sustenance for the communities.98 Consequently, the 
grievances of innocent victims of sabotage which resulted in oil-spillage and pollution are not 
being carefully considered under the above provision and it could prove to be problematic if 
left unattended to, since these indigenous communities rely solely on their environment for 
their survival. While the legislation has, to a certain degree, protected the transnational 
corporations by providing that they could not be held liable for the wrongful and criminal act 
of a third party, there is no provision under the law to protect the victims of pipeline sabotage. 
The critic of the provision therefore posits that if anyone should be hurt owing to the actions 
of a third party, should that person be an innocent victim who stands to benefit nothing directly 
from the profits of oil exploration? 99 He further concluded that the primary motive behind the 
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Oil and Pipeline Act (1956) was the protection of transnational corporations’ interest and that 
the interests of innocent victims were a secondary objective.100 
It is observed that the Oil and Pipelines Act (1956) failed to safeguard the interests of innocent 
victims of oil pollution as a result of pipelines sabotage. It is argued that there are substantial 
numbers of indigenous people who may suffer damage without protection or remedy in court 
of law simply because their interests were not catered for by the Oil and Pipelines Act.101 The 
government of Nigeria however, enacted Petroleum and Distribution (Anti Sabotage) Act 1975, 
in an attempt to reduce acts of vandalism and oil pipelines sabotage. This Act makes it unlawful 
for individual to deliberately sabotage petroleum pipeline. For example, S.1 of the Acts 
provides that: 
     “(1) Any person who does any of the following things, that is to say 
(a) wilfully does anything with intent to obstruct or prevent the production or 
distribution of petroleum products in any part of Nigeria; or 
(b) wilfully does anything with intent to obstruct or prevent the procurement of 
petroleum products for distribution in any part of Nigeria; or 
(c) wilfully does anything in respect of any vehicle or any public highway with 
intent to obstruct or prevent the use of that vehicle or that public highway 
for the distribution of petroleum products, 
Shall if by doing that thing he, to significant extent, causes or contributes to 
any interruption in the production or distribution of petroleum products in 
any part of Nigeria, be guilty of the offence of sabotage under this Act”.102 
Section 2 of the Act provides that: 
…Any person who commits an offence of sabotage under section 1 of this 
Act, shall be liable on conviction to be sentenced either to death or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 21 years.103 
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It is noted that the above provision addressed only the case of wilful damage of petroleum 
pipelines but failed to render any assistance for the innocent victims of environmental pollution 
arising therefrom. Adangor noted that those provisions are mere deterrent against wilful 
sabotage which enable transnational corporations to use sabotage as a defence to claims 
initiated by innocent victims who have suffered from oil spills.104 Another commentator argues 
that the reason law makers have excluded the innocent victims of sabotage in the provision 
could be due to fears that indigenous communities in the Delta region can frustrate the process 
of petroleum development.105 Amnesty International’s report has revealed that transnational 
corporations have claimed and relied on sabotage prior to investigation to establish the cause 
of oil spills. This was the case with the leaking pipeline at Bodo which experts later concluded 
was owing to a corrosion failure.106Another commentator has added that, in the past, oil 
companies attempted to use the sabotage as a defence to shy away from their responsibilities 
when it was not right to do so.107 
In view of these commentators’ arguments, it could be suggested that there should be a 
provision within the law to protect the interests of innocent victims of pipeline sabotage, rather 
than excluding them in an outright fashion. They should be given a chance to participate in 
decision making on exploration related matters that may affect their interest as this may enable 
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the community to benefit from the petroleum resources which is important for their survival. 
Another way to avoid tensions between the local community and oil companies operating in 
the region could be by putting in place pipelines monitoring mechanism inform to shut down 
the leakage of oil in the event of any sabotage or pipeline rupture. This practice ensures the 
best practice as required by law that exploration and exploitation of oil in Nigeria which should 
be carried out according to good oil-field practices”.108 
Another important piece of legislation that cannot be ignored is the Petroleum Drilling and 
Production Regulation 1969. It is a relevant piece of legislation enacted to regulate oil 
production and exploration activities in oil industry in Nigeria. It sets out obligations and rights 
of licenses as well as lessees and requires that exploration and exploitation activities are 
monitored and supervised. Initially, it was welcomed and accepted because of its provisions 
for protection of the land, water and promotion of a healthy environment. One of its strengths 
is the provision for process of abandonment of oil wells and the requirement that licensees 
should maintain accurate information and record keeping.  However, it was criticised for the 
lack of a provision in the regulation to deal with cases of non-compliance.  The provisions were 
perceived as ineffective because the law lacks enforcement mechanism, it cannot be enforced; 
it has no provisions for fines and penalties. Above all, it encourages lack of transparency by 
stipulating that detailed information given by licenses be kept confidential. 
The Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1968 is another piece of legislation that established that the 
government of Nigeria is determined to minimise the incidences of sea pollution. The Act was 
enacted in order to implement the terms of the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution of the Sea by Oil Acts of 1954 and 1962. Additionally, the Act was required to make 
provisions for prevention in the Nigeria’s navigable waters. It is noted that the Act addresses 
                                                          





oil pollution from oil refineries and pipelines which are regarded as one of the main sources of 
environmental pollution in the country.109 Section 3 of the Act covers the incident of pollution 
resulting from exploration activities and gas operations in Nigeria. The Section provides that; 
(1) If any oil or mixture containing oil is discharged into waters to which 
this section applies from any vessel, or from any place on land, or from 
any apparatus used for transferring oil from por to any vessel (whether 
to or from a place on land or to or from another vessel), then subject to 
the provisions of this Act- 
(a) if the discharge is from a vessel, the owner or master of the vessel; or 
(b) if the discharge is from a place on land, the occupier of that place; or 
(c) if the discharge is from apparatus used for transferring oil from or to a 
vessel, the person in charge of the apparatus, is guilty of an offence 
under this section.110 
 
It is argued that the above legislation is an instrument that may be relied upon to minimise the 
incidents of oil pollution and environmental problems.111 However, the law was criticised 
because it shows an imbalance between environmental and economic considerations.112 For 
instance, it is argued that the true intention of the law makers is to make any attempt or omission 
a criminal act which violates the legislation. There is no provision whatsoever within the Act 
for victims of oil spills, they cannot claim damages or seek compensation directly from the 
masters or the owners of the ship by bringing an action in court due to a number of defences 
available under section 4 of the Act. For example, provisions in Section 4 of the Act provide a 
defence for an offence charged under section 1 above. The polluter only needs to prove that 
the oil discharge was to prevent destruction to the cargo or ship or for the purpose of saving 
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life and that the polluter has taken reasonable steps to contain the discharge and minimise its 
effect on the environment. Section 4 of the Act provides that: 
(1) Where a person is charged with an offence under section 1 of this Act, or is 
charged with an offence under section 3 of this Act as the owner or master 
of a vessel, it shall be a defence to prove that the oil or mixture in question 
was discharged for the purpose of securing the safety of any vessel, or of 
preventing damage to any vessel or cargo of saving life: 
 
Provided that a defence under this subsection shall not have effect if the 
court is satisfied that the discharge of the oil or mixture was not necessary 
for the purpose alleged in the defence or was not a reasonable step to take 
in the circumstances.”113 
(2) Where a person is charged as mentioned in subsection (1) of this section, it 
shall also be a defence to prove 
(a) That the oil or mixture escaped in consequence of damage to the vessel, and 
that as soon as practicable after the damage occurred all reasonable steps 
were taken for preventing, or (if it could not be prevented) for stopping or 
reducing, the escape of oil or mixture; or 
(b) that the oil or mixture escaped by reason of leakage, that the leakage was 
not due to any want of reasonable care, and that as soon as practicable after 
the escape was discovered all reasonable steps were taken for stopping or 
reducing it.”114 
(3) “Where a person is charged with an offence under section 3 of this Act as 
the occupier of a place on land, or as the person in charge of any apparatus, 
from which oil or a mixture containing oil is alleged to have escaped, it shall 
be a defence to prove that the escape of the oil or mixture was not due to 
any want reasonable care, and that as soon as practicable after the escape 
was discovered all reasonable steps were taken for stopping or reducing 
it.”115 
(4) “Without prejudice to subsection (3) of this section, it shall be a defence for 
the occupier of a place on land, who is charged with an offence under the 
last preceding section, to prove that the discharge was caused by the act of 
a person who was in that place without the permission (express or implied) 
of the occupier”.116 
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From the provision above, one critic argued that human errors should not be used as pillars of 
defence.117 He believes the leakage, escape and discharge of oil from vessels could be 
prevented by proper maintenance and if vessel operators fail to live up to their expectations, 
the position of the law should be clearly stated. The words ‘reasonable’ and ‘practicable’ should 
spell out certain standards and what type of the ship’s damage that can lead to discharge of oil 
into the water. Any leakage of the oil into the water due to improper maintenance should not 
be encouraged and escape or leakage should never be allowed as a measure of self-defence. 
The effect of defences could be too costly for the victims of environmental damage from such 
lawful leakage. For instance, the rights of the indigenous fisherman whose fishing rights have 
been deprived by certain discharge might have no protection in law and on this point, Omukoro 
posits that Oil in Navigable Waters Act (1968) does not cover the interest of victims of 
environmental pollution and it might be difficult to hold a polluter liable because of the 
defences under the Act which could be pleaded by the polluters.118 Nevertheless, having 
exceptions under the Act in relation to environmental issues is not peculiar to only Nigeria. 
What matters most is to have effective mechanism to monitor the permissible level of oil 
discharge. The United Kingdom for example has similar provisions under the Prevention of 
Oil Pollution Act 1971, a careful examination of which is necessary. 
Section 6 of the Act provides that;  
(1) “Where a person is charged, in respect of the escape of any oil or mixture 
containing oil, with an offence under section 2 or 3 of this Act 
… 
(b) as a person carrying on operations for the exploration of the sea-bed and 
subsoil or the exploitation of their natural resources; or 
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(c) as the owner of a pipe-line, 
It shall be a defence to prove that neither the escape nor any delay in 
discovering it was due to any want of reasonable care and that as soon as 
practicable after it was discovered all reasonable steps were taken for 
stopping or reducing it”.119 
(2)” Where a person is charged with an offence under section 2 of this Act 
in respect of the discharge of a mixture containing oil from a place on land, 
it shall also, subject to subsection (3) of this section, be a defence to prove- 
(a) that the oil was contained in an effluent produced by operations for the 
refining of oil; 
(b) that it was not reasonably practicable to dispose of the effluent 
otherwise than by discharging it into waters to which section applies; and 
(c) that all reasonably practicable steps had been taken for eliminating oil 
from the effluent”.120 
  (3)  If it is proved that, at a time to which the charge relates, the surface of 
the waters into which the mixture was discharged from the place on land, or 
land adjacent to those waters, was fouled by oil, subsection (2) of this 
section shall not apply unless the court is satisfied that the fouling was not 
caused, or contributed to, by oil contained in any effluent discharged at or 
before that time from that place.121 
 
It is noted from the above provisions that the UK has a robust system in place to ensure that 
the environment is protected. The Act provided for several defences as did Nigeria, but a 
critical study of the UK Act reveals that section 6 subsection 3 of the Act explained the 
circumstances where defences may not be relied upon and such vital provisions were omitted 
under the Nigerian Act. The effect of fouling in the sea from oil discharge is addressed under 
the UK Act unless the court is satisfied that the fouling was not caused by oil discharge. It is 
evident from incident of water pollution and oil spill around the world122 that release of the oil 
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in the waters is considered a serious environmental problem. The effects have grown the public 
attention towards environmental justice because of the resultant damage, including the death 
of marine mammals and oiled seabirds. Besides, the UK Act makes it mandatory to report123 a 
discharge of oil into water and failure to comply with the reporting requirements would make 
the operator liable for a fine or a summary conviction.124 In addition, the UK judicial review 
proceedings allow public and environmental groups to take actions if there is proof that 
government decision on environmental issues are against the public interest, but they must 
show that they had a sufficient interest in the challenged matter.125 Judicial review is relevant 
on environmental issues which are not political and it is a procedure by which the High Court 
can review an administrative action by a public body and secure a declaration or an order of 
the court against infringement of public law rights as discussed below in EX parte Greenpeace 
cases where it is established that the public interest factor outweighed the general principle 
application. 
The liability for pollution resulting from exploration activities in Norway is also worthy of 
mention. It is governed by the Petroleum Act (1996) and based on a rule of strict liability with 
no consideration of any fault with the exception and a reduced liability in certain circumstances. 
For example, if the cause of pollution is an act of God, an act of war and any circumstances 
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beyond the control of the operators or the licensee. It is pertinent to look at some of the relevant 
chapters of the Norwegian Petroleum Act; 
Chapter 7-1 of the Act defines pollution damage, facility and part of facility as follow;  
Pollution damage means damage or loss caused by pollution as a 
consequence of effluence or discharge of petroleum from facility, including 
a well, and costs of reasonable measures to avert or limit such damage or 
such loss, as well as damage or loss as a consequence of such measures. 
Damage or loss incurred by fishermen as a consequence of reduced 
possibilities for fishing is also included in pollution damage.  
Ships used for stationary drilling are regarded as facility. Ships used for 
storage of petroleum in conjunction with production facilities are regarded 
as part of the facility. The same applies to ships for transport of petroleum 
during the time when loading from the facility takes place.126 
 
  Furthermore, Section 7-3 of the Act addresses the liable party and the extent of liability. it 
provides that: 
The licensee is liable for pollution damage without regard to fault. The 
provisions relating to the liability of licensees apply correspondingly to an 
operator who is not a licensee when the Ministry has so decided in 
connection with the approval of operator status. 
… 
If it is demonstrated that an inevitable event of nature, act of war, exercise 
of public authority or a similar force majeure event has contributed to a 
considerable degree to the damage or its extent under circumstances which 
are beyond the control of the liable party, the liability may be reduced to the 
extent it is reasonable, with particular consideration to the scope of the 
activity, the situation of the party that has sustained damage and the 
opportunity for taking out insurance on both sides.127 
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It is observed that the Norwegian Petroleum Act enforces strict liability for environmental 
pollution and damage on the licensee and operator. It is further noted that issues of liability 
arising out of exploration activities including compensation are adequately dealt with by the 
national law. This legislation was put in place to ensure offshore oil exploration activities are 
conducted in a manner that would safeguard the environment and health and wellbeing of its 
citizens. Section 7-3 above clearly stipulated that the licensee is liable for pollution damage 
irrespective of any fault. It is further noted from the Act that liability is directed to the licensee 
alone and excluded other participants in the exploration operations such as employees and 
suppliers.128 The victims of pollution damage cannot claim damages from other participants. 
Amukoro added that Norway’s liability regime is the same with its petroleum policy and that 
has contributed to its success story. He believes that the country has set the right standards that 
others could emulate.129 It is thus affirmed that Norway has struck a right balance between 
protecting transnational corporations’ interests and protecting the environment with its 
petroleum policy and liability regime compared to Nigeria’s Oil in Water Navigable Act (1968) 
which sets out a light punishment for the pollution damage.  Nigeria could follow Norway’s 
good practice and make violation of its Oil in Navigable waters Act a punishable offence 
regardless of possible cause and reason for pollution and discharge of oil into its waters. In the 
light of this, it is pertinent to examine the current penalties for offences under Section 6 of the 
Nigerian Water in Navigable Act which provides that: 
A person guilty of an offence under section 1, 3 and 5 of this Act shall, on 
conviction by a High Court or a superior court or on summary conviction 
by any court of inferior jurisdiction, be liable to a fine: Provided that an 
offence shall not by virtue of this section be punishable on summary 
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conviction by a court having jurisdiction inferior to that of a High Court by 
a fine exceeding N2, 000.130 
 
The monetary fine under section 6 of Oil in Navigable Waters Act is perceived by one critic as 
inadequate and this is said to have made the Act ineffective and ‘a toothless bull dog’.131 The 
N2000 is a small amount of money compared to the effect of discharging oil into the water. In 
addition, the purpose of penalty imposed by the government is to deter people from breaking 
the law of the land, therefore, the punishment should reflect the gravity to prevent people from 
breaking the law or committing the offence. The amount of fine under section 6 can be afforded 
by operators and they may continue to discharge oil believing that such act will accumulate 
more than the fine of N2000 into their wallet. Ajayi has expressed his concerns that the fine is 
too light, advising the government to replace it with a tougher sanction such as revocation or 
suspension of the licence, heavy fine and possibly imprisonment.132 It is believed that such 
measures will deter people from deliberately discharging oil into Nigeria’s navigable waters or 
causing environmental pollution. Nevertheless, the Act prohibits discharging of oil into waters, 
making it an offence and specifying that the master of the ship or the owner responsible for 
discharge would be guilty of an offence under section 1 and 3 of the Act. 
Consequently, it is established that Nigeria has enacted a series of pieces of legislation in order 
to minimise the incidents of oil spillage, some of which have been analysed in this chapter and 
various weaknesses have been highlighted. These statutes are far from achieving their aims and 
objectives and thus, Nigeria’s law makers should ensure the provisions of the statutes address 
environmental problems and meet international best standards. The Nigerian Government’s 
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commitment at a national level to make the spillage of oil into its Navigable waters a punishable 
offence is also acknowledged, but the disturbing fact is existence of the highlighted loopholes 
in the laws which allowed the transnational corporations to manipulate the policy by paying 
small amount of fine (N2000) rather than embarking on environmentally sustainable projects. 
Subsequently, the Nigerian government enacted a law to address some of the highlighted 
weaknesses. Nigeria Management Act on Environmental Draft, 2000 (NEMACT) made it a 
criminal offence and liability for an individual and corporate to flare gases. The Act gives the 
Minister of the Environment the power to ban gas flaring and a discretionary power to allow it 
in certain circumstances. The Act further provides for harsh punishment and fines for breaking 
the law. Subsection (4) provides that: 
Any person who violates the provisions of Sub-section (2) or (3) of this 
section commits an offence and shall on conviction be liable to a fine not 
exceeding N500,000,000.00 (Five Hundred Million Naira).”133 
In addition to the fine under subsection (4) it further provides at subsection 
(5) that; 
… the Chairman, Managing Director and the Directors of the body 
corporate at the time the offence was committed shall be liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years each.134 
 
The government initiative on the NEMACT was welcomed as the right and strict legislation 
needed to address the environmental problems. Supporters of the 2000 draft argued that this 
type of law is unprecedented in Nigeria’s history particularly for environmental protection 
because they believe international oil companies have been operating without obligation to 
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ensure human health and environment are protected.135 Ironically, NEMACT ended up as a 
mere draft and never became an Act of Parliament. While perpetrators are held liable for 
causing pollution damage in developed countries, there are identified challenges which 
impeded the implementation and enforcement of international environmental laws particularly 
in developing countries. The following paragraphs examine some of the obstacles encountered 
by these developing countries in implementing relevant laws.   
5.9 Some of the challenges facing environmental principles and their implementation in 
developing countries 
It is established from the previous section that some of the international environmental laws 
led to the creation of national laws to address the impact of environmental problems such as 
marine pollution, air quality, water and waste disposal. The countries around the world have 
signed up to several international conventions and many laws and policies have been created 
to fulfil their obligations under those Conventions. Nevertheless, there are challenges and 
obstacles in implementing some principles of international environmental laws in countries 
like Nigeria which include; corruption, the lack of governmental initiative, low education, lack 
of finance, poverty, poor administration coupled with other social, economic and political 
problems. Thomas Sterner posits that “many institutions in developing countries are multi-
ethnic oriented which has led to nepotism and corruption hence making it difficult to implement 
environmental policy and the choice of policy instrument.” 136 Mui also supports Sterne’s view 
and argues that in an ethnically diverse society, corruption and bribery within environmental 
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agencies and judiciary systems are likely to weaken the effectiveness and success of 
environmental principles137. These factors will be evaluated in the following paragraphs. 
5.9.1 The lack of Public awareness about environmental laws and policies 
The starting point is transparency which is encouraged by Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration. 
It provides that people should be given access to relevant environmental information kept by 
the State. The public need to be well informed of government’s plans and agenda on 
environmental issues as doing so would create public awareness. Rose, on this point, argues 
that “good environmental governance may be enhanced by the government transparency, 
provided in the form of freely available public access to information concerning environmental 
management”138 Environmental information could be provided and made accessible to the 
public in different forms, for example, electronic, print or social media such as television, radio, 
the internet, journals and newspapers to name but a few.  These offer an opportunity for the 
host state to create public awareness in its environmental laws and policies. For instance, social 
networks such as Instagram, Facebook and Twitter may be used to create awareness and carry 
the public along in the implementation of environmental legislations and policies. The 
government can also use the media to intensify its effort on public education by broadcasting 
environmental programmes in the native languages of host communities to overcome the 
language barrier. Media and social networks can play an important role to enhance public 
awareness and educate people about the likely effects of pipeline sabotage and vandalism. It is 
argued that in many countries, most people engaging in vandalism are not aware of any related 
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laws and would not consider them relevant even if they know about it.139 It was reported by 
Shell that sabotage in Nigeria was the largest cause of spills for Shell, accounting for about 
14,000 tonnes.140 In addition to media and social networks, the government may also create 
educational programmes to enlighten the public on the environmental implications and 
consequences of sabotage of oil pipelines on the economic and the environment where they 
live. Similarly, environmental education could be made a mandatory subject to be studied in 
schools around the country at every level to educate youths who are the leaders of tomorrow.  
Furthermore, the United Nations encourage governments of  developing countries to improve 
the living standards of people believed to be living below the poverty line because doing so 
will enhance public awareness in relation to the environmental problems and may allow them 
to act as the protectors of the environment.141 This idea was supported by Ekpeyong when he 
argued that illiteracy and poverty are the causes of environmental problems because he believes 
that uneducated and poor people are bothered with the issues relating to their daily survival 
than environmental degradation and the lack of awareness could lead to reckless environmental 
behaviour.142 The United Nations in another conference stressed further that with an easy 
access to environmental information; the people have better understanding and knowledge of 
the impacts of their activities on the environment and are able to take part in decision making 
processes that affect the environment.143 Consequently, the government in developing 
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countries should be more transparent and invest more on educating people on environmental 
programmes as this may enhance public awareness and minimise incidents of pipeline sabotage 
and vandalism within the country.  
The source of environmental challenges such as water contamination can also be from a 
neighbouring state. This as well may be controlled by effective communication and exchange 
of information between the affected regions. It is therefore pertinent to look at the regional 
arrangement and what provisions are available to overcome such challenges under International 
Conventions.  
5.9.2 Regional Arrangements  
Regional Arrangement is identified as one of the obstacles that is affecting the implementation 
of environmental laws because many states share regional waters and if there is contamination 
in one region, it is likely to cause harm to species and habitats of neighbouring countries. This 
is envisaged by the United Nations under the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory 
Species of Wild Animals (CMS). This Convention recognises the exchange of crucial 
information between regions and neighbouring states. It aims to conserve aquatic, migratory 
and terrestrial species. The treaty was established under the UN environmental programme 
which takes care of the conservation of habitats and wildlife on international scale.  
The CMS provides for several obligations and encourages parties to protect Migratory Species 
while requiring further that the places where they are located should be preserved and any 
factors which can endanger them should be adequately controlled. This Convention is regarded 
as the main framework which advises member states to create regional or international 
agreements that can be tailored to the needs of each region.  Many agreements have been 
formulated as a result the CMS, namely; the Agreement on the Conservation of Small 
Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas 1992 as amended in 2003 (ASCOBANS), the Africa 





the Black Sea and Cetaceans Area (ACCOMAS), the Agreement on the Conservation of 
European Bats and the Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses.144 
In the same vein, Latin Americans have adopted the Convention to Combat Desertification 
(UNCCD) which was established in 1994. This Convention has been regarded by the United 
Nations as the sole legally binding international agreement connecting environment and 
development to sustainable land management.145 In addition, many agreements have also been 
adopted on biodiversity, hazardous waste and climate change under the Central American 
Integration System (SICA). This organ is also known as the institutional framework of 
Regional Integration in Central America with set goals such as establishing ecological order in 
the region and to have a concerted action towards the preservation of the environment just to 
name a few.146 SICA has assisted the Central America Region in implementation of national 
environmental management as well as regional instruments.  
Furthermore, the Pacific Island states have adopted a regional system which has helped them 
to implement international Convention, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer. This treaty was intended to guide and protect the ozone layer by getting rid of 
the production of substances believed to cause ozone depletion.  The treaty received a huge 
ratification and was accepted by many countries including the European Union and for this 
reason it has been regarded as an exceptional international agreement.147 Additionally, The 
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Protocol expects developing states to control the production, consumption, import and export 
of chlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs). The following countries are operating under the provision of 
Article 5 of the Montreal Protocol; the Federal State of Micronesia, Fiji, the kingdom of Tonga, 
Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of Marshal Islands, the Solomon 
Island, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and finally, Western Samoa. It is submitted that developing countries 
are entitled to a longer phase-out period compared to developed countries and the reason for 
this preferential treatment is to address the fact that they do not have easy access to alternative 
technologies, capital investment and know-how for complying with the control measures 
stipulated under the Montreal Protocol. However, both developed and developing countries 
have binding, period-targeted and measurable commitments. It is reported that developed 
countries have been cutting back their HCFCs148 consumption and hoping to phase them out 
by 2020.149 
Nevertheless, the implementation of the Montreal Protocol has benefited human health and is 
regarded as a huge success because the world would have been a different place without the 
provisions of the Montreal Protocol, there would have been a collapse of the ozone layer 
leading to a rise in ultraviolet (UV) radiation in every part of the world with debilitating effects 
on the production of crops and marine life ecosystem. 150 The UNEP report further revealed 
that the implementation of the Montreal Protocol, through the intensive action of the parties 
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since 1987 has protected the health and wellbeing of millions of people around the world.151 In 
addition, the relevance of the agreements considered under this section to the oil and gas 
industry cannot be overemphasised. These agreements were created to protect and preserve the 
environment and its observed that factors that are likely to endanger environment and human 
health should be adequately controlled. Thus, the host state which owned the hydrocarbon 
natural resources is under obligations to ensure that exploration activities are carried out with 
utmost priority given to environmental protection. The number of incidents and cases examined 
in this chapter has established that transnational corporations are responsible for some of the 
major environmental problems and disasters and some of the identified environmental 
problems occurred as a direct result of human activities such as oil and gas exploration and 
exploitation. Consequently, some of the agreements examined here were regarded as the legally 
binding and exceptional international agreements which connected environment and 
development to sustainable land management. For example, the Montreal Protocol encouraged 
the developing states to control the production, consumption, import and export of products 
that are likely to cause harm and damage to human health and environment.  
5.9.3 Lack of Governmental Initiative  
It is pertinent to select Nigeria for a better understanding of this element. The Federal 
Government of Nigeria (FGN) is the highest authority and controls the affairs of the nation. 
The power wielded by the FGN surpasses the power of state and local authorities under the 
Supremacy and Enforcement of Power Decree of 1970. The case of Jonah Gbemre v Shell 
Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Limited152 can be cited to argue that the Nigerian 
government is not willing to enthrone environmental policies which may reduce the harm 
caused to the environment and human health from exploration activities and output of 
                                                          
151 UNEP Website (n 151). 





transnational oil corporations.  In this case, the High Court Judge held that gas flaring violates 
the rights to life and dignity including the right to a clean pollution free and healthy 
environment and Shell was then ordered to stop gas flaring immediately in the plaintiff’s 
community (Iwherekan). Ironically, the judge’s decision to stop the gas flaring was perceived 
by the Federal Government as the one which could slow down economic growth particularly 
at a time the government was planning to increase oil production output in the country. The 
High Court judge was transferred as a result and replaced with a new judge by Federal 
Government without justification. The government capitalised on the provision under the 
above legislation and reinstated oil production. This decision to reinstate exploration activities 
establishes the lack of governmental initiative and commitment in curbing environmental 
problems arising out of exploration activities simply because the oil and gas sector is the 
country’s major investment. In addition, a move to replace the judge in the above case indicates 
that the Nigerian government preferred economic growth over tackling environmental 
problems believing that environmental issues will slow or hinder economic growth. It is noted 
from the World Bank brief that 95% of Nigeria’s earnings and 76% revenues are generated 
through oil industries.153 This clearly shows that Nigerian government relies on the oil industry 
to generate the country’s incomes and it is argued that, neither environmental law nor 
environmental programme has been able to address the priority placed on economic growth in 
majority of poor countries.154 Pam Slater added that many developing countries follow similar 
development strategies which depend heavily on the use natural resources such as petroleum 
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exploration to the detriment of the environment.155 It has also been argued that there is 
dependent relationship between the Federal Government of Nigeria and the transnational 
corporations and certain factors have been pointed out to justify the relationship. For example, 
Nigeria lacks the technology and equipment to embark on exploration activities on its own and 
therefore depends on oil companies’ industries to do so and generate revenue. This may also 
cause the reluctance in regulating transnational corporations’ activities in relation to 
environmental issue due to the fear that regulation may prevent or discourage foreign investors 
particularly in the oil industry. The inability to regulate against exploration activities and its 
environmental impacts has, in turn, become problematic for the big players in the oil and gas 
industry. For example, there have been conflicts due to the negative environmental impact in 
the Niger Delta region of the country and the local people have been kidnapping oil workers, 
sabotaging the pipelines and blowing up oilfields. An oil servicing vessel for Chevron was 
seized by militants and foreign oil workers were held hostage aboard the sea craft.156 This type 
of attack and many more have greatly affected oil production in the country and an academic 
writer posits that environmental degradation, political marginalisation and cultural 
strangulation by the Federal Government of Nigeria and transitional corporations have 
unsettled the region.157 His view is supported by Klaus Toepfer that “when people are denied 
access to clean water, soil and air to meet their basic needs, we see the rise of poverty, ill health 
and a sense of hopelessness. Desperate people can resort to desperate solutions. They may care 
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little about themselves and the people they hurt”.158 In addition, the local people in Delta region 
had limited choice, they had to contend with environmental problems such as water, soil and 
air pollution and on this point Wale Ajal expressed his concerns and concludes that indigenous 
people living in these areas are isolated from their ecological environment. He believes that 
they are marginalised politically, economically and socially.159 While there are many causes of 
the conflict, it is argued that the main cause is the government failure at all levels including 
discriminatory policies which exclude the local people from participating in making the rules 
that will enable them benefit from the oil wealth. 160 The Oil companies in Nigeria have 
reported several losses due to pipelines sabotage. For instance, Shell revealed in one of its 
reports that “for us we lose somewhere between 40,000 and 60,000 barrels, a day to crude 
theft.”161 It is also observed that the so-called Martyrs Brigade blew up Nigeria National 
Petroleum Corporation’s pipelines (NNPC) in Edo State which affected oil production and the 
spill caused damage to the environment. About 180,000 barrels of crude oil was suspended per 
day because of the closure of one of its stations located in Bonny.162 Similarly, the Shell Nigeria 
Exploration and Production Company’s vessel was attacked and about 225,000 barrels of crude 
oil per day was shut-down as a result.163   It is observed that the sabotage of oil pipelines has 
significantly reduced the country oil production capacity. The economic development of 
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Nigeria is also dependent on the way the natural resources are managed both human and 
environmental. However, it could be suggested that for the country to develop without 
depleting natural resources or causing further environmental problems, the government needs 
to show initiative and willingness to strike the right balance between the country’s economic 
growth and environmental needs by way of regulations and policies. This can be achieved with 
cooperation and help from local communities as well as support from transnational 
corporations because they play a decisive role in economic development of the countries where 
they operate. Until amicable solutions are agreed from all parties involved, environmental 
degradations and other forms of environmental problems will persist.  
It is established from the above that despite the efforts to minimise environmental degradation 
through international environmental laws and United Nations Conventions, the identified 
challenges at national level need to be addressed for effective implementation of international 
conventions and environmental laws in developing countries. One of the factors discussed was 
the lack of host state’s initiative to tackle environmental problems mainly for economic 
reasons. It is also noted that lack of modern technology and highly skilled personnel had forced 
majority of developing countries to rely on transnational corporations to generate revenue. The 
adoption of Production Sharing Agreement evaluated in chapter 3 of this research can play a 
significant role to enable the host state to acquire necessary technology needed for exploration. 
The PSA enables the host state to keep the technology used for the exploitation and exploration 
of oil and at the same time, the provision of local content within the agreement would allow 
them to train their indigenous engineers to be experts in the petroleum industry. Besides, local 
content was introduced as long-term socio-economic development strategy which encourages 





building.164 It is established that the rationale behind the local content includes local factors 
such as political, economic and social environmental factors.165 It is also the aim of the host 
state to allow short-term foreign investment in order to create local participation in the oil 
industry in the long-term.  In addition, clauses on environmental protection can be inserted into 
petroleum agreements because it is claimed that environmental issues had not been given the 
right attention in such agreements. It is noted from the World Bank’s survey on Environmental 
Impact Assessments (EIAs) that “much of the emphasis of the EIAs process appears directed 
towards the approval of oil and gas projects, rather than to a life cycle approach for minimizing 
environmental and social impact”.166 The host state should ensure that oil and gas agreement 
does not focus only on the potential economic benefits for the country but provide obligations 
for the host state and transnational corporations to safeguard economic, environment and 
community rights.  
Public awareness in tackling environmental problems had been thoroughly investigated and it 
is established that media and social network can play important roles to enhance public 
awareness of certain environmental regulations and policies. Notwithstanding, the host state 
may need to strengthen the effort to educate the public and provide some essential amenities to 
improve the poor people’s standard of living as emphasised by the United Nations. In relation 
to the issue of transparency, it is understood that the host state must be more transparent and 
ensure environmental information is available and can be accessed by the public. This would 
enhance public knowledge and the likely consequences of causing damage to the environment. 
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The local people have a crucial role to play in economic development of the country as well as 
environmental management as Nwapi points out, local people have knowledge of the 
environment where they live and this is important to the conservation and sustainable use of 
natural resources which can facilitate local adaptability.167 Importantly, local participation in 
exploration activities is recognised and encouraged by the following provisions; Agenda 21 of 
the Rio Declaration, principle 22, the Desertification Convention, articles 3 (a), 10 (2) and 
19(1), Agenda 21, paragraph 23, the Biodiversity Convention, article 8 ( j ) and ILO 
Convention 169 among others.  
5.9.4 The enforcement of environmental regulations in developing countries  
The cases of waterway pollution, oil spillage and poor air quality have been highlighted in this 
research but there is no clear evidence that regulatory agencies have successfully brought an 
action in a civil court in Nigeria. Majority of the victims of environmental pollution have had 
no choice but to settle out of court or received unsatisfactory compensation. The solution to the 
enforcement could be an effective regulation and the host state’s willingness to enforce 
environmental policies rather than focus on economic growth and its challenges but pay little 
attention to environmental law enforcement.  It is therefore pertinent to examine the Nigerian 
enforcement mechanism and regulation under 1999 constitution which is regarded as the basis 
for enforcement power in relation to oil pollution and environmental law.  
Enforcement has been defined as “an authorised exercise of power against a person who has 
not voluntarily complied with an order within the time allowed by the authority making it”.168 
A range of legislative provisions may be adopted to govern the enforcement such as civil 
procedure rules and rules of court to ensure a person is returned into compliance or punished 
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appropriately by the state.  It is argued that enforcement must achieve two things to be effective; 
fairness and deterrence. 169 Fairness can be achieved if it ensures that those who comply and 
respect the law are not at a disadvantage. However, it should also serve as deterrence to those 
who disregard the law and perhaps punish them for breaking the law. Most importantly, 
individual and corporate body must understand that breaking the law or non-compliance could 
result in enforcement. Cases of environmental pollution are highlighted in this chapter and it is 
established that lack of effective environmental regulation against the transnational 
corporations in the oil and gas industry is a threat to the fundamental rights of the local people 
and environment. The Nigerian government has attempted to address the issue but more needs 
to be done as the current mechanism lacks enforcement, it is ineffective and could not protect 
the rights of victims of environmental pollution. In addition, the current regulation fails to 
create any liability for the companies causing environmental pollution.  
5.9.5 The lack of an enforcement mechanism in the host state 
It submitted that under the Agenda of the Nigerian Regulation, civil and criminal liabilities 
were included. For example, the pollution of environment and oil spill arising from oil 
exploration, exploitation and production activities are classed as criminal offences and they can 
be challenged by the host state in the court of law.  However, the provisions have been 
perceived as ineffective due to lack of resources and poor implementation. Tobi added that 
enforcement mechanisms under Nigerian laws are ineffective and weakened because of fraud, 
irregularities and a number of abuses.170Ladan’s few on this point cannot be overlooked. He 
says that the lack of good governance, mismanagement, multiple standards and nonchalance 
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are affecting the enforcement of environmental laws in Nigeria.171 In addition, some cases of 
environmental pollution were not challenged due to lack of funds by the victims of 
environmental damage and available legal aids are for criminal cases and other civil matters 
such as road accidents. Nevertheless, there is a fund for advice and representation for civil 
matters under the s.8 of Legal Aid Act 2011 but it may not be compared to high legal 
representation and status of transnational corporations. For example, the case of Chief Joel 
Anare and others v Shell Petroleum Companies was delayed for 14 years and situations such 
as this may put unnecessary financial pressure on private claimants resulting in cases being 
abandoned due to financial constraints.  
 
Furthermore, the technical rules of procedure have been perceived as a threat to environmental 
claims in Nigeria with a huge impact on judicial enforcement of environmental regulations in 
the country. For example, the requirement of locus standi, may put the local people in a difficult 
situation to bring an action against the transnational corporations as they are the indirect victims 
of environmental pollution. In OrontoDouglas v Shell Petroleum Development Company Ltd. 
& ORS, 172 the plaintiff filed the writ for declaration and injunction to stop the respondents 
from carrying on with the production of natural gas project until the required environmental 
impact assessment has been carried out as stipulated inEnvironmental Impact Assessment 
Decree No. 86 of 1992. The provisions require that the respondents comply with environmental 
Impact Assessment, but the plaintiff was not satisfied that the respondents had complied with 
the requirement hence he brought an action. However, the judge struck out the claim on the 
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ground that the plaintiff has no locus standi to bring the claim, since he was unable to show 
prima facie proof that his right was engaged, or he has suffered any direct injury more than the 
local people and, on the ground that the procedure adopted by the plaintiff was confused.  
It is pertinent here to explain the rule in Nigeria concerning locus standi. The claimant must 
establish enough interest which is peculiar to him personally and the court may not consider 
any other interest that he shares with the public or with members of the association. In addition, 
the locus standi focuses on the person bringing the claim before the court and not on the matter 
he wishes to have decided. Therefore, the concept of locus standi involves the ability of a 
person to institute legal proceeding in a court or tribunal. Flowing from this, the claimant who 
brings an action for damages as a result of environmental misuse must establish that he suffered 
damages as seen in Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Limited v Chief Otoko 
and others.173 This case was instituted in a representative capacity and the Court of Appeal 
rejected the representative’s action and argued that the persons who are to be represented and 
their representatives must have the same interest in the cause of matter. This also obtains in 
Amos v Shell BP Petroleum Development Country Limited174 where an action was also 
brought in a representative capacity for general and special damages. The defendants in this 
case constructed a dam across a navigable creek in the course of their exploration activities in 
Rivers State and an action was brought for damages, claiming that the erection of temporary 
dam had caused flood and obstructed the creek and it has made it difficult for the local 
community to maintain their usual activities as they were unable to pass with or use canoe to 
transport goods to and from the marketplace. The court held that the case was instituted by the 
representative on public nuisance and thereby dismissed the case.  
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In the light of the foregoing, it is also pertinent to examine locus standi position in developed 
countries. 
In the United Kingdom, the common law doctrine of privity of contract, states that no one can 
sue or be sued on a contract to which he is not a party.175 This basic rule was reformed by the 
introduction of the UK Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. This Act has reformed 
the primitive rules and allowed a third party to enforce a term of the contract in certain 
circumstances. The Act provides that: 
 Subject to the provisions of this Act, a person who is not a party to a 
contract (a “third party”) may in his own right enforce a term of the contract 
if- 
(a) the contract expressly provides that he may, or 
(b) subject to subsection (2), the term purports to confer a benefit on him.176 
…The third party must be expressly identified in the contract by name, as a 
member of a class or as answering a particular description but need not be 
in existence when the contract is entered into.”177 
“This section does not confer a right on a third party to enforce a term of the 
contract otherwise than subject to and in accordance with any other relevant 
terms of the contract.178 
 
It is noted from the above provision that there is an exception to English common law doctrine, 
the rule of privity of contracts. The third parties who are not party to a contract but may suffer 
damages or loss because of breach of contract can enforce the term of that contract. However, 
the standing position is not the same on public law and administrative matters. Take for 
example the judicial review. The UK locus standi requires that the claimant has enough interest 
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in a related case to litigation according to the Supreme Act. Section 31 (3) of the Act provides 
that: 
No application for judicial review shall be made unless the leave of the High 
Court has been obtained in accordance with rules of court; and the court 
shall not grant leave to make such an application unless it is considers that 
the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application 
relates.179 
 
The above provision is confirmed in R. (on the application of Greenpeace Ltd) v Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry180where it was established that the public interest factor 
outweighed the general principle application. The applicant in this case challenged the UK 
government’s claim that the result of consultation was favourable to the construction of new 
nuclear plant in the country. Greenpeace argued that the consultation process had been flawed. 
The High Court agreed with Greenpeace and held that government was bound by international 
law to provide full public consultation.181 It was further highlighted that the consultation 
process was very seriously flawed, procedurally unfair and a breach of Greenpeace’s legitimate 
expectation that there would be the fullest consultation. Insufficient information was given to 
the public and that the consultation document was misleading and a declaratory relief was 
granted. Similarly, in R v. Inspectorate of Pollution ex parte Greenpeace,182 The Greenpeace 
sought to bring judicial review against the decision of the Inspectorate of pollution to authorise 
the discharge of radioactive waste from the nuclear plant. Greenpeace argued that the group 
had sufficient interests to bring the claim and claimed that 2500 of its members living in the 
area and likely to be affected by the discharge of radioactive plant. The Court held that 
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applicant’s interest in the matter must be considered as well as the nature of relief and remedy 
sought.R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte World 
Development Movement Ltd183 is a judicial review case in English law where the Movement 
successfully challenged the UK government’s decision to give economic aid to the Pergau 
Dam, arguing that it was not required for the purpose of promoting the development of 
Malaysia. The government argued that the Movement had no sufficient interests to bring a 
judicial review claim. The Movement in response argued that as a charity itself distributing aid, 
the diversion of such huge amount affected its own actions, and this amounted to a greater 
interest. The High Court held that the Foreign Secretary had acted outside of his power, and it 
was unlawful to allocate £234 million towards the funding of a hydroelectric dam, on the 
grounds that the law only allowed him to allocate funds to economically sound projects.  
Additionally, in the United States of America, there are provisions which allow the third party 
to initiate a court action as established in Sieira Club v. Morton184this is a supreme court of the 
United States case relating to standing under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Sierra 
Club filed injunctions against federal officials to stop them from granting licences for the 
development of the Mineral King Valley. The district court granted these injunctions. The U.S. 
Court of Appeals overturned the injunctions on the grounds that the Sierra Club failed to show 
that it would be directly affected by the development of the Mineral King Valleyother than the 
fact that the actions are personally displeasing or distasteful to them185 and therefore did not 
have standing to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act. The appellate court also 
concluded that: A person has standing to seek judicial review under the Administrative 
Procedure Act only if he can show that he himself has suffered or will suffer injury, whether 
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economic or otherwise. In this case, where petitioner asserted no individualised harm to itself 
or its members, it lacked standing to maintain the action.186 However, the Supreme Court 
agreed that the club had not suffered any injury but granted certiorari to review. Nevertheless, 
it is observed from the cases discussed here that the representative and individual may struggle 
to sue if they fail to establish that they have ‘a sufficient interest or a direct link with the matter 
aside the general and common interest’.   
Furthermore, another significant impediment to the enforcement of environmental laws is 
burden of proof and remedies. For environmental laws to be enforced in Nigerian Courts, the 
parties involved must prove their cases in accordance with the law. This requirement applies 
to all litigations, but it is not known whether environmental legislation requires a standard or 
burden of proof to institute an action. In addition, it is not disputed that in criminal law 
particularly in criminal cases the prosecution is required to establish burden of proof as the 
suspect is considered innocent until he is found guilty by the relevant court. On this point Tobi 
posits that it is still debateable whether environmental offences are crimes as predicted under 
the criminal laws. 187 The law is clear on this point. S.32 (4) of National Environmental 
Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (Establishment) Act 2007 (NESREA) 
provides that: 
In a judicial proceeding for an offence under this Act or any regulation made 
under it, the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act or depending on the 
venue, the Criminal Procedure Code shall, with such modification as the 
circumstance may require, apply in respect of such matter to the same extent 
as they apply to the trial offences generally.188 
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It is noted from the above provision that the same procedural requirements of the criminal cases 
would apply to environmental matters before the court. Therefore, the burden of proof must be 
established. However, environmental pollution matters are classed under civil cases and the 
burden of proof under the common law is on the balance of probabilities or preponderance of 
evidence, so the burden is on the claimant according to the provision under s.135-137 of the 
Evidence Act 1990.It was stated under the Act that:  
135.(1) Whoever desires and court to give judgement as to any legal right or 
liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that 
those facts exist. 
(2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the 
burden of proof lies on that person. 
 
S.136. The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who 
would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side 
S.137. (1) In civil cases the burden of first providing the existence or 
nonexistence of a fact lies on the party against whom the judgement of the 
court would be given if no evidence were produced on either side, regard 
being had to any presumption that may arise on the pleadings. 
 
It is observed from the above provisions that a burden of proof must be established and this 
requirement among other things have left the indigenous victims of environmental pollutions 
with limited choice, even some without recourse to court action. It could be argued that the 
current environmental regulatory mechanisms in Nigeria need to be improved to ensure the 
interest of the local people are protected so they do not bear the consequences of oil and gas 
exploration in their region. In addition, it is noted that Nigeria has enacted so many laws to 
minimise the problems of environmental degradation, but the current regulation fails to 
establish environmental liability for oil and gas exploration and development projects. The lack 
of enforcement is another obstacle, the state should ensure that the citizens comply with 
environmental law because having regulation without compliance is as bad as not creating one 
in the first place and the environmental problems would persist. Dr Inocencio’s perspective on 





mechanisms and there is no point of establishing an effective regulation if there is an absence 
of an effective enforcement mechanism.189 It is further noted that the lack of public awareness 
in relation to environmental litigation has a huge impact on enforcement. Thus, the indigenous 
people should be educated and enlightened about their constitutional rights and duties 
particularly on environmental litigation. The case of John Eboige and others v Nigeria 
National Petroleum Corporation190can be cited to buttress this crucial point. The claimants in 
this case failed to obtain justice because they initiated the court action after the time to make 
the claim had lapsed. The lack of awareness of their legal rights had prevented them to sue at 
the appropriate time. Therefore, public should have free access to environmental information 
otherwise the society could be hampered by lack of information and poor knowledge.   
5.10 Conclusions 
This chapter has highlighted certain environmental problems and observed that international 
environmental laws have been enacted, which can minimise the pollution effects if correctly 
enforced. It is also established that both the government and the public would have to contribute 
positively for effective implementation and enforcement of environmental laws. The chapter 
has examined some of the cases of environmental pollution and established in Chief Joel Anare 
and other v Shell Petroleum Companies191 that an environmental damage claim can be 
prolonged for up to 14 years. This unnecessary delay could send a wrong message to the victims 
of pollution and perhaps discourage potential claimants from bringing their claims forward and 
challenge the transnational corporations. In addition, the decision which emanated from this 
case revealed that environmental laws are far from achieving their primary objectives. The 
State should impose obligations on the Court to consider environmental aspects of a case when 
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making decision on pollution cases but awarding damages to the pollution victims would not 
solve the environmental problems. The Polluters on the other hand should be ordered to take 
reasonable steps to protect the environment and the state can create environmental courts with 
technical experts from environmental science who are highly skilled in ecology.  
The matter of public awareness was explored, and it is suggested that the public should be 
enlightened and educated on environmental regulations. The subject of environmental issues 
could be introduced into the school syllabus to enhance the awareness and should be made 
compulsory like mathematics and English language. It is believed that if environmental subject 
is taught at the primary education level, it will create great awareness about the environment.  
The State can also promote awareness among operators and actors in the oil industry, they 
should be well informed of their responsibility on the environment. Ultimately, it is important 
that the government encourage the transnational corporations to protect the rights of local 
people as this move would prevent the likely harm that the local community and their 
environment encounter.  The transnational corporations should also be encouraged to take 
reasonable steps towards maintaining effective environmental management systems and risk 
assessments and ensure they comply with environmental regulations. Petroleum exploration 
activities could be carried out with extra care and consideration should be given to the 
environment. Consequently, keeping ecological balance natural and protecting the 








This concluding chapter has made an attempt to go over the main points discussed in the five 
substantive chapters of the thesis. As the following discussion will point out how the thesis 
adequately dealt with the three main research questions.1 All the research questions have been 
carefully attended to and chapters 1 and 2, through thorough examination of BITs related 
investors’ dispute as well as striking the right balance between the host state and the 
transnational corporations have demonstrated the current structure of the oil and gas contracts.  
It was established in chapter 1 that there is a legal framework which protect foreign investors’ 
interest and their investment in host states territories through BITs. The same legal mechanism 
however failed to balance the needs of the host states and transnational corporations. As 
discussed in chapter 1, international investment treaties have failed to regulate the activities of 
transnational corporations and the review of the literatures in this work has indicated that the 
BITs are one sided, catering for only the investors’ protection.2 Nevertheless, host states have 
successfully challenged the conduct of transnational corporations through arbitration because 
investment treaty arbitration is viewed as public law, it replaces courts with a private model of 
adjudication in matters of public law.3 It is established that Investment Treaty Arbitration (ITA) 
has been reformed; its structure, substance and procedures are geared towards achieving greater 
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coherence by balancing competing human rights and economic interest and values.4 
Petersmann and Franccioni added that the present structure of the ITA coupled with the 
development of substantive norms of international investment law are composed of a more 
balanced approach to resolving problems between competing interests and it has so far proved 
itself as a legitimate system for rights adjudication.5 
The chapter examined some investor/state disputes and it was discovered that some exception 
clauses were incorporated into their agreements which the court regarded as lawful because 
they do not constitute indirect expropriation. This conclusion is supported by outcome of AES 
Summit v Hungary,6 where the tribunal found that Hungary’s enactment of the Electricity Act 
Amendment 2006 did not breach investment standards under the Energy Charter Treaty.  In 
Plama v Bulgaria award,7 the tribunal held that concealment of information amounted to fraud, 
which violated the host state’s domestic law and international law and as a result no protection 
of the Energy Charter Treaty could be granted to the investor and his investment. Going further, 
in Genin v Estonia,8  the tribunal held that Estonia was right to act as a sensible and concerned 
supervisor of the banking sector and in Muhammad Ammar Al Bahloul v Tajikistan,9 the 
tribunal concluded that the state’s temporary failure to issue an exploration licence was not 
considered expropriation unless it could be stablished that the state terminated its contract or it 
has refused to perform its obligation under the contract. In addition, the case of Maffezini v 
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7 (ICSID case No ARB/03/24) Award August 27, 2008. 
8 ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2 Award June 25, 2001. 





Spain10 established that failure to comply with the host state’s law and regulations might 
exclude foreign investors from treaty right to which they would otherwise be entitled. 
Similarly, the tribunal acknowledged in Fraport v Philippines11 that respect for the laws of the 
host state is a critical part of development and held that there was no investment because 
Fraport had violated the law of the host state and as a result the tribunal ruled against Fraport’s 
allegation of breaches by the host state of certain provisions of the BIT and dismissed the case. 
In WDF v Kenya,12 the tribunal held that agreement stained with corruption could not be 
enforced and that bribery is contrary to the international public policy of most countries.  
Whereas, unilateral termination of a petroleum agreement is itself a fundamental breach, as the 
tribunal concluded in Occidental v Ecuador, 13 the principle of proportionality is emphasised 
because it provides that administrative measures should seek to strike the right balance between 
the host state and investor’s investments’ interests.  The tribunal findings in this case affirms 
that the principle of proportionality must be observed in a variety of international law settings 
and it must be applied to potential breaches of BIT’s obligations such as fair and equitable 
treatment obligations. Similarly, the tribunal held in CMS v Argentina14 that provision of the 
BIT had been engaged because Argentina had acted contrary to the investment agreement made 
before its economic crisis in 2001. Consequently, the tribunal held in Saluka v Czech Republic15 
that the fair and equitable standard was breached because of the non-transparent and 
discriminatory way in which the government had acted. 
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In the light of the analysis of the above cases, it is clear that arbitrators are challenging the 
conduct of transnational corporations.  The decisions emanating from the cases analysed in the 
chapter might encourage the host states to raise defences and bring claims regarding investor 
conduct to the tribunal in order to justify their alleged violations of treaty obligations. It is 
observed that investment treaties impose some reciprocal obligations on host states as well as 
foreign investors. Therefore, it could be submitted that the tribunal’s consideration of the 
investor’ obligation was derived and based on international law principles known as the 
principle of good faith, the principle that nobody can benefit from his own wrong, and 
transnational public policy which requires compliance with both domestic and international 
laws. The chapter further pointed out that developing country with a weak judicial and 
regulatory system could emulate Ecuador by reforming their judicial system. Ecuador 
successfully reformed their laws following protracted cases and arbitration hearings with 
Chevron and the realisation that the country suffered from poor and week regulatory system, 
but the country eventually succeeded in swaying some of the court and arbitration rulings to 
their favour.16 
Chapter 2 sought to provide an answer to the second part of the question 1 of the research 
question to what extent can parties’ commitments be altered to ensure the sustenance of 
economic stability? In addressing this, chapter 2 gives general guideline on how the right 
balance may be struck between the host states and transnational corporations. The imbalance 
in oil and gas contracts has been described by Sornarajah as a power-base which seeks to secure 
the rights of business over the rights of people and this underlines the need for an evolution 
from a host state with duties towards the transnational corporations to a host state with rights 
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in relation to the investor.17 The need for a balance is also in consideration of the positive 
impact of foreign companies’ investments in the economies of host states through the transfer 
of technology, expansion of trade, faster productivity growth and higher wages, the training of 
human resources, closing of the knowledge gap and the gap between developing and developed 
states. As the chapter found, one of the most effective ways to strike the right balance is for the 
BITs to focus on rights and responsibilities because one of the disadvantages of bilateral 
treaties is that they have primarily focused on the rights and not on the responsibilities of 
transnational corporations. The case of Metalclad Corp v The United Mexican States18 
examined in the chapter highlighted where the tribunal held that both rights and responsibilities 
are needed to be considered when determining appropriate compensation.  The significant point 
here is that in determining the award, the tribunal only looked at the Metaclad’s rights and 
investment but ignored its obligation to clean up the hazardous material which formed the basis 
of the original agreement. Metalclad case is therefore one example of the failure of 
transnational corporations to live up to expectations and fulfil their responsibilities. 
The principle of non-discrimination was thoroughly examined in chapter 2 and findings have 
shown that one of the dangers of the BITs is that, it introduced what Joseph regarded as reverse 
discrimination. He argues that transnational corporations are being treated well, with greater 
protection, than locally incorporated firms19 Nicolas posits that the principle of non-
discrimination constitutes a cornerstone in different fields of international law; it covers a wide 
range of area and forbids indirect discrimination. Some cases relating to non-discrimination 
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have indicated that a commitment to non-discrimination or equality remain a critical area of 
international trade law. Therefore, in order to strike the right balance, the host state should 
ensure they enter into BITs with utmost priority given to discrimination issues. A review of a 
number of nationalisation cases in this chapter revealed that in order to justify the taking of 
foreigners’ properties, certain criteria must be satisfied. The existence of a ‘national interest’ 
or ‘public need’, the related expropriation must not be a discriminatory one and the 
expropriating state must be ready to pay adequate compensation as established in the Libyan 
American Oil Co (LIAMCO) v Government of the Libyan Arab Republic. 20. In this case, the 
tribunal held that the Libyan government took several measures and those measures were 
purely discriminatory nationalisation, illegal and wrongful. It is evident from LIAMCO that 
transnational corporations are also concerned about discrimination, particularly when host 
states unilaterally enact law that will prevent them from carrying on their business activities.  
The chapter further established that the step towards striking the right balance includes 
transparency, that is, the legal framework for the business activities between the transnational 
corporations and host states are readily apparent and that important decisions that may affect 
their dealings should be traceable back to the initial legal framework. Thus, any attempt from 
either party to violate their obligations can be detected. The tribunal emphasised in Tecmed v 
Mexico21 that a state must act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally 
transparent in its relationship with the foreign investor. Similarly, in Pope and Talbot’s case,22 
the tribunal held that Canada was liable to the investor for the denial of a fair and equitable 
treatment under the treaty. However, the tribunal held in Champion Trading v Egypt ICSID23 
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that the host state may not be found to violate any rules if regulations are publicised and 
transnational corporations are made aware beforehand of any rules that govern their business 
activities. It is therefore understood from this chapter that transparency is integral to the 
maximum protection of investments and accordingly, developing countries should endeavour 
to have a legal mechanism in place to give room for full transparency and investor participation. 
Consequently, it is submitted that transnational corporations should also strive to disclose 
publicly their dealings with the host state government, so that the citizens of the developing 
state will be able to hold their government accountable.  
Consequently, this chapter attempted to fill the legal loophole in relation to transnational 
corporation as a subject of international law. The chapter, through examination of literature in 
this area highlighted some crucial points to be aware of. It was argued that transnational 
corporations are not subject to international law because some authors consider that, in the 
current stage of international law, the international personality of transnational corporations 
remain an open question.24 However, the chapter tried to identify some of the international 
instruments that focus on the activities of transnational corporations and asserted that there are 
two ways to investigate this; through binding treaties such as Bilateral Agreement and 
International Labour Organisation (ILO Conventions) and other measures or national laws 
which focus on the activities of the transnational corporations. But the chapter concluded after 
thorough examination, that the provision of ILO Declaration is voluntary in nature and is 
intended to serve as a guide to transnational corporations, workers and host states. Thus, 
transnational corporations may decide not to abide by it because sanctions are not imposed on 
them. Going further, the chapter examined other international mechanism such as the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 2011, the Global Compacts 2000 and the 
                                                          





Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2011 (OECD). It is also established 
that guiding principles25 are not binding on transitional corporations but embody certain human 
rights norms that are legally binding on them under national law or international law. Whereas, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have expressed their dissatisfaction and claimed that 
Guiding Principles imposed non-binding obligations on business and described it as an 
emphasis on processes at the expense of substance.26 Consequently, the international Court of 
Justice established corporate legal personality and legal responsibility in the Barcelona 
Traction,27 but emphasised that ‘only the company, which was endowed with legal personality, 
could take action in respect of matters that were of a corporate character’. Similarly, in 
AhmodouSadio Diallo, the Court of Justice upheld the decision of Barcelona Traction and 
added that “in determining whether a company possesses independent and distinct legal 
personality, international law looks to the rules of the relevant domestic law.”28 Thus, it was 
established that the question whether the transnational corporations have international 
personality requires a case-by-case examination of the relevant appropriate norms of 
international law and Vincent on this point asserts that a limited and derived personality may 
be conferred only by customary law, treaties and internationalised contracts usually concluded 
between a host state and a corporation and mostly in oil and gas industries.29 
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Findings from the chapter have shown that oil and gas contracts reflect rights and obligations 
of the parties to the agreement, the host state and transnational corporations and in some cases 
the contracts spell out some unique clauses stating that the contract is governed by international 
law as well as arbitration clauses in case of a disputes. In addition, this fact was confirmed by 
the tribunal in Calasiatic v Libyan Arab Republic30 as analysed in the chapter that: 
In other words, stating that a contract between a state and a private person falls 
within the international legal order means that for the purposes of interpretation 
and performance of the contract, it should be recognised that a private contracting 
party has specific international capacities. But, unlike a state, the private person 
has only a limited capacity and his quality as a subject of international law does 
enable him only to invoke, in the field of international law, the rights which he 
drives from the contracts.31 
 
The chapter pointed out that the court’s interpretation was shared and supported by many 
literatures and Portmann posits that in arbitrator’s view, then the choice of international law as 
the proper law of contract suggested that the parties to the contract as in the above case were 
bestowed with limited international personality for the purposes of the contract. Thus, it is 
submitted that petroleum contracts can be relied upon to regulate the conduct of transnational 
corporations at national level.  
Consequently, the chapter examined the various ways in which Nigerian domestic laws have 
impacted on transnational corporations. Firstly, the foreign companies were required to be 
reincorporated locally by virtue of S.54 of the Nigerian Companies Act 1968 in order to bring 
transnational corporations under the ambit of the law. However, evidence from the cases 
explored in this chapter have revealed that the provision which required that transnational 
corporations should be reincorporated with the aim of bringing them under the ambit of Nigeria 
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domestic law has not achieved that goal because it is an established law in Nigeria that a 
holding company and its subsidiaries are distinct and separate legal entities.32 It is also an 
established law that a subsidiary is not regarded as an agent of the parent company but classed 
as a separate legal person.33 The landmark case of Akpan v Shell34 has proved otherwise. Akpan 
case shows that parent company can be held liable for the wrongful acts of their foreign 
subsidiaries. The court held that there is ‘an international trend to hold parent companies liable 
in their home state for injurious acts of their subsidiaries.’ Secondly, financial disclosure was 
made compulsory for the company under Nigeria Companies and Allied Matters Act 1994 
(CAMA).35 This moved is perceived as an important measure to control and promote Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR). However, a careful examination of literatures has indicated that 
CAMA together with previous Nigeria company law have been infective and unable to address 
the problems of transnational corporations, but some human rights issues have shown great 
development in that aspect. Therefore, the chapter concluded that Gbemre v Shell’s case 36 was 
the case that signalled the possibility of using human rights provisions for the purpose of 
checking transnational corporation activities in Nigeria. Prior to this case Nigerian Judges 
regularly honoured the economic benefits of the country over human rights protection.  
It is observed from the analysis of various petroleum agreements in chapter 3 that the oil 
agreements in general have helped the host sates to uphold and benefit from the United Nations 
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General Assembly Resolution 1962. One of the research questions is to ascertain the best oil 
and gas contract type for development and financial purposes and chapter 3 of the thesis 
considered this in depth and the findings have shown that through oil and gas contracts, the 
host states have taken control over their natural resources. This was a departure from the era 
when exclusive rights to explore and exploit oil were granted to the transnational corporations 
for 75 years with freedom to control exploration activities under the old concessions. Nigeria 
was once a victim of old concessions as findings from this research revealed that Nigeria 
awarded a concession contract to Shell D’ Arcy in November 1937 to explore, produce and 
market petroleum throughout Nigeria without limitation in terms of duration and geographical 
location. The chapter discovered that many concessions between developing states and 
transnational corporations have failed to produce anticipated gains for the developing states 
because the agreement were constructed as traditional matters of public policy owing to their 
economic focus and development operations. Therefore, many of the old concessions have 
been unilaterally changed when the states became aware that the old concession agreements, 
they had signed were mostly favourable to the transnational corporations. They had given 
transnational corporations rights to search, to extract and exploit in exchange for royalty 
payment which were often little by comparison with the transnational corporation gains. The 
old concessions were regarded as unbalanced because of their long duration37 and the large 
geographical area involved and as a result, the host states challenged the concessions following 
the decolonisation movement in the 1960s. The states were capitalising on the provisions of 
Principle of Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources (PSNR) contained in the 1962 
Resolution, and it was established that the main drive of PSNR was to promote the economic 
independence of developing states through the nationalisation of natural resources previously 
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under the control of transnational corporations. Similarly, the emergence of the Organisation 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the expropriation after nationalisations, the 
renegotiation of contracts and the creation of the international Economic Order have made it 
possible to remove many of the unfavourable features associated with old concession. An in-
depth examination of modern concessions has proven that the modern contracts have 
rebalanced issues that were regarded as excessive in the traditional concession. 
Nigeria eventually adopted joint ventures (JV) model and is primarily used in onshore and 
shallow water operations but the evaluation of its features has revealed some of the associated 
problems with Nigerian JV. The poor funding due to imbalance in financial capacity and it is 
a common problem among joint ventures partners. Transnational corporations may be 
financially sound, but the host state has other pressures on its resources and could not meet up 
with the cash call requirement under joint ventures. The findings have shown that there is 
downside of sharing risks cost with transnational corporations under JV, it makes the host state 
a responsible and direct participant in the extraction of natural resources. It comes with a huge 
responsibility such as liability for environmental damage and the principles of international 
environmental law have established that those who cause harm to environment should pay for 
the damage resulting from their activities. Therefore, the host state participation in joint venture 
projects may have adverse impact on the application of necessary laws to deal with pollution 
crisis. In addition, one of the identified problems is the challenges from the host community. 
The local community agitate and demand for the development programmes and it has led to 
several disruptions and explorations activities have been affected as a result. Consequently, as 
the oil and gas industry are expanding, acreages are being allocated in deep offshore areas 
requiring more funding and advanced technology. Therefore, exploring other options is 
perceived as the right solution. This factor amongst other things led to adoption of PSA in 





Brazilian government believes that it is the best option for the newly discovered sub-salt 
reservoir and preferred it over the modern concessions.  
Service Contracts are extensively evaluated in this chapter. It is observed that this type of oil 
and gas contract confers greater control on the host state and its representative National Oil 
Company. On one hand, a service contract allows the host state to retain the full control of 
exploration activities being produced on its territory, while the transnational corporation on the 
other hand carried out exploration activities with the anticipation of getting paid for the services 
rendered to the host state.  Service contracts have over the years made it possible for the host 
state to acquire the transnational corporations’ capital and expertise without transferring 
production ownership and oil field to the transnational corporations. However, in comparison 
with the PSA the two contracts have some similarities, the transnational corporations can 
recover production costs through the sale of produced oil in these two contracts and it is known 
as cost oil under PSA.  Going further, both contract types allow easy access to transnational 
corporations’ finances, technology and highly skilled personnel. Consequently, the most 
notable difference with PSA is that the host state becomes the property owner of all equipment 
and installation used in exploration activities. This factor makes PSA standout because it is 
significant for developing countries which are struggling to fund or invest in petroleum 
exploration activities themselves, so that they may use the retained installations to build an 
independent oil and gas industry. Ultimately, a careful examination of the features of all the 
contract types presented under chapter 3, it appears that PSA has many features which makes 
it standout and preferable among stakeholders than other types of oil contracts in the industry. 
PSA features appear to be extremely beneficial and advantageous to those host state with very 
limited resources to invest. It is also a good choice for the host sates where reserves were large 
like Nigeria, Brazil and other developing countries that are willing to enhance their 





for the host states’ citizens as clearly indicted in in different legislation examined in this 
research. The inclusion of Local Content (LC) under PSA has made it a compulsory for the 
transnational corporations to source locally a percentage of labour, goods and services as part 
of the conditions for being allowed to explore and produce oil in their country. 
Chapter 3 examined a number of related oil contracts and it is observed that the oil and gas 
exploration projects are associated with risks from exploration to production and unanticipated 
change of circumstances may occur to justify non-performance of a party’s obligation under a 
petroleum contract. Therefore, chapter 4 in an effort to deal with one of the research questions, 
the causes of imbalance in the oil and gas contract first explored the risks associated with oil 
contracts and analysed some of the important clauses in an exploration and exploitation 
agreement. It is noted from the chapter that political unrest, revolutions, wars and embargoes 
amongst other thing are causes of interruptions in majority of oil and gas producing countries 
and it is important to reduce some of these risks.  Thus, Chapter 4 suggested various ways in 
which the associated risks can be minimised. One of the possible means is by obtaining political 
risk insurance from Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), a member of the 
World Bank Group. The role of this institution is to promote and protect transnational 
corporations against commercial risks in developing countries. Risk can be shared by involving 
the host state through its national oil company in the management of the project while 
demonstrating that they understand the host states’ economic and social problems. 
Additionally, the transnational corporation may enter into a loan agreement with a project 
lender with a promise that repayment will be made from the profits generated through the 
exploration project. The parties may also consider inserting a number of clauses in oil and gas 
contracts so that they will be able to share future risks among themselves. An examination of 
relevant clauses such as a stabilisation clause, renegotiation clause, force majeure clause, 





clauses from transnational corporations perspectives that these clauses contain certain risk-
mitigation provisions to protect investment from likely risk such as expropriation, 
nationalisation and other circumstances on which the host state can capitalise to impose new 
law on foreign investors and their investment as established in the following cases analysed in 
the chapter; Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company v. The Government of the Libyan Arab 
Republic,38 where the arbitrator pointed out that ‘the recognition by international law of the 
right to nationalise is not sufficient ground to empower a State to disregard its commitments, 
because the same law also recognises the power of a State to commit itself internationally’. 
Similarly, in the Government of the State of Kuwait v American Independent Oil Company 
(Aminoil), Adhoc Award,39 the arbitrator found that there was breach of the stabilisation clauses 
and held that the stabilisation clauses rendered expropriation unlawful. These cases reaffirm 
that stabilisation clauses cannot be overlooked, it must be honoured otherwise the expropriation 
will be unlawful. As noted in this research that if the host state willingly agreed and inserted 
stabilisation clauses in the exploration agreement, then the host state will be bound by the terms 
of agreement not to unilaterally change the law that would breach its obligations under the 
contract. Additionally, a careful examination of renegotiation clauses has revealed that 
inserting the clause in exploration agreement will help the parties to keep their investment 
relationship alive and ensures the right balance is struck when the circumstances changed, and 
that change can be justified. Therefore, a renegotiation clause can be relied upon to invite other 
party to resolve the problems. 
In relation to the arbitration clauses, it was discussed that arbitration clauses cannot be excluded 
even if the contracts are carefully drafted by the parties. The finding of the research could help 
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contracting parties to identify the associated risks with exploration agreement and what the 
parties can do to minimise it. The majority of the host states have opted for arbitration for 
settlement of disputes including Nigeria even though tax related disputes are not arbitrable in 
Nigeria as pointed out in this research that Nigeria courts have applied a number of principles 
to consider the arbitrability of tax related disputes. The chapter examined the Statoil (Nigeria) 
Limited & Anor v. Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) & Anor40. Here the court argued 
that if the transnational corporations were successful with arbitration proceedings, the FIRS 
would be affected and loses income with arbitral award. The significant of the court ruling in 
this case is that it showed how judges are deviating from their primary function which is to 
apply and interpret the law. They have attempted through this case to create new law and the 
only justification was that subsequent arbitral award would impede FIRS constitutional and 
statutory power to collect tax. A review of Nigerian cases discussed under the arbitration 
clauses may lead to the conclusion that Nigerian courts have applied a number of principles to 
consider the arbitrability of tax related disputes. It was furthermore discovered that the court 
decision was not stated in any of the Nigeria statutes not even in the relevant Act of parliament 
on arbitration matters. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 2004, which provides that ‘a court 
shall not intervene in arbitral proceedings in any matter governed by this Act except where so 
provided in this Act’41  The deviation from an Act of Parliament means that arbitration in the 
country cannot be predicted since judges can overturn the decision as they wish. Accordingly, 
transnational corporations should be aware of the associated risk with Nigerian arbitration 
clauses as only commercial transaction disputes are subject to arbitration despite the provisions 
under Arbitration and Conciliation Act 2004.   
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Consequently, chapter 5 examined environmental principles and the extent to which they have 
been implemented by the host states and cited Nigeria as a case study. It is established that 
Nigeria has enacted numerous pieces of environmental legislation to protect the interest of 
transnational corporations from burden that such Acts might impose on the transnational 
corporations and some of these laws were thoroughly examined. The chapter highlighted some 
of the challenges facing environmental principles and their implementation.42 Evidence from 
the chapter has shown that victims of oil spills resulting from acts of vandalism by third parties 
are not protected. They could not be held liable for the wrongful act of a third party. Section 
11 of Oil and Pipelines Act, 1956 was criticised because it revealed an imbalance between 
environmental and economic considerations. The Act exempts the transnational corporations 
from paying compensation in the event of oil-spill incident and compensation would be payable 
to the victims if injuries occurred as a result of direct activity of the oil company and transitional 
corporations have capitalised on this loophole and used it as a defence. This provision shows a 
degree of unfairness because the law failed to consider the case of corrosion failure and leaking 
of pipeline that is unrelated to sabotage and the grievances of innocent victims of sabotage 
which resulted from oil-spillage and pollution are not being catered for. Thus, the law needs to 
be reviewed and it could prove to be problematic if left unattended. The chapter therefore, 
pointed out that this Act offered maximum protection for the transnational corporations and 
their business interest. Similarly, it is established that Nigeria’s subsequent legislation, 
Petroleum Drilling and Production, 1969, also failed because there was no provision to deal 
with cases of non-compliance and its provisions were perceived as ineffective as a result. The 
Act was criticised for the lack of transparency by stipulating that detailed information obtained 
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from licenses be kept confidential. Above all, the Act lacked enforcement mechanism and 
cannot be enforced.  
Furthermore, the provisions of Oil In Navigable waters Act, 1968 were thoroughly analysed 
and the findings revealed that there was no provision for victims of oil spills like Oil and 
Pipelines Act, 1956 mentioned above. It allowed oil discharge if the polluter can establish that 
the discharge was to safe life, to secure the vessel and to prevent damage to vessels. The chapter 
pointed out that discharge of oil from vessel could be managed by effective maintenance, 
human errors should not be a defence for polluters and position of the law should be clearly 
explained, if vessel operators are unable to fulfil their environmental obligations. Therefore, 
leakage of the oil into the water due to improper maintenance should not be accepted as a 
measure of self-defence. It was suggested that Nigeria could borrow good practice from the 
UK after careful examination of section 6, UK Prevention of Oil Pollution Act, 1971. UK Act 
has robust system in place, it provided for defences as Nigeria but clearly explain the 
circumstances when the defence may not be relied upon and such vital provisions were absent 
from Nigeria Oil In Navigable Water Act. Nigeria can emulate the UK by introducing a 
provision to deal with discharging of oil into water; the law should also address fouling in the 
sea from oil discharge as prohibited by the UK Law and to have a provision for non-
compliance. Measures such as a fine or summary convictions can be introduced into the law 
and enforcement may be facilitated through effective regulations. 
Chapter 5 further compared Nigerian environmental law to Norway’s Petroleum Act, 1996 and 
it is discovered that the Act is based on rule of strict liability. Offshore oil exploration activities 
are carried out in a way that would safeguard the environment, health and wellbeing of 
Norwegians. A careful examination of its provisions showed that no consideration of any fault 
with the exception and a reduced liability in certain situation such as natural disaster, an act of 





of liability arising out of exploration and exploitation activities including compensation are 
appropriately dealt with by the national law as discussed under 7-3 which stated that the 
licensee is liable for pollution damage irrespective of any fault. It is also observed that the 
petroleum policy in Norway is the same as liability regime and that has contributed positively 
into the country’s success. Comparing Norwegian’s provision to Nigerian Oil in Navigable 
water Act, it is noted that the monetary fine for violation of environmental law in Nigeria is 
inadequate and the measures have rendered the law ineffective.43 It is therefore suggested that 
Nigeria could follow Norway and emulate its good practice and make violation of its 
environmental law a punishable offence regardless off the cause. The fine of N2000 could be 
replaced with a tougher sanction such as revocation or suspension of the licence, heavy fine 
and perhaps imprisonment. The current measures are far from achieving their goals as 
highlighted in this research, the loopholes in Nigerian environmental laws have allowed the 
transnational corporations operating in the country to violate the regulations and manipulate 
the policy. Therefore, the government in Nigeria should ensure the provisions of the laws 
address issues of liability and meet international best standards as seen in Norway. 
The findings so far have been meant to help in a better understanding of element of research 
question, the extent in which the principles of international environmental law have been 
utilised at a state level and whether developing countries have been able to overcome the 
pressure from the transnational corporations on the issue of environmental law. As it was found 
in chapter 5 that the lack of enforcement of environmental law was one of the most common 
problems facing the developing countries, and Nigeria in particular where the law failed to 
provide for strict liability for violation of environmental law. It was also shown that the lack of 
governmental initiative and commitment in curbing environmental problems arising out of 
                                                          





exploration activities has indicated that Nigerian government preferred economic growth over 
tackling environmental problems. It is not disputed that the economic development of Nigeria 
is dependent on the way the natural resources are managed. Therefore, the research has 
suggested that the government needs to show initiative and willingness to strike a balance 
between the country’s economic growth and environmental needs by way of regulations and 
policies. In the same way, it was found that the lack of public awareness about environmental 
laws and policies is another major factor significantly affecting the implementation of 
environmental law. As pointed out in the thesis that the lack of awareness could lead to reckless 
environmental behaviour such as vandalism, pipeline sabotage, kidnapping of oil workers and 
a serious deterioration in the relationship between the transnational corporation, the host state 
and the host community could result in such event. Ultimately, the public need to be informed 
and people should be given access to relevant environmental information as doing so would 
create public awareness.  
As seen above the 5 chapters of this thesis have addressed the stated aims of the research as 
well as the research questions raised. The researcher observed that there is a dearth of research 
work and literature focusing specifically on oil and gas contracts, and as a result, there are 
numerous gaps and challenges in the area of oil contracts, particularly on the negative impacts 
of such contracts on the host states. In an attempt to narrow this gap, the research analysed the 
dynamics of the legal and regulatory framework of the oil and gas industry and the ever 
changing contract types and nature, especially in developing countries. In achieving this goal 
of the research, three research questions were raised, namely: what is the current structure of 
oil contracts and to what extent can parties’ commitment be altered to ensure the sustenance of 
economic stability?  Which contract type is the best for development and financial purposes, 
and finally, what are the causes of imbalance in the oil contract and to what extent have the 





developing countries have been able to overcome the pressures from transnational corporations 
on the issue of environmental law?  
In resolving the issues raised, four types of oil and gas contracts44 and the elements of these 
contracts with the way they are drafted and interpreted in different jurisdictions, as well as the 
issues that States struggle with in formulating contracting policies, were addressed, with 
specific focus in the Nigerian jurisdiction. 
The researcher observed that international investment treaties have failed to regulate the 
activities of TNCs, and the review of literature in this thesis has indicated that the BITs are one 
sided, catering for only the investors’ protection. Notwithstanding, this research revealed that 
host States have successfully challenged the conduct of TNCs through arbitration and/or 
Investment Treaty Arbitration. Furthermore, to ensure the sustenance of economic stability or 
maintain the interest of host States and the TNCs in any contract, BITs must strike a balance 
between the rights and responsibilities of TNCs. It is submitted that a substantial adherence to 
arbitration as a means of dispute resolution, and the striking of balance in the drafting of BITs 
to represent the rights of TNCs as well as their responsibilities to the host states, will 
constructively resolve major challenges in the area of oil contracts, particularly the mitigation 
of the negative impacts of such contracts on the host states, which is the primary aim of this 
research. 
It is further concluded, having regard to the research questions raised in this thesis, that the 
Joint Venture (JV) model is one of the best, and that despite the financial burden it places on 
the host States, the JV makes the host States a responsible and direct participant in the 
extraction of natural resources. However, since this research is aimed at bridging the gaps in 
the nature of oil contracts that will addresses the challenges faced in host States, this research 
                                                          





recommended the Production Sharing Agreement or Contract as the best, in that in PSA, host 
States retain full control of exploration activities in a manner that TNCs carry out exploration 
activities with the anticipation of getting paid by the host States.  
It is observed that whilst it is suggested that arbitration clauses in oil contracts are more 
favourable for both TNCs and host States, it is pertinent to note that tax related issues within 
such contracts cannot form the subject matter of arbitration in Nigeria. In this vein, the 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act may be amended to accommodate tax related issues, and/or 
TNCs and host States may adopt Rules of other arbitral institutions as governing law. 
It is concluded that the numerous and extant laws in the protection of the Nigerian environment 
should be reviewed and environmental activities should be carried out in a way that will 
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